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1Introduction
This thesis contains five chapters that contribute to macroeconomics and macroeco-
nometrics. The first line of research in this dissertation, chapters 2-4, studies the role
of producer heterogeneity for macroeconomics. This dissertation shows how hetero-
geneity matters for both business cycles and cross-country income differences. The
second line of research, chapters 5-6, studies time series models, in particular vector
autoregressions. These models are widely used in business cycle research including
the work in my first line of research.
Chapter 2 contributes to the business cycle literature. Following the Great Reces-
sion, a wide range of business cycle research has emphasized the role of investment.
This includes much of the uncertainty literature and the literature on financial fricti-
ons. A defining characteristic of investment is time to build, which is the time an
investing firm needs to wait for delivery of ordered capital goods. In Chapter 2, I
examine the role of time to build for business cycles. While existing business cycle
models assume constant time to build, I document that time to build is volatile and
largest during recessions. Motivated by this finding, I develop a heterogeneous firms
general equilibrium model in which time to build fluctuates exogenously. In the mo-
del, investment is partially irreversible. The longer time to build, the less frequently
firms invest, and the less firm investment reflects firm productivity. As a result, an
increase in time to build worsens the allocation of capital across firms and decreases
aggregate productivity. In the calibrated model, a shock increasing time to build by
one month lowers investment by 2% and output by 0.5%. Structural vector autore-
gressions corroborate the quantitative importance of time to build shocks.
2 | 1 Introduction
The next chapter studies business cycles as well. Chapter 3, which is joint work
with Ariel Mecikovsky, contributes to the uncertainty literature. Various measures of
uncertainty are countercyclical and there is ample evidence that uncertainty shocks
are contractionary. In addition, a large number of structural macroeconomic models
have been proposed to study various transmission channels of uncertainty shocks. In
Chapter 3, we ask which of the proposed channels are empirically important for the
transmission of uncertainty shocks. Exploiting highly disaggregated industry-level
data from the US, we examine the empirical relevance of several transmission me-
chanisms. To this end, we study models with factor adjustment frictions, nominal
ridigities, and financial frictions. We provide testable implications of these models
based on the interaction between the severity of a friction and the job flows response
to uncertainty shocks. Empirically, uncertainty shocks lower job creation and raise
job destruction in the aggregate and in more than 80% of industries. We show that
these responses are significantly magnified by the severity of financial frictions in
a given industry, in line with the model-based findings. We do not find supportive
evidence for the other transmission channels.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on macroeconomic development. Develop-
ment accounting shows that a large share of the cross-country income differences
remains unexplained by differences in physical and human capital intensity, which
suggests an important role for aggregate total factor productivity. One explanation
for these differences in total factor productivity builds on to the observation that firm
productivity tends to be more dispersed in less developed economies. The idea is that
resources are misallocated across producers and reallocating them would boost ag-
gregate productivity. In Chapter 4, Ariel Mecikovsky, Christian Bayer, and I ask whet-
her differences in micro-level factor productivities should be understood as a result of
frictions in technology choice. Using plant and firm-level data from Chile, Colombia,
Germany, and Indonesia, we document that the bulk of all productivity differences is
persistent even within industries and related to highly persistent differences in the
capital-labor ratio. This suggests a cost of adjusting this ratio. In fact, a model with
such friction in technology choice can explain our findings. At the same time, the
loss in productive efficiency from this friction is modest in the sense that eliminating
it would increase aggregate productivity by 3-5%.
| 3
Chapter 5 and 6 primarily contribute to time series econometrics. Time series
econometrics is at the core of applied macroeconomic research and structural vec-
tor autoregressions are among the most widely used models. A reduced-form vector
autoregressive (VAR) model is a multivariate time series model that is based on the
notion that every model variable depends on its own lags as well as the lags of every
other model variable. A structural VAR model combines the reduced-form VARmodel
with additional theoretical restrictions to identify uncorrelated structural shocks. If
these restrictions are sufficiently strong, they point-identify a unique structural VAR
model. Imposing weaker restrictions only yields set-identification. Based on a joint
project with Bulat Gafarov and Josè Luis Montiel Olea, Chapter 5 and 6 examine
set-identified structural VAR models. Chapter 5 studies models that impose equality
and/or inequality restrictions on a single shock, e.g. a monetary policy shock. The
paper proposes a computationally convenient algorithm to evaluate the smallest and
largest feasible value of the structural impulse response, e.g. the response of GDP one
year after a monetary policy shock. We further show under which conditions these
values are directionally differentiable and propose delta-method inference for the
set-identified structural impulse response. We apply our method to set-identify the
effect of unconventional monetary policy shocks.
In Chapter 6 we study models that impose equality and/or inequality restricti-
ons on multiple shocks. The projection region is the collection of structural impulse
responses compatible with the vectors of reduced-form parameters contained in a
Wald ellipsoid. We show that the projection region has both frequentist coverage and
robust Bayesian credibility. To address the possibility that projection inference is con-
servative, we propose a feasible calibration algorithm, which achieves exact robust
Bayesian credibility of the desired credibility level, and, additionally, exact frequen-
tist coverage under differentiability assumptions.
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2Time to Build and the Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
Capital goods are complex and manufactured to the specific needs of an investing
firm. For example, an assembly line consists of many elements that need to fit toget-
her; think of conveyor belts, robotic arms working along these belts, and the concrete
foundation that supports the machines. Further, an assembly line needs to fit the spe-
cific good it produces. The complexity and specificity of capital cause a time gap
between the order of capital goods and their delivery. This time gap is commonly re-
ferred to as time to build and is assumed constant in modern business cycle theory.¹
My paper first documents substantial variation in time to build, with peak values
in recessions. Second, I ask whether exogenous fluctuations in time to build are of
first-order importance for business cycles.
To address this question, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium mo-
del. Firms in my model face persistent shocks to their own productivity. Their invest-
ment is partially irreversible. The market for capital goods is characterized by search
frictions, which imply time to build. Variations in time to build immediately result
from changes in this friction. Calibrating the model to US manufacturing data, I find
that time to build fluctuations are quantitatively important. A one month increase in
time to build lowers investment by 2% and output by 0.5%.
¹While Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume four quarters time to build, the standard assumption
in real business cycle models quickly shifted to one quarter, see Prescott (1986) for example.
6 | 2 Time to Build and the Business Cycle
A lengthening in time to build is contractionary. This is due to two channels.
First, later delivery of outstanding investment orders, as follows from longer time to
build, mechanically reduces contemporaneous investment and thus production. Se-
cond, and this channel is both novel and quantitatively central, longer time to build
worsens the allocation of capital across firms. While the efficient allocation dictates
that more productive firms use more capital, longer time to build weakens the align-
ment between capital and productivity. At the core of the mechanism, later delivery
of an investment order affects the ex-ante productivity forecasts for the periods the
investment good is used as well as the associated forecast uncertainties. In turn, firms
invest less frequently and, if they invest, their investment reacts less to their contem-
poraneous productivity. A lengthening of time to build therefore means capital is less
well aligned with firms’ productivity, meaning aggregate productivity is lower and so
are output, investment, and consumption.
To measure time to build, I use the US Census M3 survey of manufacturing firms.
The Census provides publicly available time series for order backlog and shipment
in the non-defense equipment goods sector since 1968. These time series allow me
to estimate time to build as the time span new capital good orders remain unfilled
in capital producers’ order books. I document that time to build exhibits substantial
variation. It fluctuates between three and nine months. Time to build tends to be
largest at the end of recession periods.²
The model I develop is a real business cycle model. Households consume and sup-
ply labor. The model distinguishes between firms that supply capital and firms that
demand capital. On the capital demand side, there are firms that produce consump-
tion goods combining labor with specific capital. To invest in specific capital, they
need to hire an engineering firm that devises a blueprint for the investment project.
Using the blueprint, the engineering firm searches for a capital supplier to produce
the required capital good. Production takes place when engineering firm and capital
supplier are matched and goods are delivered at the end of the period. Shocks to the
matching technology cause fluctuations in time to build. These shocks may be seen
as shortcut for changes in the capital supply network, which make it more difficult
² This paper is not the first to document the countercyclicality of the backlog ratio, see, e.g. Nale-
waik and Pinto (2015). To the best of my knowledge, however, my paper is the first to relate fluctua-
tions in the backlog ratio to time to build in the context of modern business cycle models.
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to supply the required components. The model further features lumpy firm-level in-
vestment in line with the micro-level evidence on capital adjustment. The lumpiness
arises because investment is partially irreversible.
To evaluate the quantitative importance of shocks to the matching technology, I
calibrate the model to US data. The strategy is to jointly target moments of the inves-
tment rate distribution and aggregate fluctuations in time to build. In the calibrated
model, shocks to thematching technology that raise time to build by onemonth cause
a sharp 2% drop in investment and a more gradual drop in output that peaks after six
quarters at 0.5%. I show that the direct effects of later delivery explain the short-term
responses while increased capital misallocation explain nearly all of the persistent re-
sponses. Misallocation endogenously lowers measured aggregate productivity. Using
the calibrated model, I back out a time series of shocks to the matching technology
that explain the measured time to build fluctuations. The model predicts that these
shocks account for a third of the decline in output and investment during the early
1990s recession and the Great Recession.
To solve the model, I build on the algorithms in Campbell (1998), Reiter (2009)
andWinberry (2016a). The conceptual idea is to combine global projection with local
perturbation solution methods. Compared to Winberry (2016a), the model in this
paper is computationally more involved because the idiosyncratic state additionally
consists of outstanding capital good orders. Hence, I show that the algorithms can
be applied to solve more involved firm heterogeneity models.
To reassess the results of my business cycle model, I use time series techniques to
investigate the importance of time to build shocks. In particular, I fit an eight-variable
vector autoregression (VAR) including macroeconomic aggregates, prices, and time
to build. To be conservative, I restrict the identified shocks to matching technology
to contemporaneously only affect time to build. The restriction also implies that all
other shocks may affect time to build contemporaneously.³
The results of the structural VAR corroborate the quantitative findings of my busi-
ness cycle model. I find that adverse shocks to matching technology significantly and
persistently lower GDP, investment, and consumption. The identified shock explains
more than 20% of the forecast error variance of GDP and consumption. The impulse
³ The results are robust to the alternative restriction that only shocks to matching technology affect
all variables in the VAR contemporaneously.
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response functions (IRFs) of output and investment are of similar magnitude as the
IRFs in the business cycle model. Moreover, the forecast error variance of time to
build explained by the identified shock is almost 50% and the identified shocks are
uncorrelated with conventional direct measures of business cycle shocks (e.g., pro-
ductivity, monetary policy, and tax shocks). This lends support to my business cycle
model’s assumption of exogenous shocks directly affecting time to build. I further
show that my results are robust to relaxing the equality restrictions of the structural
VAR by flexible elasticity bounds, using the methods suggested in Gafarov, Meier,
and Montiel Olea (2016).
Related literature
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, this paper contributes to the litera-
ture studying the macroeconomic implications of lumpy investment. There is ample
evidence for investment lumpiness, see Doms and Dunne (1998), and structural ex-
planations are investment irreversibilities or fixed costs of capital adjustment, see
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Recent work has investigated the macroeconomic
implications of capital adjustment costs for the response to aggregate productivity
shocks, see Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013), and, for the
response to uncertainty shocks, see Bloom (2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2013), and
Bloom et al. (2014). In my model, the interaction between time to build and invest-
ment irreversibilities is key for the transmission of shocks to the matching technology.
The transmission mechanism shares the real options effect prominent in the uncer-
tainty literature, albeit without inducing the volatility effect that higher uncertainty
eventually realizes and leads to reversals and overshooting, see Bloom (2009). To
the extent that longer time to build increases the effective forecast uncertainty, this
paper also contributes to the endogenous uncertainty literature, see Bachmann and
Moscarini (2011) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2014).
Second, my paper relates to recent work studying the interaction between time to
build fluctuations and investment irreversibility. Studying time to build for residential
housing, Oh and Yoon (2016) document a time series pattern fairly similar to the
one for equipment capital goods documented in this paper. In their model, higher
uncertainty increases time to build because residential construction occurs in stages
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and each stage involves irreversible investment. Kalouptsidi (2014) studies the bulk
shipping industry and shows that procyclical fluctuations in time to build dampen
the volatility of investment into ships.
Third, in modeling a frictional market for capital goods, I build on the search
literature. Since Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search frictions are popular in la-
bor market models. For capital markets, Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) and
Ottonello (2015) show that search frictions amplify business cycle shocks. Tightness
on the capital goods market governs the intensive margin of investments, while in
my setup search frictions also affect the extensive margin of investment. Shocks to
the matching technology in my model build on the labor market search and mat-
ching literature, see Krause et al. (2008), Sedláček (2014), and Sedláček (2016) for
example.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 documents time
to build. Section 2.3 presents the central model mechanism and Section 2.4 develops
the quantitative business cycle model. I discuss the calibration in Section 2.5 and
results in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides the SVAR evidence. Finally, Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Does time to build vary over the cycle?
My goal is to estimate time to build using survey data on the order books of capital
good producers. I show that time to build exhibits substantial variation between three
and nine months with peak values during recessions.
I use US Census data collected in the Manufacturers’ Shipments, Inventories, and
Orders Survey (M3). The M3 covers two third of manufacturers with annual sales
above 500 million USD and some smaller companies to improve industry coverage.
M3 participants are selected from the Economic Census and the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers and the M3 is benchmarked against these datasets. US quarterly in-
vestments are computed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis using the M3.⁴
⁴ See Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (2014, ch. 3).
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The Census provides publicly available data for shipments and order backlog at
the sectoral level. Under the premise of excluding defense goods, I use the sector
category non-defense equipment goods, which is available at monthly frequency from
1968 through 2015.⁵ M3 data satisfies a stock-flow equation for equipment good
orders, where O denotes new orders net of cancellations, S shipments, and B the
beginning-of-period stock of order backlog⁶
Bt+1 = Bt + Ot − St . (2.1)
My baseline measure of time to build, also called backlog ratio, is
T TBt ≡ BtSt . (2.2)
It measures the intensity of flows (shipments) out of the stock of backlogged orders,
expressed in months. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of time to build, which exhibits
substantial variation. Time to build tends to start increasing before recessions and
peaks at the end of recession periods. In Appendix 2.A.1, I plot the component series
of (2.1) over time. The correlation of annualized real GDP growth with log time to
build is -0.3. Detrending the slow-moving trend from time to build using the HP filter
with a smoothing parameter of 810,000, the correlation increases to -0.4. The finding
of a countercyclical backlog ratio coincides with previous studies, see Nalewaik and
Pinto (2015) for example.
Under two conditions this time to build measure equals the expected waiting time
of a new equipment good order: First, the shipment protocol is first-in first-out, i.e.
new orders are shipped only after backlogged orders are shipped. Second, shipments
are expected to be unchanged in the future. While the first condition is plausibly sa-
tisfied, the second one is roughly satisfied given that shipments are highly persistent.
In Appendix 2.A.1, I show that an alternative measure of time to build, based on
⁵Notice that for finer disaggregation of the equipment goods sector into two-digit sectors, the
distinction of defense and non-defense is not always available.
⁶A new order is defined as a legally binding intention to buy for immediate or future delivery,
and the survey does not ask separately for order cancellations. Shipments measure the value of goods
delivered in a given period, while order backlog measures the value of orders that have not yet fully
passed through the sales account.
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Figure 2.1. Time to build
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Notes: Time to build is measured as the ratio of order backlog to monthly shipments, for non-defense
equipment goods. Shaded, gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
ex-post shipment realizations, closely resembles my baseline measure. Additionally,
I provide the evolution of the individual component series defining the order stock-
flow equation.
A caveat of estimating time to build using the M3 is that it excludes structure
capital and imported equipment capital, which together account for no more than
35% of total non-residential private fixed investments in the US.⁷
Given the aggregate nature of the data I use, my measure is necessarily one of
macroeconomic time to build. If there are cross-sectional differences in time to build,
this will be different from the average micro-level time to build. Notice that within
the model I develop in Section 2.4, I will recompute the measure of time to build in
the exact same way and use that as calibration target.
⁷Out of total private non-residential fixed investment, structure capital constitutes on average 25%
over the last 40 years, declining over time with 10% in 2015. Imported equipment capital is on average
10% of total investments, increasing over time with 20% in 2015.
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2.3 Firm-level investment and time to build
This section discusses a novel, and quantitatively central, mechanism of my paper.
In short, fluctuations in time to build affect how frequently firms invest, and, if they
invest, by how much. These changes in the investment policy hamper an efficient
reallocation of capital across firms and thereby depress real economic activity.
In general, two key determinants of a firm’s investment decision are expected fu-
ture productivity and uncertainty about future productivity. Higher expected future
productivity makes larger investments appear profitable. Higher uncertainty about
future productivity may induce the firm to postpone investments if investment is
partially irreversible.⁸ To understand the specific effects of time to build on a firm’s
investment decision, it is of central importance that longer time to build shifts the
expected usage period of the investment good into the future. Hence, longer time
to build affects the expected productivity, and the associated uncertainty, during the
usage period.
To illustrate the point, suppose firm productivity follows an AR(1) process
x t = ρx t−1 + σεt , εt ∼ N (0, 1).
Conditional on the firm’s period zero productivity x0, the forecast of productivity in
period τ > 0 and the associated forecast uncertainty are
xˆτ = ρ
τx0 and sˆ
2
τ
= σ2
τ∑
t=1
ρ2(t−1),
respectively. Consider τ the expected period of investment delivery and 0< ρ < 1.
Longer time to build, that is larger τ, moves the forecast for productivity after deli-
very closer to the (zero) long-run mean of productivity and the associated forecast
uncertainty increases. Figure 2.2 illustrates the first and second moment effect of an
increase in time to build from one to three quarters.⁹
⁸Abel and Eberly (1996) show analytically that the inaction range, in which not adjusting capital
is optimal, expands in uncertainty when capital is partially irreversible.
⁹ Longer time to build increases the relevant forecast uncertainty by shifting the relevant forecast
horizon, which is not captured by empirical estimates of forecast uncertainty as Jurado et al. (2015).
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Figure 2.2. Productivity forecasts and time to build
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Notes: Starting from an initial productivity level one unconditional standard deviation above zero,
the figure plots the productivity forecast, xˆτ, and its 90% confidence interval (CI), [x0 − 1.96sˆτ, x0 +
1.96sˆτ], per forecast horizon, τ. The arrow illustrates a shift in time to build from one to three quar-
ters, roughly resembling the increase in time to build observed from 2006 to 2009. The figure is based
on the parameters for the firm-level productivity process calibrated in Section 2.5.
What are the implications of longer time to build for the firm’s investment policy?
First, longer time to build reduces the sensitivity of investment to contemporaneous
deviations of productivity from its long-run mean. This follows directly from mean-
reversion, and I refer to this intensive-margin change in the investment policy as
regression-to-the-mean effect. Second, higher time to build increases the uncertainty
about productivity after delivery. Assuming partial investment irreversibility, the real
option value of waiting increases. That is, the firm finds it optimal to tolerate larger
deviations of the current capital stock from its optimal size. In turn, the adjustment
frequency falls. I refer to this extensive-margin change in the investment policy as
wait-and-see effect.¹⁰,¹¹
¹⁰ The wait-and-see effect is also prominent to explain contractionary aggregate effects of exoge-
nous uncertainty shocks, see, e.g., Bloom (2009) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013). In my setup, ho-
wever, uncertainty is driven by changes in the expected delivery period. The volatility effect, leading
to fast reversals as discussed in Bloom (2009), is not present in my setup.
¹¹ If productivity shocks are permanent,ρ = 1, the regression-to-the-mean effect is turned off, while
the wait-and-see effect will be strengthened through larger effects on forecast uncertainty.
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Increases in time to build have aggregate consequences because the altered in-
vestment policy hampers the efficient allocation of capital across firms with different
levels of productivity. Intuitively, more of the high productivity firms with low capi-
tal stocks do not invest or invest less. Increased capital misallocation endogenously
lowers measured aggregate productivity, output, investment, and consumption.
2.4 Modeling cyclical fluctuations in time to build
This section develops a model which extends the basic real business cycle model in
two ways. First, producers of consumption goods vary in their productivity and use
producer-specific capital. Second, investment in specific capital is partially irrever-
sible and supplied through a frictional capital market giving rise to time to build.
Shocks to the matching technology cause fluctuations in time to build.
2.4.1 Households
Households value consumption and leisure. I assume the existence of a representative
household with separable preferences
U(Ct , Lt) =
C1−σt
1 − σ − ψLt , (2.3)
where Ct is consumption and Lt labor supply in period t. σ denotes the intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity, andψ parametrizes the disutility of working. I suppose the
period utility function is the result of indivisible labor, see Hansen (1985) and Roger-
son (1988).¹² The household owns all firms and receives aggregate profits denoted
Πt . The problem of the household is
max
Ct ,Lt
U(Ct , Lt) s.t. Ct ≤ wt Lt + Πt , (2.4)
¹² These preferences are common in related general equilibrium models with non-convex capital
adjustment frictions, see Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bloom et al. (2014) for example.
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where wt is the wage. Due to household ownership, firms discount future profits by
Q t,t+1 = β
pt+1
pt
, (2.5)
with pt = C−σt the marginal utility of consumption. The household’s optimal labor
supply requires wt =ψ/ pt .
2.4.2 Engineering firms and capital suppliers
To invest in specific capital, producers of consumption goods need to hire an engineer-
ing firm that acts as an intermediary on the capital market. Engineering firms search
for a capital good producer to supply the required goods. When search succeeds, the
capital supplier produces all goods within one period.
Let me motivate the setup by the assembly line example in the introduction. Since
assembly lines are complex, the investing firm needs to hire an assembly line producer
(engineering firm). This producer, in turn requires a network of suppliers that provide
the various inputs that compose an assembly line. On top, assembly lines are specific,
and thus require different supplier networks across orders. While many individual
business relationships are firmly established, the producer may need to search for
some new suppliers given a new assembly line order. Inmymodel, the capital supplier
is a shortcut for a supply network.
In detail, I assume a continuum of capital submarkets indexed by cost parameter
ξ, distributed by G. Consumption good producers randomly access a submarket ξ.
The remainder of this subsection focuses on an arbitrary submarket ξ. There is a
large mass of engineering firms (short: engineers) and capital suppliers. The mass
of active engineers be Et , and the mass of active capital suppliers St . Formally, the
matching technology between engineers and capital suppliers is
Mt = mtE
η
t S
1−η
t , (2.6)
where mt is stochastic matching efficiency that follows an AR(1) process in logs
log(mt) = (1 − ρm) log(µm) + ρm log(mt−1) + σmεmt , εmt iid∼ N (0, 1). (2.7)
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I define market tightness as θt = Et /St . The order filling probability for an engineer
is qt = mtθ
η−1
t , and the matching probability for a supplier is θtqt . Once matched,
the probability of match separation is χ.
Suppliers and engineers need to hire ξ workers to participate in the market and
workers are mobile across sectors so the wage is equal across sectors. When matched
for any given investment order it , the capital supplier produces within the period
and delivers the order to the engineer for unit price pSt . Capital suppliers have unit
marginal costs to transform consumption goods into capital. Given the stochastic
discount factor in (2.5), the value of an unmatched and matched capital supplier is
V St = −ξwt + θtqtJSt + (1 − θtqt)Et[Q t,t+1V St+1], (2.8)
JSt = p
S
t it − it + (1 − χ)Et[Q t,t+1JSt+1], (2.9)
respectively. Engineers are hired on a spot market for investment orders, they can
perfectly commit and are perfectly competitive. A consumption good producer can
only hire one engineering firm. Thus, the number of engineers equals the number
of orders. Conditional on delivery, engineers receive unit price pEt . To deliver, the
engineer needs to find a matching capital supplier. The value of an unmatched and
matched engineer is, respectively,
V Et = −ξwt + qtJ Et + (1 − qt)Et[Q t,t+1V Et+1], (2.10)
J Et = p
E
t it − pSt it + (1 − χ)Et[Q t,t+1J Et+1]. (2.11)
In equilibrium, engineers make zero profits on the spot market for investment orders,
and I assume that capital suppliers satisfy a free entry condition.
V Et = V
S
t = 0. (2.12)
When matched, engineer and capital supplier split the match surplus by Nash bargai-
ning over the unit price pSt , where φ is the engineer’s bargaining weight
max
pSt
(J Et − V Et )φ(JSt − V St )1−φ. (2.13)
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The two equations in (2.12) together with the solution to (2.13) jointly define the
equilibrium values of θt , p
S
t , p
E
t .
Assumption: Matches are formed for a single period, χ = 1.
The assumption considerably simplifies the problem and appears less strong when
reconsidering the capital supplier as shortcut for a supplier network. Under χ = 1,
the solution to (2.13) is pSt = φ + (1−φ)pEt and the unit price engineers receive
becomes pEt = 1+
ξwt
φqt
1
it
. Thus, investment expenditure pEt it = it + ft consists of a size-
dependent component with unit price of one, and a fixed cost component
ft =
ξwt
φqt
. (2.14)
It further follows that equilibrium tightness is constant
θt =
φ
1 − φ . (2.15)
Hence, lower matching efficiency mt unambiguously lowers delivery probability qt .
2.4.3 Consumption good producers
The economy consists of a fixed unit mass of perfectly competitive consumption good
firms, indexed by j, that produce a homogeneous consumption good
y j t = zt x j tk
α
j t`
ν
j t , (2.16)
using firm-specific capital, k j t , labor, ` j t , and subject to aggregate productivity, zt ,
and idiosyncratic productivity, x j t . The production function has decreasing returns
to scale in the control variables, 0< α+ ν < 1. Aggregate productivity has a deter-
ministic trend but throughout the paper, the model is formulated along the balanced
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growth path. Both idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity follow an AR(1) process
log(zt) = ρ
z log(zt−1) + σzεzt , ε
z
t
iid∼ N (0,1), (2.17)
log(x j t) = ρ
x log(x j t−1) + σxεxj t , ε
x
j t
iid∼ N (0, 1), (2.18)
respectively. Labor adjustment is frictionless and I define gross cash flow as
c f j t ≡ max
` j t∈R+
¦
zt x j tk
α
j t`
ν
j t − wt l j t
©
. (2.19)
Capital adjustment is not frictionless. Firm-specific capital evolves over time accor-
ding to γk j t+1 = (1−δ)k j t + i j t , where δ denotes the depreciation rate, i j t is invest-
ment, and γ denotes constant, aggregate growth of labor productivity.
Let me detail the capital adjustment frictions. First, to invest, consumption good
producers need to hire an engineering firm that searches for capital suppliers to sup-
ply the required capital goods. As a result of frictional capital markets, investment or-
ders are not delivered instantaneously, but with probability qt implying average time
to build of 1/qt . Second, investment entails a fixed cost, ft , see (2.14). The fixed
cost depends on the capital submarket ξ. The submarket in which the consumption
good producer can order capital is random and iid across firms and investment or-
ders. Third, re-adjusting an outstanding order before delivery is prohibitively costly.
Fourth, I assume resale losses of capital.¹³
In the dynamic firm problem, I distinguish between consumer good producers
with and without outstanding orders. For firms without outstanding orders, the idio-
syncratic state is described by (k j t , x j t ,ξ j t) with probability distribution µ
V defined
for space SV = R+ ×R+ ×R+. For firms with outstanding order, the idiosyncratic
state consists of (k j t , i
o
j t , x j t ,ξ j t), where i
o
j t denotes the outstanding investment or-
der. The probability distribution is µW defined for space is SW = R+ ×R×R+ ×R+.
The cross-sectional distribution of all consumption good firms over their idiosyncra-
tic states is µt = (µVt ,µ
W
t ) defined for S = S
V × SW . The economy’s aggregate state
is denoted by st = (µt , zt ,mt). In the following, I drop time and firm indices and use
′ notation to indicate subsequent periods. The value of a firm without outstanding
¹³ I assume reselling is also subject to time to build: Disinvesting producers need to hire an engineer
that searches for a capital supplier that transforms the capital into consumption goods.
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order is given by
V (k, x ,ξ, s) = max
¦
V A(k, x ,ξ, s),V NA(k, x , s)
©
. (2.20)
Conditional on not ordering investment (not adjusting), the firm value is
V NA(k, x , s) = c f (k, x , s) + E[Q(s, s′)V ((1 − δ)k /γ, x ′,ξ′, s′)|x , k, s]. (2.21)
Conditional on ordering investment (adjusting), the firm value is
V A(k, x ,ξ, s) =max
io∈R
¦
W (k, io, x ,ξ, s)
©
, (2.22)
The resale loss of divestment is expressed by the investment price function pi(io),
which equals 0≤ p¯i ≤ 1 if investment io < 0, and which equals one if investment is
positive. Total investment expenditure is
ac(io,ξ, s) = (1 − pi(io))io + f (ξ, s) (2.23)
The value of the consumption good firm with outstanding orders is
W (k, io, x ,ξ, s) = c f (k, x , s) (2.24)
+ q(s)
 − ac(io,ξ, s) + E[Q(s, s′)V  ((1 − δ)k + io) /γ, x ′,ξ′, s′ |x , s]
+ (1 − q(s))E[Q(s, s′)W  (1 − δ)k /γ, io /γ, x ′,ξ, s′ |k, io, x , s].
The extensive margin of the capital adjustment decision is described by the threshold
value ξˆ(k, x , s) that satisfies
V A(k, x , ξˆ(k, x , s), s) = V NA(k, x , s). (2.25)
Adjustment is optimal whenever fixed adjustment costs ξ < ξˆ(k, x , s). Note that this
formulation of the firm problem nests the conventional firm problem with one period
time to build whenever q(s)= 1 ∀s.
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2.4.4 Recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE)
Before I define the equilibrium conditions, I define important macroeconomic aggre-
gates. The aggregate production of the consumption good is
Y (s) =
∫
S
zxkα`(k, x , s)νµ(d[k × io × x × ξ]), (2.26)
where `(k, x , s) is the solution to (2.19). Aggregate investment expenditure is
I(s) =
∫
SV
1{ξ<ξˆ(k,x ,s)}q(s)ac(i
o(k, x , s),ξ, s)µV (d[k × x × ξ]) (2.27)
+
∫
SW
q(s)ac(io,ξ, s)µW (d[k × io × x × ξ]).
1{·} is an indicator function, that equals one if the argument is true and zero otherwise.
I define aggregate order backlog as the total volume of investment orders at the
beginning of the period, after new orders have been made
B(s) =
∫
SV
1{ξ<ξˆ(k,x ,s)}ac(i
o(k, x , s),ξ, s)µV (d[k × x × ξ]) (2.28)
+
∫
SW
ac(io,ξ, s)µW (d[k × io × x × ξ]),
A RCE is a list of functions (w, f ,q,`, io, ξˆ,C , L,Π,Q,V,W,µ′) that satisfies:
1. Consumption good producers: Labor demand `, intensive and extensive margin
investment demand (io, ξˆ), and value function (V,W ) solve (2.19)–(2.25).
2. Engineering firms and capital good producers: Capital prices f and delivery pro-
bability q satisfy (2.14) and (2.15).
3. Household: Consumption demand C and labor supply L solve (2.4).
4. Consistency:
(a) Π is consistent with profit maximization of consumption good firms.
(b) Q is given by (2.5).
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(c) µ′, the law of motion of µ, is consistent with functions (q, io, ξˆ) describing
capital adjustment.
5. Labor market clearing: Labor supply L equals labor demand for consumption
good production ` and labor demand for fixed costs of engineers and suppliers,
described by ξˆ and G, the distribution of ξ.
6. Goods market clearing: C = Y − I , with Y and I given by (2.26) and (2.27).
2.4.5 Solution
The recursive competitive equilibrium is not computable, because the solution de-
pends on the infinite-dimensional distribution µ. Instead, I solve for an approximate
equilibrium building on the algorithms in Campbell (1998) and Reiter (2009). The
general idea is to use global approximation methods with respect to the individual
states, but local approximation methods with respect to the aggregate states. I solve
the steady state of my model using projection methods and perturb the model locally
around the steady state to solve for the model dynamics in response to aggregate
shocks.
Compared to the Krusell-Smith algorithm, see Krusell et al. (1998), the pertur-
bation approach does not require simulating the model with respect to aggregate
shocks (in order to update the parameters of the forecasting rules). Further it can
easily handle a large number of aggregate shocks. Terry (2015) compares the Krusell-
Smith algorithm with the Campbell-Reiter algorithm for a Khan and Thomas (2008)
economy. He finds that the Campbell-Reiter algorithm is more than 100 times faster.
Ahn et al. (2016) combine the Campbell-Reiter algorithm to compute aggregate dyna-
mics for a general class of heterogeneous agent economies in continuous time. More
closely related to this paper, Winberry (2016b) uses (and extends) the Campbell-
Reiter algorithm to solve a variation of the Khan and Thomas (2008) economy.
My adaptation of the Reiter method uses cubic B-splines with collocation to ap-
proximate the value functions. For the baseline calibration of the model, it takes one
minute to solve the steady state, aggregate dynamics, and compute the impulse re-
sponse functions. Appendix 2.A.2 contains the details of my solution method.
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2.5 Calibration
This section discusses the model calibration, which broadly follows the literature
on non-convex capital adjustment frictions in general equilibrium models, see Khan
and Thomas (2008) for example. I calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. I set
the discount factor β = 0.99 to match an annual risk-free rate of 4%. I assume log-
utility in consumption, σ = 1. The parameter governing the household’s disutility
from work, ψ, is calibrated to match one third of time spent working.
Table 2.1. Quarterly model calibration
Description Parameter Value
Households
Discount factor β 0.990
Intertemporal elasticity σ 1.000
Preference for leisure ψ 2.400
Engineers and capital suppliers
Bargaining power φ 0.500
Mean matching efficiency µm 0.542
Persistence of matching efficiency ρm 0.959
Dispersion of matching efficiency σm 0.041
Consumption good producers
Capital share α 0.250
Labor share ν 0.580
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Aggregate growth γ 1.004
Idiosyncratic persistence ρx 0.970
Idiosyncratic dispersion σx 0.065
Aggregate persistence ρz 0.950
Aggregate dispersion σz 0.007
Fixed adjustment cost (upper bound) ξ¯ 0.010
Resale loss p¯i 0.830
The parameters that describe the technology of consumption good producers are
set to α= 0.25 and ν= 0.58. These values are well within the range of estimates
in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Kehrig (2015), and similar to the values
assumed in Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013).¹⁴ I assume
¹⁴ Interpreting the production function as revenue production function derived in a model of mono-
polistic competition, the value for output elasticities would imply a markup of roughly 20%.
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δ = 0.025 consistent with an annual depreciation rate of 10%. Following Khan and
Thomas (2008), I calibrate γ to an annualized aggregate labor productivity growth
of 1.6%.
On capital markets, I assume symmetric Nash bargaining between engineers and
suppliers, φ = 0.5. This implies delivery probability qt = mt , which is independent
of η. To calibrate mean, persistence, and variance of matching efficiency, I target the
corresponding first and second moments of the empirical baseline measure of time to
build, the backlog ratio. To this end, I use (2.28) to compute aggregate order backlog.
Since the delivery probability is state-independent and since shipments equal inves-
tment in the model, the backlog ratio in the model is Bt /St = qt . I set the mean
matching efficiency to satisfy an average time to build of 5.5 months corresponding
to the mean of the backlog ratio. Given that the backlog ratio has a weak, non-linear
time trend, I detrend the quarterly time series using a low-frequency HP filter with
λ= 100,000 and fit persistence and standard deviations to the residual. This yields
ρm and σm for the quarterly matching efficiency process.
I assume that G, the distribution of ξ, is uniform with lower bound zero and up-
per bound ξ¯. To calibrate ξ¯ and resale loss p¯i, I target the share of spike investment
rates in micro data. Since the idiosyncratic productivity process, described by ρx and
σx , also determines the investment rate distribution, it is key to calibrate these four
parameters jointly using the same dataset. I use manufacturing establishment-level
data from the Longitudinal Research Database. In particular, I use the estimates in
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) based on revenue function x˜ kθ , which I take as the
production technology after maximizing out labor with θ = α/(1− ν). Given ν, I
translate their estimates of the profitability process at annual frequency into the pa-
rameters describing the quarterly process of x , where x = x˜1−ν. This yieldsρx = 0.97
and σx = 0.065. To calibrate adjustment cost parameters ξ¯ and p¯s I target the share
of positive and negative spike adjusters, documented in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006). The two model parameters can exactly match the 18.6% share of positive
spikes and the 1.5% share of negative spikes. The fixed cost is important to generate
fat tails, while the resale loss is particularly important in generating the large diffe-
rence between positive and negative spikes. Appendix 2.A.3 provides more details
and robustness on the calibration.
24 | 2 Time to Build and the Business Cycle
2.6 Macroeconomic effects of matching technology
shocks
This section discusses the quantitative effects of shocks to the matching technology.
In short, a shock to the matching technology that raises time to build by one month
lowers investment by 2 percent and output by 0.5 percent. These shocks explain up
to one third of the decline in output and investment during the early 1990s recession
and the 2007-09 Great Recession.
In more detail, Figure 2.3 shows the responses to an adverse shock to the mat-
ching technology. The shock increases time to build by exactly one month, which is
roughly an increase by one standard deviation of the filtered time to build series. The
shock causes substantial fluctuations in output, investment, and consumption. Inves-
tment (first row, right) has the strongest impact response to the match efficiency
shocks. It falls by 2 percent initially and remains strongly depressed during the first
two years after the shock. Output (second row, right) falls by 0.3 percent on impact
and reaches its trough of 0.55 percent five quarters later. Measured aggregate total
factor productivity (last row, right) declines gradually and reaches its trough at 0.3
percent 5 quarters after the shock.
The aggregate effects of adverse shock to the matching technology are explained
by a direct and an indirect channel. The direct channel captures that longer time to
build delays delivery of outstanding investment orders and thus reduces investment
and output. The indirect channel captures that longer time to build affects firm-level
investment policies: firms invest less frequently and, if they invest, their investment
reflect less their contemporaneous productivity. In turn, the alignment between firm-
level capital and productivity weakens. Thus, longer time to build lowers measured
aggregate total factor productivity. For a more detailed discussion of the indirect
channel revisit Section 2.3.
To understand the relative quantitative importance of the two transmission chan-
nels, I suggest a simple exercise. While the indirect channel affects measured aggre-
gate total factor productivity, the direct channel has no impact on measured producti-
vity. To isolate the direct channel, I compute a series of exogenous shocks to aggre-
gate productivity that exactly offset the effects the matching technology shock has
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Figure 2.3. Responses to an adverse shock to the matching technology
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Notes: The impulse response functions are for a shock to the matching technology that decreases
time to build by one (unconditional) standard deviations starting from steady state and using the
baseline calibration. ‘Direct channel’ denotes the impulse responses when aggregate TFP changes
are eliminated through opposing aggregate productivity (z) shocks. Aggregate TFP is computed as
T FP = log(Yt)−α log(Kt)− ν log(Lt).
onmeasured aggregate productivity. Thus, measured aggregate productivity remains
at its steady state level. The effects of the direct channel are the macroeconomic re-
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sponses to the joint occurrence of the initial match efficiency shock and the series of
productivity shocks.
The resulting ‘direct channel’ responses are shown as dotted lines in Figure 2.3.
The direct channel is only central to understand the immediate responses, while
the medium-term effect is by and large explained by the indirect channel operating
through capital misallocation. The prominent role of aggregate productivity in my
model corresponds to the finding in Chari et al. (2007) on the efficiency wedge. The
direct channel is most important on impact of the shock because in subsequent peri-
ods firms adjust their investment policies. Firms prepone investment orders as deli-
very takes longer, see Figure 2.7 in Appendix 2.A.4. Abstracting from the on-impact
effect, capital adjustment frequency falls, consistent with wait-and-see behavior.
Note that I evaluate the quantitative impact of shocks to the matching techno-
logy in general equilibrium. Accounting for general equilibrium effects is important
because household consumption smoothing motives may substantially dampen the
investment and output responses that would arise in partial equilibrium, see Khan
and Thomas (2008). The initial increase in consumption (second row, right) reflects
a general equilibrium mechanism. Since prices are flexible in my model, the intra-
temporal household optimality condition dictates that consumption has to increase
initially in response to the initial decrease in investment. The reason is that the capital
input in production is predetermined and labor demand falls.
As robustness check of the results, I consider a model driven by an exogenous
process for the delivery probability qt . This will turn off the equilibrium effects that
matching technology shocks have on fixed capital adjustment costs ft . Figure 2.9 in
the Appendix shows that the responses are somewhat weaker, but the effects of time
to build fluctuations remain quantitatively important.
The responses in Figure 2.3 show quantitatively important and persistent effects
of match efficiency shocks. Next, I assess the importance of time to build for under-
standing past business cycles. To this end, I compute a matching technology shock
series that fits the empirical time to build series. This confines my analysis to the
period from 1968 through 2015. Using the model, I can compute the time series
for output, investment, consumption, and employment. To be clear, in this exercise
fluctuations in these series are only driven by shocks to the matching technology. To
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make the quarterly series comparable to the data, I HP filter both the simulated series
and their empirical counterparts using the same low-frequency filter (λ= 100,000)
I used in the calibration. More details on the empirical time series are provided in
Section 2.7.
Figure 2.4 plots the model-implied time series against their empirical counter-
parts. Two observations stand out. First, the official recession periods (grey-shaded
areas) are relatively well matched by periods where shocks to the matching techno-
logy induce below-trend output. The figure also reveals some phase shifts for the
timing of expansions and contractions in aggregate production. This may not be sur-
prising given that this paper does not claim that shocks to the matching technology
are the sole driver of business cycles and other business cycle shocks may follow dis-
tinct time patterns. Second, shocks to the matching technology explain an important
share of the observed business cycle variations. These shocks alone explain a drop
in investments of more than 5% during the Great Recession and the early 1990s re-
cession, compared to a drop of 16% in the data. For output, the model also explains
more than a third of the empirically observed drop during these two recessions and
for consumption it is almost a quarter. The exercise, thus, suggests that time to build
fluctuations are important drivers of business cycles.
Finally, Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.A.4 reports business cycle moments for both the
empirical data and based on simulations of the model. The model generates autocor-
relation in the detrended series for output, consumption, investment, and employ-
ment close to the empirical estimates. Further, the volatility of investment relative
to output in the model is very similar to the data. The magnitudes of fluctuations
generated by the model are between five and ten times lower than in the data. This
reflects the observation that time to build exhibits large fluctuations only in two of
the seven recessions for which data is available. Conversely, while shocks to the mat-
ching technology account for an important share of the early 1990 recession and the
Great Recession, these shocks are less important for other recessions.
2.7 Time series evidence
In this section, I assess the importance of structural time to build shocks using vector
autoregressions. The identification requires few assumptions and I compare the iden-
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Figure 2.4. Role of time to build in understanding past business cycles
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Notes: These time series are computed matching the empirically observed (filtered) movements in
time to build through shocks to the matching technology and otherwise using the baseline model ca-
libration. Grey-shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
tified shocks to the shocks to matching technology in my general equilibrium model.
The main finding is that the qualitative effects of time to build shocks are similar
to the effects of matching technology shocks in the model above, while the quantita-
tive effects are even larger. In addition, the identified shocks are largely uncorrelated
with various external measures of business cycle variation, which supports the notion
that time to build is driven by an independent source of variation.
2.7.1 Baseline model
I estimate a medium-scale, eight-variable vector autoregression (VAR) that allows
for rich dynamic interactions between the baseline time to build measure, see
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Section 2.2, and several macroeconomic series, prominent in both structural and
empirical business cycle models. The vector of endogenous variables is:
Y =

Time to Build
Real GDP
Real Consumption
Real Investment
Consumer Prices
Real Wage
Federal Funds Rate
Labor Productivity

I use data at quarterly frequency that covers 1968Q1 through 2014Q4. All ma-
croeconomic series except time to build are sourced from FRED.¹⁵ All variables but
the federal funds rate are transformed by the natural logarithm. Notice that I use
non-durable consumption goods, because durable consumption goods include equip-
ment goods that time to build shocks may directly affect. Similarly, my preferred
investment time series is nonresidential investments because only firms invest in my
model. The results are robust against using total consumption and total investment
instead.
The baseline structural VAR model is in levels with linear time trend (D)
Yt = A0 + Dt +
4∑
j=1
A jYt− j + But , Cov(ut) = I8, Σ = Cov(But) = BB′,
(2.29)
where But denotes reduced-form shocks and ut structural shocks. The covariance
matrix of ut is the identity matrix of dimension eight, I8. I assume thematch efficiency
¹⁵ The FRED series names are GDPC96 (Real GDP), DNDGRA3Q086SBEA (Real Personal Consump-
tion Expenditures: Nondurable goods), B008RA3Q086SBEA (Real Private Fixed Investment: Nonresiden-
tial), CPI, AHETPI/CPI (Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Total
Private; deflated by CPI), FEDFUNDS (Effective Federal Funds Rate), PAYEMS (All Employees: Total Non-
farm Payrolls). Labor productivity is real GDP over employment.
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shock is the last element in vector ut . The structural impulse responses of Yt to the
match efficiency shock are identified by the last vector in B, denoted B8.
2.7.2 A conservative identification scheme
The baseline identification assumption is that time to build increases in response to
a structural time to build shock while all other macroeconomic time series do not
respond contemporaneously, i.e. B8 = [0, . . . , 0, b88]′. Combining this identification
restriction with BB′ =Σ, it follows that b88 =
Æ
e′8Σ−1e8, where ei is the i-th column
of I8. B8 is point-identified by the identification restriction.
This identification scheme is conservative in the following sense. Except for the
time to build shock, all structural shocks may affect time to build contemporaneously,
while the time to build shockmay affect all variables except time to build only through
a one-quarter lag.¹⁶ The identification is also conservative relative to the general
equilibrium model where all variables are contemporaneously affected by shocks to
the matching technology. Later, I reassess the importance of time to build shocks
using a model-consistent identification scheme.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses to a positive time to build shock that rai-
ses time to build by one month at peak. I have chosen the size of the shock to mimic
the exercise in the general equilibrium model. The shock has a persistent, significant
effect on time to build. More interestingly, GDP and its two main components, inves-
tment and consumption, significantly fall in response to the match efficiency shock.
Not only are the responses statistically significant, but their magnitudes are also eco-
nomically relevant: GDP and consumption fall by up to 2%, and investment by up to
6% within the first three years.
To get a sense of the role of time to build shocks to explain variation in macroe-
conomic variables, Table 2.2 shows the shares of forecast error variance explained
by time to build shocks. Albeit conservatively identified, the time to build shock ex-
plains an important fraction of macroeconomic fluctuations: more than 20% of GDP
and consumption, and 7% of investment. This provides further evidence in support
of this paper’s suggestion that time to build fluctuations are important for a better
understanding of business cycle fluctuations. Importantly, at business cycle frequency
¹⁶ The identification strategy resembles Christiano et al. (2005) for monetary policy shocks.
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Figure 2.5. Impulse responses to a one month time to build shock
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Notes: Solid, blue lines show (selected) responses to a match efficiency shock, under the baseline
identification scheme. Shaded, gray areas illustrate the associated 90% confidence intervals.
Table 2.2. Forecast error variance decomposition
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years ∞
GDP 0.2 7.6 18.1 22.6 23.4 18.2
Investment 0.3 0.9 2.8 4.9 6.6 6.7
Consumption 0.8 9.8 22.2 26.9 28.2 24.6
Time to build 73.4 57.0 48.8 44.8 42.2 31.1
Note: The shares of forecast error variance explained by time to build
shocks are expressed as percentages for different forecast horizons ran-
ging from 1 year to infinity.
the time to build shock explains almost 50% of the forecast error variance of time
to build itself. That is, other structural shocks explain only 50%. This supports the
modeling choice of the general equilibrium model, in which time to build is directly
driven by a shock to the matching technology, and not by a conventional business
cycle shock, such as a shock in aggregate productivity.
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The importance of time to build shocks could potentially reflect other structu-
ral shocks that are not well identified in my model. To address this concern, I cor-
relate my identified time to build shock series with various business cycles shocks,
constructed in a number of papers outside my empirical framework. These business
cycles shocks include direct estimates of productivity shocks and numerous policy
shocks. Table 2.3 provides the correlation of the time to build shock series with le-
ads and lags of the external business cycle shock series. By and large, I find time to
build shocks uncorrelated with external shocks. This finding further supports to the
importance of exogenous shocks to time to build.
Table 2.3. Correlogram of time to build shocks with external business cycle shocks
quarterly lags/leads
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
TFP -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.00
UA-TFP -0.09 -0.13∗ 0.04 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.07
UA-TFP-I -0.03 -0.15∗∗ 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05
UA-TFP-C -0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.05
MP 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.11
Oil -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.04
Defense -0.12 -0.15∗∗ -0.02 -0.03 -0.16∗∗ -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.10
Tax 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.02
Note: The table shows the correlation of time to build shocks with various shock se-
ries at lags/forwards between -4 and +4 quarters. */**/*** denote 10%/5%/1% sig-
nificance levels, respectively. Productivity shock series are from Fernald (2014): TFP,
Utilization-Adjusted (UA) TFP, UA-TFP in equipment and durables, and UA-TFP in non-
durables. Monetary policy shocks (MP) are based on Romer and Romer (2004) and Coi-
bion (2012). Oil price shocks are based on Ramey and Vine (2010). Surprise defense
expenditures as fiscal shocks are from Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and tax shocks from
Mertens and Ravn (2011).
The identified time to build shock series appears not to reflect investment-specific
productivity shocks along the lines of Justiniano et al. (2010) and Justiniano et al.
(2010). Beyond the evidence in Table 2.3, this conclusion is supported by the finding
that extending my VAR model by the relative price of investment goods only mar-
ginally affects the results presented here. By the same argument, identified time to
build shocks appear not to reflect uncertainty shocks. The identified shocks further
do not appear to reflect changes in aggregate financial conditions. This conclusion is
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based on the following result. The VAR exercise in Gilchrist et al. (2014) finds that
uncertainty shocks are crucially transmitted through credit spreads. When replacing
uncertainty by time to build, I do not find evidence for the transmission of time to
build shocks through credit spreads.
2.7.3 Robustness
Appendix 2.A.5 provides robustness for the empirical results. First, I evaluate the im-
portance of the linear time trend assumption by estimating the VAR under the same
identification restrictions but expressing all variables in first differences. The results
are broadly robust. Within the first three years, GDP, investment, and consumption
respond significantly to a time to build shock, and the magnitudes are similar to the
baseline model in levels. Second, I compare the role of my identification scheme by
suggesting an alternative identification scheme, in which time to build shocks can
affect all variables contemporaneously, but no other structural shock can affect time
to build contemporaneously. Importantly, this restriction is consistent with the re-
strictions imposed in the general equilibrium model. The responses to a time to build
shock tend to be stronger under the alternative restriction, albeit the differences are
small. Third, I suggest a new robustness for frequentist, point-identified structural
VARs. Based on the findings in Gafarov, Meier, and Montiel Olea (2016), I replace
zero restrictions by elasticity bounds. To provide robustness for time to build shocks,
I replace the contemporaneous zero restrictions of the baseline restriction by con-
straining the elasticity of the contemporaneous response of variables other than time
to build to be bounded by ±1%. I do find my baseline results to be robust against
such relaxation of identification restrictions.
Beyond the robustness in Appendix 2.A.5, the results are also robust against esti-
mating a monthly VAR, in which I replace GDP by IP and investment by new orders
for non-defense capital goods. Further, the results are not solely driven by the Great
Recession period. The VAR results are robust against cutting the sample from 2008.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of business cycles by addressing a novel
question: What are the business cycle implications of fluctuations in time to build?
To address this question, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model,
in which capital good markets are characterized by search frictions. Fluctuations in
time to build are driven by shocks to the matching technology. Calibrating the model
to US data, I show that the empirically observed fluctuations in time to build are
quantitatively of first-order importance for business cycles. Of particular quantitative
importance is the interaction of time to build and firm investment policies leading to
capital misallocation. To corroborate the model-implied results, I provide time series
evidence on the importance of structural time to build shocks. I find that the effects
of time to build shocks are even stronger than in the structural model.
An important follow-up question is to better understand the micro-foundations
behind fluctuations in time to build. In particular, it may be useful to study capital
good supply networks. Small changes at critical points in such networks, for example
the exit of an important supplier, could have non-trivial aggregate implications for
time to build. A complementary explanation may revolve around trade credit. While
the empirical evidence rejects an important role for aggregate financial conditions,
trade credit in capital good production networks might be important to understand
the observed time to build fluctuations. For example, suppose capital suppliers pro-
duce subject to cash-in-advance constraints. During recessions short-run liquidity in
the form of trade credit may become scarce. As a result, suppliers may need to slow
down production despite long order books.
The long-run time series pattern of time to build shows that it has become more
volatile since the mid-1980s. In fact, this coincides with the Great Moderation period
from themid-1980s until 2007. The GreatModeration is characterized by less volatile
business cycles. One popular explanation for the decline in volatility is ‘just-in-time’
inventory practices, whichmitigates inventory volatility. Possibly, the flip side of lower
inventory volatility is larger volatility in order backlog, and thus time to build.
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Appendix 2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Time to build fluctuations
My ex-postmeasure of time to build captures the time which new orders remain in the
capital good producers’ order books using ex-post realizations of shipments (instead
of current shipments). To be precise, I compute the lowest number of future periods
required to deplete the given order backlog
àT TB t ≡ min
τ
 bτc∑
j=1
St+ j + (τ − bτc)(St+bτc+1 − St+bτc) − Bt
2
,
where b·c denotes the floor function. The second term in above formula captures a
linear interpolation of shipments between two periods, by which the ex-post time to
build measure becomes continuous.
Figure 2.6 compares my baseline measure with the ex-post measure of time to
build. Differences between the two series are barely visible, which mainly reflects
the high auto-correlation of monthly shipments.
Figure 2.6. Alternative measurement of time to build
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Notes: Time to build is measured as the ratio of order backlog to monthly shipments, for non-defense
equipment goods. Shaded, gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
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The two panels of Figure 2.7 show the individual series defining the order stock-
flow equation. The series are plotted in nominal values because the stock-flow equa-
tion is defined over nominal values.
Figure 2.7. Responses of investment orders to an adverse match efficiency shock
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Notes: The time series for order backlog, shipments, and new orders refer to the non-defense equip-
ment goods sector and are expressed in nominal values. Shaded, gray areas indicate NBER recession
dates.
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2.A.2 Solution algorithm
2.A.2.1 Simplified consumption good firm problem
To solve the model most efficiently, I rewrite the firm problem. First, I transform
the firm problem. Instead of io, the investment order, I let firms choose ko, the
new capital stock upon delivery. Computationally, this transformation has the ad-
vantage that I can use the same grid for ko as for k, and this grid can be tighter
than the one for io. To leave the firm problem unchanged, ko needs to evolve over
time to guarantee the implicitly defined investment order satisfies io′ = ioγ . Using
the identity, io = γko + (1−δ)k, the evolution of ko over time (conditional on no
delivery) according to ko′ = koγ − δ(1−δ)kγ2 . Second, in slight abuse of notation, I drop
the aggregate state s and instead use time subscripts for functions that depend on
the aggregate state. I express the firm value functions in utils, see Khan and Tho-
mas (2008), and redefine the value function such that the expectation with respect
to idiosyncratic productivity does not have to be computed within the maximiza-
tion problem. This raises computational efficiency and it tends to smooth the va-
lue functions. More precisely, I define V˜t(k, x ,ξ)= ptExEξV (k, x ′,ξ′), V˜ At (k, x ,ξ)=
ptV
A
t (k, x ,ξ), V˜
NA
t (k, x)= ptV
NA(k, x), W˜t(k, x ,ξ)= ExW¯t(k, x ′,ξ), W¯t(k, x ,ξ)=
ptWt(k, x ,ξ), where Ex (Eξ) denotes the expectation with respect to x ′ (ξ′) con-
ditional on x (ξ) and pt = C−σt as before. Then equations (2.21), (2.20), (2.22), and
(2.24) can be rewritten as:
V˜t(k, x ,ξ) = ExEξmax
¦
V˜ At (k, x
′,ξ′), V˜ NAt (k, x
′)
©
V˜ NAt (k, x) = pt c ft(k, x) + βEt[V˜t+1((1 − δ)k /γ, x ,ξ)]
V˜ At (k, x ,ξ) = maxkot ∈R+
¦
W¯t(k, k
o
t , x ,ξ)
©
W¯t(k, k
o, x ,ξ) = pt c ft(k, x)
+ qt
 − pt[(1 − pi(k, ko))(γko − (1 − δ)k) + f Et (ξ)] + βEt[V˜t+1 (ko, x ,ξ) ]
+ (1 − qt)

βEt[W˜t+1
 
(1 − δ)k /γ, ko /γ − δ(1 − δ)k /γ2, x ,ξ ]
W˜t(k, k
o, x ,ξ) = ExW¯t(k, x ′,ξ)
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where Et denotes the expectation with respect to aggregate state st+1 conditional on
st . The net present value of the fixed adjustment cost can be expressed by f actξ,
where f act is defined recursively
f act = qtpt
wt
φqt
+ (1 − qt)βEt f act+1.
In turn, this allows me to simplify the firm problem as
V˜t(k, x) = ExEξmax
¦
V˜ At (k, x
′) − f actξ′, V˜ NAt (k, x ′)
©
f act = qtpt
wt
φqt
+ (1 − qt)βEt f act+1
V˜ NAt (k, x) = pt c ft(k, x) + βEt[V˜t+1((1 − δ)k /γ, x)]
V˜ At (k, x) = maxkot ∈R+
¦
W¯t(k, k
o
t , x)
©
W¯t(k, k
o, x) = pt c ft(k, x)
+ qt
 − pt(1 − pi(k, ko))(γko − (1 − δ)k) + βEt[V˜t+1 (ko, x) ]
+ (1 − qt)

βEt[W˜t+1
 
(1 − δ)k /γ, ko /γ − δ(1 − δ)k /γ2, x ]
W˜t(k, k
o, x) = ExW¯t(k, x ′)
Importantly, this allows me to compute the extensive margin adjustment policy in
closed form,
ξˆt =
V˜ At (k, x
′) − V˜ NAt (k, x ′)
f act
.
Next, I approximate firm values using collocation where Φ denotes basis functions in
matrix representation and c denotes vectors of coefficients
V˜t(k, x) 'ΦV (k, x)cVt
W˜t(k, k
o, x) 'ΦW (k, ko, x)cWt
The approximations are exact at the nk collocation nodes k1, ..., knk and k
o
1, ..., k
o
nk
. In
practice, I choose the same collocation nodes for k and ko.
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As baseline we use cubic B-splines to approximate the firm value functions. This
does not only have the advantage of being computationally fast, but also conditional
on the coefficients we know the Jacobian in closed form. In particular, I can write
down the optimality condition for intensive margin capital adjustment (kot ) as
qtptp
s(k, kot )γ =qtβEtΦVk (kot , x)cVt+1 + (1 − qt)βEtΦWko((1 − δ)kt /γ, kot , x)cWt+1,
where ΦVk = (∂ Φ
V ) /(∂ k) and ΦWko = (∂ Φ
W ) /(∂ ko).
I approximate the AR(1) process of idiosyncratic productivity using Tauchen’s
algorithm. I denote the discrete grid points of x by x1, ..., xnx consisting of nx grid
points and the transition probability from state x j to state x j′ one period later by
pix(x j′ |x j).
To render the infinite-dimensional distribution µt tractable, I approximate it with
a discrete histogram. That is, µt measures the share of firms for each discrete combi-
nation of capital stock ki1 , outstanding order k
o
i2
(both correspond to the collocation
nodes), and productivity x j. A further distinction is useful: Let µ
V
t denote the cross-
sectional distribution of firms without outstanding orders over idiosyncratic states
(ki, x j) and µ
W
t the distribution of firms with outstanding orders over (ki1 , k
o
i2
, x j). It
holds that µt = (µVt ,µ
W
t ).
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2.A.2.2 Campbell-Reiter algorithm
Using the preceding approximation and simplification steps, the model equilibrium
is described by the following non-linear equations:
ΦV (k, x)cVt = ExEξmax
¦
V˜ At (k, x
′) − f actξ′, V˜ NAt (k, x ′)
©
(2.30)
ξˆt(k, x) = (V˜
A
t (k, x) − V˜ NAt (k, x)) / f act
V˜ NAt (k, x) = pt c ft(k, x) + βEtΦV ((1 − δ)k /γ, x)cVt+1
V˜ At (k, x) = W¯t(k, k
o
t , x)
W¯t(k, k
o, x) = pt c ft(k, x)
+ qt
 − pt(1 − pi(k, ko))(γko − (1 − δ)k) + βEtΦV (ko, x)cVt+1
+ (1 − qt)

βEtΦW ((1 − δ)k /γ, ko /γ − δ(1 − δ)k /γ2, x)cWt+1

c ft(kt , x t) = (1 − ν) (ν/wt)ν/(1−ν) (zt x t)1/(1−ν)kα/(1−ν)t
wt = ψ/ pt
qt = mt(φ /(1 − φ))η−1
ΦW (k, ko, x)cWt = ExW¯t(k, x ′) (2.31)
f act = qt pt
wt
φqt
+ (1 − qt)βEt f act+1 (2.32)
qt pt p
s(k, kot )γ = qtβEtΦVk (kot , x)cVt+1 + (1 − qt)βEtΦWko((1 − δ)kt /γ, kot , x)cWt+1 (2.33)
1
pt
= Yt − It (2.34)
Yt =
∑
i1,i2, j
µt(ki1 , ki2 , x j) (ν/wt)
ν/(1−ν) (zt x j)1/(1−ν)kα/(1−ν)i1
It =
∑
i, j
µVt (ki , x j)G(ξˆt(ki , x j))qt p
s(ki , k
o
t (x j))

γkot (x j) − (1 − δ)ki

+
∑
i1,i2, j
µWt (ki1 , k
o
i2
, x j)qt p
s(ki1 , k
o
i2
)

γkoi2 − (1 − δ)ki1

µVt+1(ki′ , x j′) =
∑
i, j
pix(x j′ |x j)µVt (ki , x j)[ωV,V,At (i, i′, j) + ωV,V,NAt (i, i′, j)] (2.35)
+
∑
i1,i2, j
pix(x j′ |x j)qtµWt (ki1 , koi2 , x j)ωW,Vt (i1, i2, i′, j)
µWt+1(ki′1 , ki′2 , x j′) =
∑
i, j
pix(x j′ |x j)µVt (ki , x j)ωV,Wt (i, i′1, i′2, j) (2.36)
+
∑
i1,i2, j
pix(x j′ |x j)µWt (ki1 , ki2 , x j)ωW,Wt (i1, i2, i′1, i′2, j)
log(mt+1) = (1 − ρm) log(µm) + ρm log(mt) (2.37)
log(zt+1) = ρ
z log(zt) (2.38)
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With the following auxiliary equations for the law of motion of the distribution:
ωV,V,At (i, i
′, j) =

G(ξˆt(ki , x j))qt
ki′−kot (x j)
ki′−ki′−1 if k
o
t (x j) ∈ [ki′−1, ki′]
G(ξˆt(ki , x j))qt
kot (x j)−ki′
ki′+1−ki′ if k
o
t (x j) ∈ [ki′ , ki′+1]
0 else
ωV,V,NAt (i, i
′, j) =

[1 − G(ξˆt(ki , x j))] ki′−(1−δ)ki /γki′−ki′−1 if (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′−1, ki′]
[1 − G(ξˆt(ki , x j))] (1−δ)ki /γ−ki′ki′+1−ki′ if (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′ , ki′+1]
0 else
ωV,Wt (i, i
′
1, i
′
2, j) =

G(ξˆt(ki , x j))(1 − qt) ki′1−(1−δ)ki /γki′1−ki′1−1
ki′2−kot (x j)
ki′2−ki′2−1
if kot (x j) ∈ [ki′2−1, ki′2] and (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′−1, ki′]
G(ξˆt(ki , x j))(1 − qt) (1−δ)ki /γ−ki′1ki′1+1−ki′1
ki′2−kot (x j)
ki′2−ki′2−1
if kot (x j) ∈ [ki′2−1, ki′2] and (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′ , ki′+1]
G(ξˆt(ki , x j))(1 − qt) ki′1−(1−δ)ki /γki′1−ki′1−1
kot (x j)−ki′2
ki′2+1−ki′2
if kot (x j) ∈ [ki′2 , ki′2+1] and (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′−1, ki′]
G(ξˆt(ki , x j))(1 − qt) (1−δ)ki /γ−ki′1ki′1+1−ki′1
kot (x j)−ki′2
ki′2+1−ki′2
if kot (x j) ∈ [ki′2 , ki′2+1] and (1 − δ)ki /γ ∈ [ki′ , ki′+1]
0 else
ωW,Vt (i1, i2, i
′, j) =

qt
ki′−ki2
ki′−ki′−1 if ki2 ∈ [ki′−1, ki′]
qt
ki2−ki′
ki′+1−ki′ if ki2 ∈ [ki′ , ki′+1]
0 else
ωW,Wt (i1, i2, i
′
1, i
′
2, j) =

(1 − qt) ki′1−(1−δ)ki1 /γki′−ki′1−1 if (1 − δ)ki1 /γ ∈ [ki′1−1, ki′1] and i2′ = i2
(1 − qt) (1−δ)ki1 /γ−ki′1ki′1+1−ki′1 if (1 − δ)ki1 /γ ∈ [ki′1 , ki′1+1] and i2′ = i2
0 else
Labeled equations (2.30)–(2.38) are the main equations, and all other unlabeled
equations are auxiliary in defining the model equilibrium. Given nk collocation nodes
and nx discrete grid points of x , equations (2.30)–(2.38) are n f = 2n2knx + 3nknx + 4.
I organize these equations in
Et[ f (xt ,xt+1,yt ,yt+1)] = 0, (2.39)
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where εt = (εmt ,ε
z
t) ∈ R2 denotes the vector of aggregate shocks. xt denotes prede-
termined state variables and yt denotes non-predetermined state variables
xt = [µt; log(mt); log(zt)] ∈ Rnx≡n2knx+nknx+2, (2.40)
yt = [c
V
t ; c
W
t ; log(act); log(k
o
t ); log(pt)] ∈ Rny≡n2knx+2nknx+2. (2.41)
The non-stochastic steady state is defined as f (x¯, x¯, y¯, y¯)= 0. In the general case, the
model solution is given by
yt = g(xt ,ζ), (2.42)
xt+1 = h(xt ,ζ) + ζσ˜εt+1, (2.43)
where ζ is the perturbation parameter and g : Rnx ×R+→ Rny and f : Rnx ×R+→
Rnx . The exogenous shocks are collected in εt+1 ∈ Rnε , and σ˜ ∈ Rnx×nε attributes
shocks to the right equations while also scaling them (by σm, σz). To solve the two
policy functions, I use a first-order approximation. I follow the perturbation algo-
rithm in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). This requires to compute the Jacobians of
function f (locally) at steady state. Importantly, the algorithm in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) checks for existence and uniqueness of a model solution.
2.A.2.3 Krusell-Smith algorithm
This subsection suggests how the model can be solved using the Krusell-Smith al-
gorithm. Following Krusell et al. (1998), and the adaption for heterogeneous firms
by Khan and Thomas (2008), I assume agents in my model only observe a finite
set of moments, informative about the entire distribution, instead of observing µ di-
rectly. The agents approximate equilibrium prices and the evolution of the observed
moments by a log-linear rule.
I approximate the distribution µ by the aggregate capital stock,
Kt =
∫
S
kdµ, (2.44)
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and the stock of investments outstanding from the preceding period
I ot =
∫
SW
(γko − (1 − δ)k)dµW . (2.45)
If time-to-build dropped to zero q = 1, I ot would constitute the investments activated
in addition to new orders. I suggest the following log-linear forecast rules
logKt+1 = β
0
k (zt ,mt) + β
1
k (zt ,mt) logKt + β
2
k (zt ,mt) log I
o
t , (2.46)
log I ot+1 = β
0
i (zt ,mt) + β
1
i (zt ,mt) logKt + β
2
i (zt ,mt) log I
o
t , (2.47)
and the log-linear pricing rule
log pt = β
0
p (zt ,mt) + β
1
p (zt ,mt) logKt + β
2
p (zt ,mt) log I
o
t . (2.48)
The forecasting and pricing rules are described by coefficients that depend on the exo-
genous aggregate shock. For discretized processes of z and m, the equilibrium under
bounded rationality with the above rules becomes computable. I use these rules to
solve for the optimal policy functions and then simulate the economy and compute
equilibrium prices pt in every period t. The simulated economy allows price series
are then used to update the coefficients of the log-linear rules. I stop the procedure
when the coefficients have converged.
2.A.3 Additional information on the model calibration
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) targets the spike investment shares, but also persis-
tence of investment rates and the correlation of investment rates with idiosyncratic
productivity, when estimating a richer specification of capital adjustment costs inclu-
ding convex adjustment costs. I exclude the latter two moments because they may
depend sensitively on the specific time to build setup. Nonetheless, the model mat-
ches these moments reasonably well with a persistence of 1.6% (empirically 5.8%),
and a productivity correlation of 24% (empirically 14%).
An alternative strategy to calibrate adjustment costs is to target cross-sectional
skewness and kurtosis of investment rates, see Bachmann and Bayer (2013). In fact,
our calibrated model closely matches these moments in the data: skewness/kurtosis
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in the model are 5.1/48.3, while in a balanced panel of Census data these are
6.5/67.4 for total investment and 5.5/47.9 for equipment investment, see Kehrig
and Vincent (2016). Since skewness and kurtosis monotonically increase in the ad-
justment cost parameters, this indicates the calibrated adjustment costs may be too
low.
Table 2.4. Calibration targets
Model Data
Targeted (LRD)
Positive spikes 18.6% 18.6%
Negative spikes 1.5% 1.5%
Non-targeted (LRD)
Persistence 0.016 0.058
Productivity correlation 0.14 0.24
Non-targeted (Census)
Skewness 5.1 6.5
Kurtosis 48.3 67.4
Notes: All moments relate to annual invest-
ment rates computed as I /K . Positive and
negative spikes denote the share of inves-
tment rates larger than 20% and smaller
than -20%, resp. LRD moments are from
Cooper, Haltiwanger (2006), Census mo-
ments are from Kehrig, Vincent (2016).
Alternative data sources used to calibrate and estimate similar models are the IRS
tax data, see, e.g., Winberry (2016a), and Compustat data, see, e.g., Bloom (2009).
Both datasets are at the firm-level. The IRS does includes only positive investments,
and Compustat is biased to large private firms. The main disadvantage of the LRD
dataset is that it covers manufacturing only.
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2.A.4 Additional results from the model simulation
Figure 2.8. Responses of investment orders to an adverse match efficiency shock
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Notes: The impulse response functions are based on a decrease in match efficiency by one (unconditi-
onal) standard deviations starting from steady state and using the baseline calibration. Inaction me-
asures the share of firms without outstanding orders that do not make a new order in a given period.
The order backlog is the total of investments outstanding for delivery.
Table 2.5. Business cycle statistics
Data Model
Volatility of output (%) 2.37 0.31
Volatility of consumption (%) 2.08 0.16
Volatility of investment (%) 7.27 1.23
Volatility of employment (%) 2.11 0.24
Autocorrelation of output 0.94 0.96
Autocorrelation of consumption 0.94 0.87
Autocorrelation of investment 0.96 0.89
Autocorrelation of employment 0.97 0.89
Correlation of consumption with output 0.86 0.61
Correlation of investment with output 0.72 0.92
Correlation of employment with output 0.71 0.89
Note: All series, from data and model simulations, are ex-
pressed in logs and HP-filtered with a quarterly smoothing
parameter of 100,000.
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Figure 2.9. Responses under alternative fixed adjustment costs:
f (ξ, s)= ξw(sφq¯ with q(s)= q¯ in steady state
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Notes: The impulse response functions are based on a decrease in match efficiency by one (unconditi-
onal) standard deviations starting from steady state and using the baseline calibration. ‘Direct effect’
are the impulse responses when aggregate TFP changes are eliminated through opposing aggregate
productivity (z) shocks. Aggregate TFP is computed as T FP = log(Yt)−α log(Kt)− ν log(Lt).
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2.A.5 Robustness of the structural VAR results
2.A.5.1 Alternative identification scheme and first differences
First, I investigate the results under an alternative identification assumption. While
the baseline identification scheme tends to be conservative, its restrictions are stron-
ger than the restrictions of the general equilibrium model. As alternative identifi-
cation, I suggest to have the time to build shock ‘ordered first’. This term refers to
the ordering of variables in the VAR. It means that time to build shocks can con-
temporanously affect all other variables in the VAR, but no shock other than time
to build shocks can affect time to build contemporaneously. Figure 2.10 shows that
the baseline identification implies smaller macroeconomic respones to time to build
shocks compared to the alternative identification, albeit the differences are not large.
Impulse responses under the alternative identification remain significant.
Figure 2.10. Impulse responses to a one standard deviation time to build shock
(model in levels with linear time trend, alternative identification schemes)
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Notes: Solid lines show (selected) impulse responses to a time to build shock under the baseline identi-
fication scheme. Dashed lines show the impulse responses under the alternative identification scheme,
in which time to build is ‘ordered first’. Shaded, gray areas illustrate the 90% confidence intervals as-
sociated with the alternative identification scheme.
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Figure 2.11 shows the cumulative impulse responses when estimating a VAR, in
which all variables enter in first differences and the linear time trend is dropped. At
the same time, the figure compares the two identification schemes. The differences
of the impulse responses across identification schemes appears negligible. The im-
portant finding is that the impulse responses are similar to the ones in Figure 2.10.
While I assumed a linear time trend for the latter, the findings on time to build shocks
appear robust to non-linear time trends.
Figure 2.11. Cumulative impulse responses to a one standard deviation time to build shock
(model in first differences, two alternative identification schemes)
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Notes: Solid lines show (selected) cumulative impulse responses to a time to build shock under the
baseline identification scheme. Dashed lines show the impulse responses under the alternative iden-
tification scheme, in which time to build is ‘ordered first’. Shaded, gray areas illustrate the 90% confi-
dence intervals associated with the alternative identification scheme.
2.A.5.2 Elasticity bounds
In this subsection, I propose a new approach to provide robustness for point-
identified structural VAR models in a frequentist setup. Structural VAR models, such
as Gali (1999), Christiano et al. (2005), and Bloom (2009), impose various zero re-
strictions on contemporaneous and long-run responses to obtain point identification.
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As robustness, I propose to replace some or all of the zero restrictions by bounds on
the elasticity with respect to the shock of interest.¹⁷ For example, instead of assu-
ming an uncertainty shock does not contemporaneously affect GDP, as robustness I
would restrict the elasticity of GDP with respect to a change in uncertainty due to
an uncertainty shock to be bounded between ±c%. This nests the point-identified
model in the limit case when all bounds are zero (c = 0). The structural VAR model
is no longer point-identified when replacing a zero restriction with strictly positive
bounds on the elasticities (c > 0).
I implement this robustness exercise using the results in Gafarov, Meier, and Mon-
tiel Olea (2016), which provide inference for set-identified structural VAR models.
Formally, to apply their results, I need to assume that for a given IRF either the lower
and upper elasticity bound may not hold jointly. Notice that confidence sets are esti-
mated based on Deltamethod inference. In fact, bootstrap inference is not necessarily
valid here because the endpoints of the identified sets are not fully differentiable.
The suggested robustness is similar to Conley et al. (2012) which proposes as
robustness to relax the exclusion restriction when using IV methods. I suggest the
following robustness for the conservative baseline identification. Instead of zero re-
strictions on contemporaneous responses, I constrain the elasticity of all variables
(except for the backlog ratio) with respect to the match efficiency shock to be bet-
ween -1% and +1%, see Table 2.6. For an increase in the backlog ratio of 2.5%, the
contemporaneous responses are bound to be between -0.025% and +0.025%.
Figure 2.12 shows the resulting impulse responses under the robustness identifica-
tion scheme. Instead of a single impulse response, there is an interval with admissible
impulse responses (dotted lines). The confidence set is adjusted accordingly based
on Gafarov, Meier, and Montiel Olea (2016). Notice that the main findings of the
baseline model in Figure 2.12 are ‘robust’ in the sense that the declines in GDP, in-
vestment, and consumption remain significant.
¹⁷ Elasiticity bounds have recently gained popularity in the Bayesian structural VAR literature, see,
e.g., Kilian and Murphy (2012a) and Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b).
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Table 2.6. Identification schemes: constraints on contemporaneous elasticities
TTB GDP Inv Con CPI Wag FFR LaP
Baseline + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robustness + ±1% ±1% ±1% ±1% ±1% ±1% ±1%
Notes: +/0/±1% indicate that the elasticity is constrained to be posi-
tive/exactly zero/between -1% and +1%, respectively. The contempora-
neous elasticity of variable i and time to build in response to time to build
shocks is given by (e′iB1) /(e′1B1), where ei is the i-th column of the iden-
tity matrix I8. TTB: Time to build, GDP: Real GDP, Con: Real Consump-
tion, Inv: Real Investment, CPI: Consumer Prices, Wag: Real Wage, FFR:
Federal Funds Rate, LaP: Labor Productivity.
Figure 2.12. Impulse responses to a one standard deviation time to build shock
(model in levels with linear time trend, two alternative identification schemes)
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Notes: Solid lines show (selected) responses to a time to build shock under the baseline identification
scheme. Dashed lines show the bounds of the identified set under elasticity constraints, see Table 2.6.
Shaded, gray areas illustrate the 90% confidence intervals for the identified sets.
3Do Plants Freeze Upon Uncertainty
Shocks?
Joint with Ariel Mecikovsky
3.1 Introduction
One of the most active areas of business cycle research since the Great Recession is
the literature studying fluctuations in uncertainty. The following briefly revises this
literature: First, there is ample evidence that uncertainty shocks are contractionary.¹
Second, a number of transmission channels have been put forward that rationalize
the broad empirical finding.² Third, we know relatively little about the empirical
relevance of these various transmission channels.
However, understanding the transmission of uncertainty shocks is of central im-
portance when designing counter-cyclical policy interventions. For example, in mo-
dels with (non-convex) factor adjustment frictions, in which the transmission is cha-
racterized by plants adopting wait-and-see behavior (freezing) in response to higher
¹ Empirical evidence includes Bloom (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013), Caggiano et al. (2014),
Jurado et al. (2015), Baker et al. (2016), and many, many more.
² Transmission channels suggested in the literature build on capital adjustment frictions, e.g. Bloom
(2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2013), Bloom et al. (2014); labor adjustment (search) frictions, e.g.
Schaal (2012), Leduc and Liu (2014), Riegler (2014); price rigidities, e.g. Bundick and Basu (2014),
Born and Pfeifer (2016), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015), Vavra (2014); and financial frictions,
e.g. Alfaro et al. (2016),Christiano et al. (2010), Arellano et al. (2012), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Dyrda
(2015)
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uncertainty, an effective policy may be an investment or hiring subsidy that targets
those plants close to their adjustment threshold, e.g. small plants as in Winberry
(2016a). Instead, if financial frictions are key, an effective policy intervention may
target the financing conditions of firms close to defaulting. Finally, if price rigidities
are key, adequate monetary policy rules are important, see Basu and Bundick (2015).
This paper contributes to the uncertainty literature by providing evidence on the
channels through which uncertainty shocks affect employment. For this purpose, we
first analyze models with various frictions – labor adjustment frictions, capital adjus-
tment frictions, price rigidities, and financial frictions, respectively – and show how
the response of job flows to uncertainty shocks depends on the strength of these fricti-
ons.³ This provides testable implications for our empirical analysis, which uses highly
disaggregated industry-level data on job creation and job destruction. We identify the
response of these job industry-level flows to uncertainty shocks and document sub-
stantial variation. We then relate the estimated responses to measures that capture
the strength of various frictions. Using our model-based findings, we argue that the
data strongly suggests that financial frictions are important for the transmission of
uncertainty shocks, while we find no evidence in support of factor adjustment fricti-
ons or price rigidities.
In models with non-convex labor adjustment frictions, plants postpone employ-
ment changes under higher uncertainty. Such freezing lowers both job flows. We
show that this decline is magnified by larger adjustment costs. If instead capital ad-
justment is frictional, plants postpone investment in response to higher uncertainty.
This unambiguously lowers job creation because non-investing plants shrink due to
capital depreciation. Quantitatively, this decline is magnified by larger adjustment
costs. In models with nominal rigidities, adjusting plants increase prices and thus
markups when uncertainty increases. That is because profits can turn negative if pri-
ces are too low, but remain non-negative for too high prices. Assuming that prices
are set one period in advance, we find that the job flow responses are mitigated if
prices are more rigid. Finally, with financial frictions, higher uncertainty raises the
³We study the responses of (gross) job creation and (gross) job destruction. Following Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992), we define job creation as the total employment change of plants with net em-
ployment gains and job destruction as the total employment change of plants with net employment
losses.
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probability of (costly) default and thus raises borrowing costs. In return, job creation
falls and job destruction increases. Quantitatively, the effects are stronger the more
severe financial frictions.
Guided by our model-based insights, we empirically examine the interaction of
job flow responses to uncertainty shocks and the severity of various frictions. In this
paper, we create a new panel dataset of four-digit manufacuring industry job creation
and job destruction series from 1972 to 2013. We estimate job flow responses to
uncertainty shocks using a sectoral vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The model
includes aggregate variables - stock market level, uncertainty, aggregate job flows
- and industry-level job flows. The VAR model is restricted such that the identified
uncertainty shock series is common across industries while industry-level responses
may differ.
At the aggregate level, job creation decreases while job destruction increases in
response to uncertainty shocks. While we find substantial variation in the industry-
level responses, 80% of industries exhibit a joint decrease in job destruction and an
increase in job creation. This finding by itself is hard to reconcile with (non-convex)
labor adjustment frictions playing a key role for the shock transmission since that
would imply all employment adjustment, both downward and upward, shrinks in
response to uncertainty shocks.
To study the interaction of job flow responses with frictions, we construct industry-
level indices that capture the severity of frictions. For example, we consider the
within-industry kurtosis of gross investment rates and employment growth as indica-
tors of capital and labor adjustment costs, respectively. The justification is that larger
costs lead to more lumpy adjustment, which in turn raises the kurtosis, see, for exam-
ple, Caballero et al. (1997) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013). Similarly, we construct
various industry-level variables that capture the degree of nominal rigidities and fi-
nancial frictions.
When relating our friction indices to the estimated job flow responses, we find
strong evidence in support of financial frictions as transmission channel of uncer-
tainty shocks. In particular, we find that the job flow responses are significantly larger
in industries with stronger financial frictions. The relations between the other friction
indices and job flow responses are either statistically insignificant, or significant but
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of the opposite sign when compared to our model-based predictions. For example, in
industries with stronger measured labor adjustment frictions, job destruction increa-
ses by more.
This paper relates to recent empirical work examining the effects of uncertainty
shocks on labor markets. The evidence concentrates on the effects at unemployment
rate (Leduc and Liu, 2014), job finding rate (Guglielminetti, 2013), and separation
rate in connection with job finding rate (Riegler, 2014). Our empirical findings com-
plement their results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 examines the model-based
relation of frictions and job flow responses to uncertainty shocks. Section 3.4 des-
cribes the data used and created. Our estimation strategy is outlined in Section 3.3.
Section 3.5 provides the main empirical results, and Section 3.6 concludes. An Ap-
pendix follows.
3.2 Theoretical background: frictions and uncertainty
This section examines the role of various plant-level frictions for the transmission
of uncertainty shocks on labor markets. We separately consider plants facing labor
adjustment frictions, capital adjustment frictions, price rigidities, and financial fricti-
ons. For each friction, we study the response of job flows to a shock that increases
uncertainty.
3.2.1 Model primitives
We consider an economy with a unit mass of plants. Each plant i produces output yi t
using a neoclassical production function that combines capital ki t and labor li t ,
yi t = l
α
i tk
1−α
i t .
Plants are monopolistically competitive and face an isoelastic demand curve,
pi t = zi t

yi t
Yt
−1/ξ
Pt ,
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where zi t is a stochastic demand shifter for the product of plant i, Yt is the aggregate
demand, Pt is the aggregate price, and ξ is the elasticity of demand. We assume that
idiosyncratic demand zi t follows a log-normal AR(1) process
log(zi t+1) = ρ log(zi t) + εi t+1, εi t+1
iid∼ N (−σ2t /2,σ2t ).
The volatility of demand shocks, σt , also follows a first-order Markov process. We
adopt the timing convention that changes in uncertainty are observed one period be-
fore these affect the distribution of new demand shock realizations, cf. Bloom (2009).
3.2.2 Labor adjustment frictions
There is ample evidence suggesting that non-convex labor adjustment frictions at the
plant level are important. For example, Caballero et al. (1997) shows that the distri-
bution of net employment growth at the establishment-level exhibits excess kurtosis,
which suggests lumpiness in employment adjustment. Further, indirect inference as
in Cooper and Willis (2009) or Bloom (2009) estimate significant non-convex labor
adjustment costs.
Such non-convex labor adjustment frictions bear important implications for the
impact of uncertainty shocks on labor markets. When uncertainty, broadly about
plant profitability, is high, the option value of postponing labor adjustment increa-
ses. The intuition is that higher volatility makes reversals in profitability more likely,
which might necessitate reversals in employment size. However, such employment
reversals need to be evaluated against partially sunk employment adjustment costs,
leading plants to avoid such reversals and consequently adjust labor less frequently.
In other words, some plants freeze their employment adjustment plans.
To understand the relation between uncertainty shocks and the degree of labor
adjustment frictions, we consider a dynamic problem of the plant. We assume capital
is adjusted every period and abstract from nominal rigidities and financial frictions.
We abstract from general equilibrium effects setting Yt = Pt = 1. Let us drop firm and
time indices and define revenues net of capital expenditures as
CF l(z, l) = max
k

zlαµk(1−α)µ − (r + δ)k	 , µ = (ξ − 1) /ξ.
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We assume that adjustment costs apply for net employment changes as in Cooper
and Willis (2009). In the hypothetical presence of exogenous quits, labor adjustment
costs were zero if plants adjust employment to offset quits.⁴ Employment adjustment
costs are given by
AC l(l, l ′) = ac lf 1{l
′ 6= l} + ac lp|l ′ − l|,
where 1{·} is an indicator function, ac lp denotes partial irreversibility costs, and ac lf
fixed costs. The wage is w and the problem of the plant is given by
V (z, l,σ) = max
l ′

CF l(z, l ′) − wl ′ − AC l(l, l ′) + βE[V (z′, l ′,σ′)]	 .
A shock that increases uncertainty unambiguously lowers both job creation and job
destruction on impact. That is due to the timing convention for demand shocks, which
exclusively give rise to a real option effect on impact, cf. Bloom (2009). What is less
clear is how the job flow response to uncertainty shocks changes in the level of labor
adjustment friction. We will come back to this question in Section 3.2.6.
3.2.3 Capital adjustment frictions
Similar to the employment change distribution, the gross investment rates exhibit ex-
cess kurtosis and negative skewness, see, for example, Bachmann and Bayer (2013)
and Kehrig and Vincent (2016). This suggests lumpy investment as explained by non-
convex capital adjustment costs or investment irreversibilities. Given irreversibilities,
a shock raising uncertainty raises the option value of waiting and leads plants to
freeze investment plans. The capital stock of inactive plants decreases because of
physical depreciation. This indirectly depresses labor demand, which lowers job cre-
ation. The effect on job destruction is ambiguous. The freezing of plants that had
disinvested absent an increase in uncertainty contributes to less job destruction. Ho-
wever, the freezing of plants that had invested absent an increase in uncertainty
contributes to more job destruction.
⁴ The literature alternatively considers costs in adjusting gross flows in the presence of exogenous
quits. However, the combination of exogenous labor attrition and sufficiently high adjustment costs
for gross employment changes implies a negative median net employment growth in the cross-section
of plants. Empirically, however, this median is non-negative, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
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We aim to understand the relation between uncertainty shocks and the degree of
capital adjustment frictions. We assume labor is adjusted every period and abstract
from nominal rigidities and financial frictions. Analogous to the model above, we
define revenues net of labor expenditures as
CF k(z, k) = max
l

zlαµk(1−α)µ − wl	 , µ = (ξ − 1) /ξ.
Capital adjustment costs are given by
AC k(k, k′) = k′ − (1 − δ)k + ackf 1{k′ 6= (1 − δ)k} + ackp1{k′ < (1 − δ)k},
where ackp are resale losses, and ac
k
f fixed costs. The problem of the plant is given by
V (z, k,σ) = max
k′

CF k(z, k) − AC k(k, k′) + βE[V (z′, k′,σ′)]	 .
In Section 3.2.6 we show how the job flow response to uncertainty shocks changes
in the level of capital adjustment frictions.
3.2.4 Price rigidities
In an economy with monopolistic competition and staggered prices, plants respond
to an uncertainty shock by setting a higher price. Important for the upward-pricing
result is the asymmetry of the profit function in the price: it is costlier setting a too
low relative price than setting a too high relative price. Consequently, less jobs are
created and more jobs destroyed. Upward-pricing emerges under price setting à la
Rotemberg or Calvo and when prices are set before shocks realize, see Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2015) and Born and Pfeifer (2016).⁵
To understand the relation between uncertainty shocks and the degree of nomi-
nal price rigidity, we study a plant problem subject to Calvo (1983) rigidities. Uncer-
tainty of idiosyncratic demand does not affect plants’ price policy. As a shortcut to
generate precautionary price setting, we let the aggregate price level be stochastic
⁵On the contrary, in a model with menu costs and time-varying uncertainty as in Vavra (2014),
an uncertainty shock increases the frequency and volatility of price changes, resulting in more jobs
created and destroyed.
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with stochastic volatility. In particular, we assume it follows
log(Pt+1) = ρ log(Pt) + ε
P
t+1, ε
P
t+1
iid∼ N (−σ2t /2,σ2t ).
We abstract from factor adjustment frictions and financial frictions and set Yt = 1.
Prices are set before observing realizations of the stochastic states. The dynamic pro-
blem of the plant is given by
V (z, p, P,σ) = E

θ max
p′
V˜ (z′, p′, P ′,σ′) + (1 − θ)V˜ (z′, p, P ′,σ′)

where θ denotes the price adjustment probability, and
V˜ (z, p, P,σ) =

p
P
−
w
α
α r + δ
1 − α
1−α p
zP
−ξ
+ βV (z, p, P,σ).
In Section 3.2.6 we study the role of the degree of price stickiness for the job flow
response to uncertainty shocks.
3.2.5 Financial frictions
Fluctuations in uncertainty may affect the economy through financial frictions. Un-
certainty may raise default probabilities and thereby increase plant borrowing costs,
which in turn depresses economic activity. In addition, liquidity may become more
valuable in periods of high uncertainty and plants may optimally downscale to pre-
serve liquidity. In the following, we consider a plant model which highlights the role
of financial frictions and liquidity, in the spirit of the model by Arellano et al. (2012).
The key financial friction in our model is that plants cannot borrow against ex-
pected future profits. Whenever period profits, dividends, are negative, the plant
defaults, irrespective of their continuation value. For simplicity, we abstract from
capital and assume technology y = l. Plants need to choose employment before ob-
serving their demand shock, which implies that profits can turn negative. Plants thus
default for a sufficiently low demand shock. The plant may finance its expenditures
by issuing a defaultable one-period bond. The debt contract pays b′ units when not
defaulting, and provides qb′ in return. In addition, plants face fixed operating costs
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f such that plant dividends are
d = zlµ − wl − b + q(l ′, b′, zt ,σt)b′ − f ≥ 0, µ = (ξ − 1) /ξ.
The dynamic problem a continuing plant is given by
V (z, l, b,σ) = max
b′,l ′,d
d + νβE[V (z′, l ′, b′,σ′)],
where plants exogenously exits the market with probability 1− ν every period.⁶
Plants sign one-period loan contracts with a perfectly competitive financial in-
termediary. The plant saves (b < 0) at the risk free rate, with the price of the bond
q(l ′, b′|z,σ)= β . If the plant accumulates debt, default may occur, denoted by in-
dicator ψ(z, l, b,σ)= 0, while one is no default. In the case of default, the lender
recovers part of the outstanding debt by taking possession of the plant with debt re-
set at zero and at cost η.⁷ The parameter η can be thought of as a cost for processing
bankruptcy, but also determines how much from plants’ value can be collateralized.
The price of the bond when borrowing is thus given by
q(l ′, b′|z,σ)b′
= βE

ψ(z′, l ′, b′,σ′)b′ +
 
1 − ψ(z′, l ′, b′,σ′)minb′, V¯ (z′, l ′, 0,σ′)	 ,
where V¯ (z′, l ′, 0,σ′)= max

V (z′, l ′, 0,σ′)−η, 0	 is the recovery value. In the next
section we study the job flows response to an uncertainty shock for different levels
of default costs, η.
3.2.6 Quantitative results
We calibrate the various models at quarterly frequency, in line with the frequency
of our empirical analysis. We use standard assumptions for parameters α, ξ, δ, and
⁶ The assumption of exogenous exit further motivates the use of debt by plants, see, for example,
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). We assume defaulting or exiting plant are
replaced by an identical plant with zero debt next period.
⁷We express η proportional to steady state revenues. As in Gilchrist et al. (2013), the exit rate
does not affect the loan price. We implicitly assume plants make payment decisions before the exit
shock realizes.
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r. Based on Bloom et al. (2014), we calibrate the stochastic demand process and
assume stochastic uncertainty, σt , follows a two-state Markov chain. We denote low
and high uncertainty byσL andσH , respectively. The transition probability, e.g. from
low to high uncertainty, is denotedpiσL,H . As in Cooper andWillis (2009), we calibrate
the wage rate to match the average plant employment of 600 workers observed in
the Longitudinal Research Database. Finally, following Gilchrist et al. (2013), we
calibrate the exogenous exit rate based on establishment entry and exit tabulations
from the Business Employment Dynamics, and the fixed operation costs based on the
ratio of general expenses to sales from Compustat data.⁸
Table 3.1. Model parameters
Parameter Value Explanation
α 0.65 Labor share in the economy
ξ 4 Markup of 33%
β 0.99 Discount factor at quarterly frequency
δ 2.6% Annual capital depreciation of 10%
r 1.01% Annual risk free interest rate of 4%
ρ 0.95 Serial correlation process
σL 0.051 Baseline uncertainty level
σH 4 x σ High uncertainty is four times the baseline level
piσL,H 0.03 Probability from low to high uncertainty
piσH,H 0.92 Probability of remaining at high uncertainty
state
All models except financial frictions
w 0.113 Average plant employs 600 workers
Model with financial frictions
w 0.07 Average plant employs 600 workers
ν 0.95 Survival probability
f 8 Fixed costs (11% of revenues)
⁸ Based on firm-level data from Compustat, the median ratio of sales, general, and administra-
tive expenses to sales is 22%. As Gilchrist et al. (2013), we assume that 50% of those expenditures
represent fixed costs of operations.
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After solving the dynamic problems, we independently simulate 5,000 economies
with 1,000 plants, for 80 quarters, respectively. Each economy is hit with an uncer-
tainty shock in the same quarter. In order to calculate the average response of aggre-
gate job flows to an uncertainty shock, we average across simulated economies.
Figure 3.1 shows the immediate response of job flows to an uncertainty shock
under different degrees of frictions. Stronger labor adjustment frictions increase the
magnitude of the job creation and job destruction response to an uncertainty shock.
While it is well known that adjustment frequency falls in adjustment costs, and thus
job creation and destruction fall, we find that adjustment costs positively interact
with uncertainty shocks and magnify the responses. Critically important for this re-
sult is the change in the employment adjustment triggers in response to higher uncer-
tainty. If the relative increase of these triggers is at least as large under high capital
adjustment costs as under low capital adjustment costs, then on impact job creation
and job destruction must fall by more under high costs. That is because under high
costs, plants’ employment policies are such that adjustment frequency is lower even
in normal times. Thus the probability mass of plants close to adjustment triggers is
lower. If the triggers move by at least as much under high costs as under low costs,
then the share of plants that adjust drops by more under high costs.⁹
As explained in Section 3.2.3, with capital adjustment frictions the immediate
response of job creation to higher uncertainty is an unambiguous drop, while the re-
sponse of job destruction is less clear. We find that job creation falls by more the large
capital adjustment costs are. The explanation is analogous to our discussion on labor
adjustment frictions. As for job destruction, however, we indeed find an ambiguous
effect of capital adjustment costs on the immediate response to uncertainty.
Under nominal rigidity, upward-price setting leads to lower job creation and hig-
her job destruction in response to higher uncertainty. We find that these response are
stronger the less rigid prices are. Notice that in our setup even when prices can be
adjusted every period (θ = 0), prices are set before observing the period profitability.
Thus, upward-price setting exists even for θ = 0. The longer-lived prices are, i.e. the
⁹ The analytical results in Abel and Eberly (1996) lend support to these quantitative results. Ap-
plying their results to our model with labor adjustment frictions by setting δ = 0, we can show that
the shift of adjustment triggers in response to higher uncertainty is magnified through the level of
adjustment costs.
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larger θ , the less are prices set only for a period of high uncertainty, but also for
subsequent periods during which plants expect lower uncertainty. This weakens the
incentive for upward-price setting. In addition, if less plants adjust prices, less plants
can raise them. This explains the mitigated responses of job flows to uncertainty
shocks when prices rigidity increases.
In an economy with financial frictions, higher uncertainty increases the proba-
bility of default. Therefore, the bond price declines, which leads to more jobs de-
stroyed and less jobs created. Importantly, the costlier default is, the more the bond
price declines in response to a shock that raises uncertainty. As a result, the adverse
responses of job flows to an uncertainty shock are magnified by the costs of default.
Alternatively, we could consider an economy where borrowing is subject to collateral
constraints. Higher uncertainty makes default more likely, which induces lenders to
charge a higher risk premium and raise collateral requirements. Consequently, plants
scale down production.
3.2
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Figure 3.1. First-quarter response of job flows to an uncertainty shock for varying degrees of frictions
Labor frictions
0% 2% 4% 6%
Labor costs (% Revenues)
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
  0%
J
o
b
s
 c
re
a
te
d
 (%
)
Capital frictions
  0%  30%  60%  90% 120%
Capital costs (% Revenues)
-100%
 -75%
 -50%
 -25%
   0%
J
o
b
s
 c
re
a
te
d
 (%
)
Nominal rigidities
  0%  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
Adjustment Probability (%)
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
  0%
J
o
b
s
 c
re
a
te
d
 (%
)
Financial frictions
1 2 3 4 5
Bankruptcy costs
-60%
-40%
-20%
  0%
J
o
b
s
 c
re
a
te
d
 (%
)
0% 2% 4% 6%
Labor costs (% Revenues)
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
  0%
J
o
b
s
 d
e
s
tr
o
ye
d
 (%
)
  0%  30%  60%  90% 120%
Capital costs (% Revenues)
-15%
-10%
 -5%
  0%
  5%
 10%
 15%
J
o
b
s
 d
e
s
tr
o
ye
d
 (%
)
  0%  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
Adjustment Probability (%)
  0%
 50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
J
o
b
s
 d
e
s
tr
o
ye
d
 (%
)
1 2 3 4 5
Bankruptcy costs
 50%
 75%
100%
125%
150%
J
o
b
s
 d
e
s
tr
o
ye
d
 (%
)
Notes: The figures show the percentage change of aggregate jobs flows in the first quarter after an uncertainty shock hits when varying the degree of labor adjust-
ment frictions, capital adjustment frictions, price rigidity, and financial frictions. Labor/Capital costs (% Revenues) denote the average costs of adjusting plants re-
lative to revenues. Bankruptcy costs are proportional to optimal revenues in the steady state. The model with labor frictions is solved for ac lf ∈ {0, 0.0005, ..., 0.05}
and ac lp ∈ {0, 0.1, .., 1}, with capital frictions for ackf ∈ {0,0.0005, ..., 0.05} and ackp ∈ {0,0.1, .., 1}, with price rigidity for θ ∈ {0, 0.1, .., 1}, and with financial
frictions for η ∈ {1,0.5, ..., 5}.
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3.3 Empirical estimation strategy
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the transmission of uncertainty
shocks with a focus on labor markets. Our empirical approach builds on the struc-
tural relation between various frictions and the transmission of uncertainty shocks
established in the previous section. In particular, our estimation strategy is to exploit
variation in the job flow responses to uncertainty shocks of narrowly defined indus-
tries and link variation in the estimated responses to industry-level observables that
are informative about the severity of the frictions we consider.
To identify industry-level responses of job flows to uncertainty shocks, we consi-
der a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model
Yt = A0 + Dt +
p∑
j=1
A jYt− j + But (3.1)
where Yt denotes a vector of endogenous variables, A0 is a vector of constants, D is
a vector capturing time trends, A1, . . . ,Ap are lag matrices of slope coefficients up to
maximum lag length p, ut are structural shocks with the identity matrix as covariance
matrix, and B is the matrix of structural coefficients such that But are reduced-form
residuals.
The model is six-variate including aggregate and industry-specific variables, spe-
cifically the log of the S&P 500 stock market index, uncertainty, the log of aggregate
manufacturing job creation and destruction and the log of industry-specific job cre-
ation and destruction. We include the aggregate variables to make sure we identify
responses in job flows that are industry-specific. To avoid identifying different shocks
from the same uncertainty series, we do not allow industry-specific job flows to feed
back into aggregate time series. To be precise, we restrict the slope coefficients that
capture such feedbacks to be zero. Denoting by Ak,lj the slope coefficent that captures
the effect of variable k on variable l at lag j, then the restrictions we impose are
Ai jc,ag gj = A
i jd,ag g
j = 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , p, and ∀ag g = s,u, jc, jd,
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where i jc and i jd denote industry-specific job creation and destruction, respectively,
whereas aggregates s,u, jc, jd denote the stock market, uncertainty and aggregate
job creation and destruction, respectively. This approach mimics Davis and Haltiwan-
ger (2001), who identify the effect of oil price shocks on industry-level job flows.
To identify uncertainty shocks, we impose restrictions on B. We assume that stock
market level is not contemporaneously affected by an uncertainty shock, while shocks
that contemporaneously affect the stock market may also contemporaneously affect
uncertainty. All other variables in the VARmodel may be contemporaneously affected
by uncertainty shocks. Following convention of the VAR literature, we let the uncer-
tainty shock be the second structural shock. The impulse response to the uncertainty
shock are then identified by the second column of B, here denoted B2. The recursive
identification scheme exactly identifies B2.
Using this identification scheme, we directly estimate the impulse responses to
uncertainty shocks using local projections, see Jorda (2005). Compared to the alter-
native of estimating the VAR model and inverting it to obtain impulse responses, the
local projections is more robust to model misspecification and importantly more flex-
ible to handle nonlinearities or the extra zero restrictions we impose on the reduced-
form model. We can use local projection to estimate reduced-form impulse responses
and transform these into structural impulse responses. To obtain reduced-form im-
pulse responses we project the vector of endogenous variables at different forecast
horizons h= 0,1, . . . ,H on its own lags
Yt+h = µ
h + δh t +
p∑
j=1
Mh+1j Yt− j + vt+h, (3.2)
where vt+h is the forecast error. For consistency with the VAR model, we re-
strict Mh+1,i jc,ag gj = M
h+1,i jd,ag g
j = 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , p, ∀ h= 0, 1, . . . ,H, and ∀ ag g =
s,u, jc, jd. Matrices Mh1 contain the reduced-form impulse responses, while the struc-
tural impulse response to the uncertainty shocks at horizon h are given by vector
Mh1B2. (3.3)
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After collecting the impulse responses of job creation and job destruction for all in-
dustries, we construct indices that capture the strength of the frictions we consider.
We then investigate whether cross-industry variation in these indices predicts the
estimated cross-industry variation in job flow responses to uncertainty shocks. We
propose to test for the importance of various transmission channels by whether the
responses of both job creation and job destruction significantly varies in the strength
of frictions with the sign as suggested by theory in the preceding section.
3.4 Data
This section describes the data used in the empirical application. In addition to ag-
gregate data used in the VAR model, we use industry-level data on job flows, and
data to capture cross-industry variation in the strength of labor adjustment frictions,
capital adjustment frictions, price rigidities, and financial frictions.
3.4.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is not directly observable. Instead we consider the series of conditional
foracast uncertainty over macroeconomic and financial variables as estimated in Ju-
rado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2015). Importantly, these uncertainty mea-
sures condition on predicted variability. Macroeconomic uncertainty is based on real
economic activity, prices, bond and stock market indexes, among others. Financial
uncertainty is based on financial variables, such as credit spreads, valuation ratios,
risk factors. Our baseline analysis uses the quarterly averaged macroeconomic un-
certainty.¹⁰ Appendix 3.A.3 shows the robustness of our results when using financial
uncertainty.
3.4.2 Job flows
A secondary contribution of this paper is to construct a panel of quarterly industry-
level job flows from 1972 until 2013. We do so by combining data from two sources,
the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) and the Quarterly Workforce Indicator
¹⁰We use the 3-month ahead conditional forecast uncertainty, but our findings are robust against
alternative forecast horizons.
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(QWI). LRD-based industry-level data on job flows are made publicly available by
Davis et al. (1998). The panel covers the years 1972-1998, and provides industry
disaggregation at the 4-digit SIC level, totaling 456 manufacturing industries.¹¹ We
complement this panel with the QWI, publicly available through the United States
Bureau of the Census (2015). The QWImeasures worker and job flows disaggregated
at the 4-digit NAICS level.¹² The underlying data is provided by states. State partici-
pation in the QWI has not been complete initially, and has increased over time. We
consider only those states who started providing information before 2000Q2. The
selected sample constitutes 90% manufacturing employment in United States. We
use X-13 ARIMA to remove the seasonal component from the series. To create a com-
mon industry classification, we use a correspondence table, provided by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, which maps NAICS into SIC codes. Notice that our
final panel has a gap from 1999 to 2001.
Figure 3.2 shows the aggregate time series of manufacturing employment based
on our new panel compared to the corresponding series published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). As expected, employment is about 90% lower in the QWI-
based series because of some missing states. Yet, the two series display strong como-
vement with the correlation being 98%. We refer the reader to Appendix 3.A.2 for
additional details about this data.
3.4.3 Indices of industry-level frictions
To provide empirical evidence on the transmissionmechanisms of uncertainty shocks,
we propose cross-sectional indices intended to capture the strength of factor adjust-
ment frictions, price rigidities, and financial frictions at the industry-level. These indi-
ces will be constructed such that higher index values imply higher degree of frictions
in a given industry.
¹¹ The LRD collects employment data from all US manufacturing plants with at least five employees
and accounts for more than 99% of total manufacturing employment.
¹² The QWI is based on the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD). The LEHD con-
sists of linked employer-employee data covering over 95% of US private sector jobs. It considers
employer’s state-specific UI account number as the business identifier.
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Figure 3.2. Aggregate employment in US manufacturing
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Notes: Manufacturing employment based on the connected industry sample from LRD and QWI. Aggregate manufactu-
ring employment based on tabulations from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3.4.3.1 Labor adjustment frictions
Labor market regulation tends to be common to all industries within the same coun-
try. Yet, the cost of raising hours worked, hiring or firing workers may differ across
industries. Following Botero et al. (2004), we use the industry-level share of workers
in full-time positions as measure of the flexibility of employment contracts and the
cost of firing workers. Further, we include the share of workers affiliated to labor uni-
ons to capture union power at the industry.¹³ Finally, we consider the industry-level
kurtosis of the cross-sectional net employment growth distribution based on Compu-
stat data. As argued in Section 3.2.2, under the presence of non-convex employment
adjustment costs, labor adjustments are infrequent and lumpy, which implies excess
kurtosis.¹⁴
¹³ The share of full-time workers and union density are based on the March Supplements from the
Current Population Survey, see Table 3.2. In order to map the industry classification from CPS into
1987 SIC we use a concordance table provided by David Dorn at http://www.dorn.net/data.htm.
¹⁴We compute the kurtosis of net employment growth at the industry if we have at least ten observa-
tions at the industry. Given that we lack of sufficient information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute
it at the 3-digit SIC level. Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC
level is not available, so we impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
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3.4.3.2 Capital adjustment frictions
Capital adjustment costs can be estimated through indirect inference using the dis-
tribution of cross-sectional gross investment rates, see, for example, Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) and Bachmann and Bayer (2014). A striking feature of the
cross-sectional distribution is substantial positive skewness and excess kurtosis. Non-
convex capital adjustment costs can account well for these empirical observations,
because they lead to lumpy investment, generating excess kurtosis, while in between
adjustments the capital stock depreciates leading to positive skewness. Importantly,
the large skewness and excess kurtosis, the larger adjustment costs must be to ma-
tch these moments. Using Compustat data, we consider the within-industry skew-
ness and kurtosis of the gross investment rate distribution to capture the degree of
capital adjustment frictions.¹⁵ In addition, we consider the ratio of structures over
equipment at the industry. Since structures are more costly to adjust than equipment
capital, see, for example, Caballero and Engel (1999), a large structure share implies
larger capital adjustment costs for a given total stock of capital.
3.4.3.3 Price rigidity
We measure industry-level price rigidity using the estimates in Petrella and Santoro
(2012). The authors consider sector-specific New Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) to
back-out the degree of price rigidity. They evaluate alternative measures of marginal
costs and different specifications of the sectoral NKPC. We consider the average sec-
toral price adjustment probabilities based on the intermediate input share as a proxy
for marginal costs, which fits best their model predictions.
3.4.3.4 Financial frictions
Industries differ in their liquidity and borrowing needs, which affect their vulnera-
bility to financial frictions. Following Raddatz (2006), we construct measures of li-
quidity needs as the industry-level median ratio of inventories to sales, and labor
¹⁵We compute these moments if we have at least ten observations for a industry. Given that we lack
of sufficient information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute the indicators at the 3-digit SIC level.
Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC level is not available, so we
impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
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costs to sales.¹⁶ These variables capture the share of inventory investments or labor
costs which can be commonly financed by revenues. The larger these ratio, the hig-
her the need for external finance. In principle, the constructed ratios may not be
entirely technological. For example, businesses may opt to accumulate liquid assets
to avoid financial dependence. To circumvent this problem, we follow the literature
and construct the measures using information from publicly traded U.S. companies.
The underlying assumption is that observed industry differences at these large publi-
cly traded companies are not driven by the supply of credit, which is assumed to be
perfectly elastic.
We complement this information with the employment share of young firms (be-
low 5 years old) per industry. There is ample evidence which associates larger bor-
rowing costs to young businesses, as they have higher degree of idiosyncratic risk,
lower amount of collateral, and shorter credit records.¹⁷
3.4.3.5 Industry-level indices
Table 3.2 summarizes the variables we use to capture cross-industry variation in
the severity of various frictions. We aggregate the information available by crea-
ting industry-level indices for the severity of each friction. Our baseline approach
is to average the variables after standardizing them. For example, the baseline la-
bor friction index for a given industry is the mean over the standardized values of
the share of full-time workers, the unionization rate, and the employment growth
kurtosis.¹⁸ Our final panel includes 443 manufacturing industries. Table 3.3 presents
the correlations between the indexes. On the one hand, industries with larger capi-
tal adjustment costs tend to have larger labor adjustment costs. On the other hand,
¹⁶We consider only those industries with at least 5 firms at the industry. Given that we lack of
sufficiently information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute the indicators at the 3-digit SIC level.
Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC level is not available, so we
impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
¹⁷ The literature used size of the business as alternative indicator for access to credit and tightness
of the borrowing constraint. However, there is recent evidence which suggests that financial frictions
do not lead to different business dynamics across firm size, once controlling by the age of the firm.
See for example Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Dyrda (2015), and Fort et al. (2013).
¹⁸As alternative to such index, we estimate the first principal component over the set of included
variables. Our main findings are robust to this specification, see Appendix 3.A.3.2.
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industries more vulnerable to financial conditions tend to exhibit lower factor adjus-
tment frictions.
Table 3.2. Variables used to measure the strength of frictions at the industry-level
Variable Source
Labor adjustment frictions
Share of (35 hours or more) full-time workers March CPS: 1970-2011
Unionization rate of workers March CPS: 1990-2011
(Within-industry) net employment growth kurtosis Compustat: 1968-2006
Capital adjustment frictions
(Within-industry) gross investment rate skewness Compustat: 1968-2006
(Within-industry) gross investment rate kurtosis Compustat: 1968-2006
Share of structure per equipment capital NBER-CES: 1958-2011
Price rigidities
Price adjustment probability (model-based estimates) Petrella and Santoro (2012)
Financial frictions
Share of inventory value over sales Compustat: 1968-2006
Share of labor cost over sales Compustat: 1968-2006
Employment share at young firms (below 5 years) QWI: 2000-2013
Table 3.3. Correlation between indexes
Labor index Capital index Price index Financial index
Labor index 1
Capital index .268∗∗∗ 1
Price index -.022 −.03 1
Financial index −.311∗∗∗ −.083∗ 0.087∗ 1
Notes: This table presents pairwise correlations between our indexes. See Table 3.2 for for a
detail description of the industry indexes. Significance: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
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3.5 Empirical evidence on the transmission of
uncertainty shocks
3.5.1 Job flow responses to uncertainty shocks
We fit our VAR model in (3.1) using quarterly data from 1972Q2 to 2013Q4 and assuming
four lags. To account for the missing states in the QWI data used, we add a step dummy to
(3.1), which takes the value of one from 2000Q2 onwards, and zero otherwise. Further, we
allow for different time trends in the first part of the panel (1972-1998) and the second part
(2000-2013).
Figure 3.3 shows the effects of an uncertainty shock on aggregate job creation and job
destruction. Note that job creation significantly falls while job destruction significantly increa-
ses. This finding is of interest by itself. In particular, in a simple model where net employment
change is subject to non-convex costs, we should expect job destructions to fall in response to
higher uncertainty, because plants freeze, see Section 3.2.2. Therefore, the response of the
aggregate series suggests that such employment frictions are likely not key for the transmis-
sion of uncertainty shocks, which further motivates the subsequent industry-level analysis.
Figure 3.3. Response of aggregate job flows to uncertainty shock
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Notes: The blue lines show the responses of aggregate manufacturing job flows to a positive, three-standard deviation
uncertainty shock. The shaded area is the 90% confidence interval using block bootstraps as in Kilian and Kim (2009).
To compress the information contained in the industry-level impulse response functions,
we focus on the average response within the first year after the uncertainty shock hits. We
restrict attention to the short-term responses because in models with factor adjustment fricti-
ons the real options effect, i.e. plant freezing, has a predominantly short-term effect on the
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response of job flows to uncertainty shocks. Figure 3.4 shows the cross-sectoral variation in
job flow responses to uncertainty shock. Reconfirming the result in Figure 3.3, we find for
80% of the industries a joint decline in job creation and an increase in job destruction.
Figure 3.4. Cross-industry variation in job flow responses to uncertainty shock
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Notes: Response of job flows averaged over the first year horizon to a three-standard deviation uncertainty shock. Mar-
ker size is proportional to employment of an industry.
3.5.2 Transmission channels
Given the estimated aggregate and industry-level responses, the central question we ask is
through which channel uncertainty shocks affect labor markets. To tackle this question, we
relate the first-year average industry-level impulse responses to the labor frictions index, capi-
tal frictions index, price rigidity index, financial friction index as constructed in Section 3.4.3.
In Table 3.4, we rank industries according to the indices and provide mean and standard
error of the job flow response of those industries in the first (bottom) quintile and those in-
dustries in the fifth (top) quintile. Only for financial frictions, the responses across quintile
groups are both significantly different and the differences correspond to theoretical predicti-
ons: The stronger financial frictions, the larger the drop in job creation and the larger the
rise in job destruction. For labor frictions, the quintile-group difference for job destruction is
significant but of the wrong sign: Empirically, industries in which our index suggest stronger
labor adjustment frictions destroy more jobs. If labor adjustment frictions are the key frictions
for the transmission of uncertainty shocks on labor markets, we would expect the opposite
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sign. We find a significant negative effect of capital frictions for the job destruction response.
Yet, our theoretical prediction were ambiguous. To summarize, while we do find evidence in
support of financial frictions being key for the transmission of uncertainty shocks, we do not
find such supportive evidence for any of the other three frictions.
Table 3.4. Job flow responses and quintiles of friction indices
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.64 -0.75 0.49 0.85
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.55 -0.60 0.68 0.54
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.70 -0.70 0.66 0.62
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.45 -0.61 0.26 0.64
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Bottom (Top) quintile: First-year average job flow response of industries in
the first (fifth) quintile of the cross-industry distribution of a given index. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Complementing the quintile-based friction-by-friction analysis in Table 3.4, we estimate
a regression of the job flow response on cubic polynomials of all four friction indices jointly.¹⁹
Figure 3.5 shows the fitted relationships between the job flow responses and each individual
friction index, while evaluating the remaining indices at their median. The results broadly
reconfirm and strengthen the findings in Table 3.4. We do not find supporting evidence of
capital frictions and price rigidities as channels through which uncertainty affects job flows.
While the share of jobs destroyed declines with the size of capital frictions at the industry,
there is no significant relation between the decline in job creation and the size of capital
adjustment frictions. Similarly, the relation between price rigidity and industry-level job flow
responses is almost flat. On the contrary, financial frictions seems to play an important role for
explaining the effects of uncertainty shocks. The more severe financial frictions in an industry,
the stronger the response of job flows from an uncertainty shock. The role of financial frictions
is quantitatively important: In response to a three-standard deviation uncertainty shock, job
creation barely falls for industries with weak frictions, while it falls by up to 0.7% for strong
¹⁹Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) inspired us to conduct this exercise.
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frictions. Similarly, Job destruction does not increase for weak-friction industries, while it
increases by up to 0.7% for strong-friction industries.
3.5.3 Robustness of empirical findings
Our main empirical findings, in particular the empirical support of financial frictions as trans-
mission mechanism for uncertainty shocks, is robust along various dimensions. In Appen-
dix 3.A.3, we show that the results are robust against substituting macroeconomic uncer-
tainty based on Jurado et al. (2015) by a financial uncertainty series based on Ludvigson et
al. (2015). Moreover, instead of constructing indices to capture the strength of various fricti-
ons across industries, we extract the first component form the set of variables considered
for the various frictions. In the appendix, we show that this leaves our conclusions broadly
unaffected. To address concerns about the construction of our job flow panel, we separately
consider the LRD-based panel from 1972 to 1998 and the QWI-based panel from 2000 to
2013. The former panel reconfirms our baseline findings. This also addresses concerns whet-
her our results are driven by the extraordinary uncertainty spike during the Great Recession.
For the second sample, we receive the same qualitative results, with the only exception that
the job creation response varies insignificantly across quintiles of different degrees of finan-
cial frictions. Obviously, using a 14-year panel to study business cycles is challenging in terms
of statistical power.
In addition, we assess whether our findings are robust in a richer VAR system which
explicitly controls for monetary and fiscal shocks. We augment our baseline specification
with monetary and fiscal shocks identified through narrative approaches. For the former, we
include the shocks series by Coibion et al. (2012), for the latter the series inMertens and Ravn
(2014). Data availability limits this analysis until 2006Q4. We place the tax and monetary
shocks first in the recursive ordering. We find that in more than 60% of the industries, an
uncertainty shock leads to a joint increase in job destruction and a decrease in job creation.
Figure 3.6 shows that the relation between job flow responses and financial vulnerability
remains significant and of similar quantitative magnitude when compared to our baseline
results.
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Figure 3.5. Nonlinear relation between job flow responses and friction indices
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Notes: The figures are based on regressions of industry-level job flow responses on cubic polynomials of all friction indi-
ces. Blue lines show the estimated relation between job flow responses and one friction index when keeping the other
friction indices at their medians, respectively. Shaded areas denote 90% confidence interval. We weight industry-level
responses by the estimated absolute effect relative to its standard error.
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Figure 3.6. Nonlinear relation between job flow responses and friction indices
when explicitly controlling for monetary and fiscal shocks
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Notes: The figures are based on regressions of industry-level job flow responses on cubic polynomials of all friction indi-
ces. Blue lines show the estimated relation between job flow responses and one friction index when keeping the other
friction indices at their medians, respectively. Shaded areas denote 90% confidence interval. We weight industry-level
responses by the estimated absolute effect relative to its standard error.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper revises a number of transmission channels for uncertainty shocks studied in the
literature, in particular labor adjustment frictions, capital adjustment frictions, price rigidi-
ties, and financial frictions. Focusing on labor markets, we provide empirical evidence on the
aggregate and industry-level response of job flows to uncertainty shocks. The key contribu-
tion of this paper is to exploit the cross-industry variation in job flow responses to provide
evidence for the transmission mechansims of uncertainty shocks.
We create industry-level data on job flows for 1972-2013 in the US and find that a po-
sitive uncertainty shock jointly raises job destruction and lowers job creation in 80% of the
industries. The (absolute) magnitude of these responses strongly and significantly responds
to how vulnerable industries are to financial conditions, which supports financial frictions as
transmission channel of uncertainty shocks. On the contrary, we do not find evidence in sup-
port of factor adjustment frictions or price rigidities as transmission channels of uncertainty
shocks.
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Appendix 3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Computation
We solve the models by discretizing the state space. For the exogenous demand process z,
we apply a Tauchen discretization with 19 grid points while taking into account time-varying
volatility, see Bloom et al. (2014). For the model with labor adjustment frictions, we use
1,000 log-linear grids points for labor. For the model with capital adjustment frictions, we
use 1,000 grid points for capital. In the model with price rigidities, we further discretize the
exogenous aggregate price process P with 19 grid points, applying again a Tauchen algorithm,
and consider 1,000 grid points for the price of the plant. Finally, for the financial frictions
model, which is relatively more complex than the other dynamic problems, we discretize the
demand process with 16 grid points, and consider 40 log-spaced grid points for labor, and
48 equi-distant grid points for debt. We solve the models using value function iteration.
To numerically solve the model with financial frictions in Section 3.2.5 we consider the
following steps: First, guess the price for the bond the value of the plant. Second, given
the bond price, calculate the value function using value function iteration. Third, using the
updated value function, construct the default function and update the bond price. Fourth,
based on the updated bond price, return to point 1 until the price of the bond convergences.
3.A.2 Data description
We use a concordance table provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
to connect the LRD-based information at the 4-digit 1987 SIC level with the data series from
QWI, disaggregated at the 4-digit 2007 NAICS level, see http://www.nber.org/nberprod/.
We create consistent a consistent industry classification using this concordance table toget-
her with weights that reflect the share of employment at the SIC level which corresponds to
an industry in NAICS. Before proceeding with this concordance, we need to conduct some
adjustments. First, the available concordance between SIC and NAICS is based on the 1997
NAICS. Therefore, we translate 6-digit 2007 NAICS into 6-digit 1997 NAICS using the ta-
ble given by US Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/
concordances.html. Second, we adjust the concordance table from the 6-digit NAICS level to
the 4-digit NAICS level, and re-compute the weights from SIC into NAICS based on the share
of employment of the 6-digit NAICS industry at the 4-digit NAICS level. At the end, we are
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able to map all industry-level job flows from NAICS with the LRD-based data from Davis et al.
(1998).
3.A.3 Robustness
3.A.3.1 Job flow responses from a financial uncertainty shock
Figures 3.7 and Table 3.5 show the effect of uncertainty shocks on job flows when using
financial uncertainty as a proxy for uncertainty. Ludvigson et al. (2015) distinguish between
macroeconomic and financial uncertainty where the latter seems to have larger negative
impact on real economic activity. Yet, the quantitative effect on job flows and its relation
with the industry indexes are remarkably similar to our baseline results, when using as a
proxy macroeconomic uncertainty.
Figure 3.7. Response of aggregate job flows to financial (instead of macroeconomic)
uncertainty shock
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Notes: The blue lines show the responses of aggregate manufacturing job flows to a positive, three-standard deviation
uncertainty shock. The shaded area is the 90% confidence interval using block bootstraps as in Kilian and Kim (2009).
3.A.3.2 Results based on the first principal component
As alternative to the baseline indices, mean of standardized variables, to capture the strength
of various frictions, we consider the first principal component of of the variables used to
capture frictions. Our results are remarkably robust against these alternative indices.
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Table 3.5. Job flow responses and quintiles of friction indices
when using financial (instead of macroeconomic) uncertainty
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.63 -0.65 0.50 0.73
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.59 -0.58 0.64 0.52
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.61 -0.63 0.60 0.57
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.52 -0.64 0.22 0.57
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Bottom (Top) quintile: First-year average job flow response of industries in
the first (fifth) quintile of the cross-industry distribution of a given index. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Table 3.6. Job flow responses and quintiles of friction indices
when using first principal components to construct friction indices
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.70 -0.77 0.52 0.86
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.52 -0.60 0.65 0.58
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.71 -0.72 0.66 0.62
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.48 -0.62 0.25 0.66
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Bottom (Top) quintile: First-year average job flow response of industries in
the first (fifth) quintile of the cross-industry distribution of a given index. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
3.A.3.3 Effects from uncertainty shocks in the first and second sample of analysis
We explore whether our findings hold if we focus on the first sample of analysis (1972-1998),
see Figures 3.8 and Table 3.7, and second sample of analysis (2000-2013), see Figures 3.9
and 3.7. While the samples differ in regards to the quantitative effect of uncertainty shocks,
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as higher the vulnerability to financial frictions, stronger is the effect of uncertainty shocks
on job flows at both series.
Figure 3.8. Response of aggregate job flows to uncertainty shock
when using the sample 1972-1998
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Notes: The blue lines show the responses of aggregate manufacturing job flows to a positive, three-standard deviation
uncertainty shock. The shaded area is the 90% confidence interval using block bootstraps as in Kilian and Kim (2009).
Table 3.7. Job flow responses and quintiles of friction indices
when using the sample 1972-1998
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.58 -0.70 0.33 0.86
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Capital frictions index -0.55 -0.67 0.68 0.51
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Price rigidity index -0.71 -0.70 0.57 0.51
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Financial frictions index -0.31 -0.56 0.12 0.57
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Notes: Bottom (Top) quintile: First-year average job flow response of industries in
the first (fifth) quintile of the cross-industry distribution of a given index. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
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Figure 3.9. Response of aggregate job flows to uncertainty shock
when using the sample 2000-2013
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
 
%
-c
ha
ng
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
 
Quarters after the shock
Jobs Created
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
 
%
-c
ha
ng
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
 
Quarters after the shock
Jobs Destroyed
Notes: The blue lines show the responses of aggregate manufacturing job flows to a positive, three-standard deviation
uncertainty shock. The shaded area is the 90% confidence interval using block bootstraps as in Kilian and Kim (2009).
Table 3.8. Job flow responses and quintiles of friction indices
when using the sample 2000-2013
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.31 -0.42 0.40 0.50
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Capital frictions index -0.42 -0.33 0.47 0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Price rigidity index -0.36 -0.29 0.42 0.40
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial frictions index -0.28 -0.31 0.20 0.41
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Notes: Bottom (Top) quintile: First-year average job flow response of industries in
the first (fifth) quintile of the cross-industry distribution of a given index. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
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3.A.3.4 Alternative time horizons for average job flow responses
Figure 3.10. Nonlinear relation between job flow responses and friction indices
when using different horizons of job flow responses
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Notes: The figures are based on regressions of industry-level job flow responses on cubic polynomials of all friction indi-
ces. Dashed/solid/dash-dotted lines show the estimated relation between first-two-quarters/first-year/first-six-quarters
average job flow responses and one friction index when keeping the other friction indices at their medians, respectively.
Shaded areas denote 90% confidence interval. We weight industry-level responses by the estimated absolute effect rela-
tive to its standard error.
4Productivity Dispersions: Could it Simply
be Technology Choice?
Joint with Christian Bayer and Ariel Mecikovsky
4.1 Introduction
The allocation of factors to their most productive use is often seen as one of the key deter-
minants of economic prosperity (Foster et al., 2008). While first-best efficiency requires that
factors produce the same marginal revenue across all production units, many studies show
this condition to be violated in micro-data: factor productivities differ substantially within
industries.¹
We ask whether these micro-level differences can be understood as a result of frictions
in technology choice. We suggest a setup, where firms may in principle choose from a broad
set of technologies, but it is costly to search for them, to install them, and to acquire the
know-how necessary to use them. This leads firms to operate one single technology which
they adjust only occasionally. In between adjustments, the capital-labor ratio, the capital
intensity, remains fixed: firms operate a Leontief production technology. As the economic
environment changes and firms asynchronously adapt their technology in response, cross-
sectional differences in factor productivities and capital intensity emerge.
This cross-sectional dispersion, however, is not the only empirical implication of frictional
technology choice. Across all firms, differences in factor productivities and capital intensity
¹ See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Peters (2013), Asker et al. (2014),
Gopinath et al. (2015), and Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2015) to name a few.
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should be predominantly long-lived. Moreover, there must be a trade-off involved. Firms with
persistently high productivity in one factor should have a persistently low productivity in
another factor. Further, as long as the capital intensity is fixed, i.e. in the short run, labor and
capital productivity can only move in the same direction. Finally, the extent of competition
limits the scope of technologies used in the economy. The more competitive the environment,
the larger is the pressure to abandon cost-inefficient technologies.
To explore whether these implications are borne out empirically, we compute micro-level
labor and capital productivity controlling for industry and time effects, and decompose them
into their persistent and transitory components. To have a broad empirical base, we exploit
micro data from Germany (firm-level), Chile, Colombia, and Indonesia (plant-level). We find
that between 61% and 94% of the cross-sectional variance in labor and capital productivity
is explained by their persistent components. The result is even stronger for capital intensity
where the persistent component explains more than 77% for all countries. Furthermore, the
persistent components of labor and capital productivity are negatively correlated, while their
transitory components are positively correlated. In addition, persistent differences in capital
intensity are less dispersed in more competitive environments, i.e. where markups are persis-
tently lower. Firms/plants in the most competitive quintile exhibit a 30-50% lower variance
of capital intensity than those in the least competitive quintile. In summary, the data qualita-
tively supports the idea of a friction in technology choice driving productivity dispersions.
We use this framework to quantify the effects of a frictional technology choice in ag-
gregate productivity. Despite the large cross-sectional productivity dispersion, our estimated
efficiency losses from misallocation are on average 5%, which is small relative to the estima-
tes from the literature. Important for this is our focus on productive efficiency, i.e. deviations
from optimal capital intensity. In contrast, studies like Hsieh and Klenow (2009) have taken
a broader focus including allocative efficiency, i.e. deviations from optimal scale. We disre-
gard those deviations, showing up as dispersions in markups, for our efficiency calculations
for two reasons. First, these dispersions might reflect efficient differentiation within industry.
For example, they might stem from alternative strategies on product quality or range (e.g.
Bar-Isaac et al., 2012), think of generics vs. patented pharmaceuticals. Second, there is al-
ready a broad set of theories predicting markup dispersions to which we have little to add.
Think of models with price setting frictions á la Calvo (1983), with building a customer base
(Gourio and Rudanko, 2014), or with entry dynamics and innovation as in Peters (2013). All
of these provide explanations of productivity dispersions through heterogeneous markups as
endogenous objects. At the same time, our data suggests that markup dispersions themselves
explain only a minority of all productivity dispersion.
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Our results are linked to the traditional putty-clay assumption (Johansen, 1959), which
has been advocated to address a broad array of other empirical phenomena (Gilchrist and
Williams, 2000, 2005; Gourio, 2011). Particularly closely related is Kaboski’s (2005) model
of putty-clay technology choice under factor price uncertainty. An important insight from
this paper that carries over to our setup is that firms underreact to current prices in setting
their technology, such that the regression techniques usually used to identify the long-run
elasticity of substitution (see e.g. Raval (2014) or Oberfield and Raval (2014) for recent
contributions or Chirinko (2008) for an overview) are subject to a downwards bias. In fact, we
provide evidence that this downwards bias is likely substantial. This high elasticity not only
has important implications for income-shares (see e.g. Solow, 1956; Piketty, 2011; Piketty,
2014; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013) but is also key to compute the efficiency losses from
a friction in technology choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes our technology
choice model. This guides our empirical analysis in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we discuss the
potential gains from eliminating this friction. Section 4.5 concludes and an Appendix follows.
4.2 Technology choice model
This section suggests a simple model of technology choice. We then study the implications of
technology choice for productivity dispersions and for aggregate productive efficiency.
4.2.1 Model setup
We consider a two-period model. We assume a mass of firms of measure one. Each firm, i,
is endowed with one plant that has an exogenously given capital intensity ki =
Ki
Ni
, where Ki
is the physical amount of capital and Ni is labor. Furthermore, wages, W , and user costs of
capital, R, are exogenously given but stochastic.
Each firm has a constant returns to scale production technology and faces monopolistic
competition for its product, where the elasticity, ξi , of demand for the product, yi , of firm i
is firm-specific and constant, such that prices are given by
pi =
1
1 − ξi z
ξi
i y
−ξi
i ,
where zi is the stochastic market size for firm i’s product. Unit costs of production depend
on the plant’s capital intensity and factor prices, ci = c(ki ,W,R). The firm maximizes profits,
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and we assume that the firm needs to decide about output before knowing actual factor
prices and demand. The optimal policy will choose output in order to stabilize the expected
markup at its optimal level. The expected gross markup is constant, 11−ξi > 1. Denoting the
expectations operator as E, it is straightforward to show that the profit maximizing output,
y∗i , and expected profits under the optimal policy, pi∗, are given by
y∗i =
 Ezξii
Ec(ki ,R,W )
1/ξi ; pi∗i = ξi1 − ξi y∗i Ec(ki ,R,W ). (4.1)
4.2.2 Revenue productivities
Profit maximization implies that firms facing higher demand elasticities, ξi , have larger mar-
kups on average. In addition, deviations from expected costs, Eci / ci , and deviations from
expected demand, zξii /Ez
ξi
i , lead to fluctuations in realized markups, given by:
pi y
∗
i
WNi + RkiNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
Eci
ci
. (4.2)
Splitting up realized markups in two components, the same terms affect revenue factor pro-
ductivities, the capital and labor expenses per value added:
pi y
∗
i
WNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
E(W + Rki)
W
(4.3)
pi y
∗
i
RkiNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
E(W + Rki)
Rki
(4.4)
(4.3) and (4.4) show that firms with higher (target) markups, 11−ξi exhibit both higher la-
bor and capital productivities. Similarly, positive and unforeseen demand shocks, zξii /Ez
ξi
i ,
increase both factor productivities. Notice that in a more general multi-period setup, these
deviations from expectations can only be transitory. Importantly, firms with higher capital
intensity have a lower capital revenue productivity and higher labor revenue productivity,
even when these capital intensity differences are expected.
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To summarize, productivities differ across firms either because of differences in size re-
lative to demand (the first two terms) or due to differences in capital intensity and factor
prices (the last term) in (4.3) and (4.4).²
4.2.3 Choice of technology
We assume that in the period preceding production, the firm can opt to replace its existing
plant, setting up a new one with different capital intensity k. In doing so, the firm compares
expected profits with and without technology adjustment to decide the period preceding
production whether to produce with its initially given capital intensity or to invest in changing
the technology. We assume adjustment is costly as it disrupts production. This disruption
summarizes all costs of searching for a technology, installing it and learning to operate it.
Upon adjustment the firm forgoes a fraction φi of next period’s profits, where φi stochastic
and drawn from a distribution Φ. The firm drawsφi before it decides about adjustment. If the
firm adjusts, it chooses kˆ, the capital intensity that minimizes expected unit costs. Adjustment
is optimal whenever (1−φi)Epi(kˆ)> Epi(ki). Using (4.1), this simplifies to
(1 − φi) >

Ec(ki ,R,W )
Ec(kˆ,R,W )
 ξi−1
ξi
. (4.5)
Since Ec(ki ,R,W )≥ Ec(kˆ,R,W ), firms with higher elasticity of demand, ξi , are less li-
kely to adjust for a given ex ante capital intensity ki . The reason is that firms with highmarket
power can offload their higher unit costs to consumers and hence have less incentive to in-
vest in efficient capital intensities. This is reminiscent of Leibenstein’s (1966) X-inefficiency
of monopolies or Bester and Petrakis’s (1993) results for oligopolies.³
As a result, ex-post capital-intensity will be less dispersed within the group of firms with
low markups than among high-markup firms if the ex-ante distribution of capital intensities
is centered around the cost minimizing level kˆ.
²As evident from equation 4.2, in this environment, adding an additional shock to unit costs (a
TFP shock) has the same implications as a demand shock.
³ There is, however, one interesting side result of our setup. One can easily show that under the
specific assumption of an isoelastic demand curve and monopolistic competition, producer profits and
consumer rents are equal and therefore, total social surplus of adjustment as well as the social costs
of adjustment need to be scaled by factor two such that the individual optimal adjustment choice is
socially optimal.
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4.2.4 Productive efficiency
The friction in technology choice is costly. We study the aggregate costs of this friction focu-
sing on the losses in productive efficiency, i.e. deviations from optimal capital intensity. We
compute these losses by characterizing the difference of unit costs under the friction compa-
red against a frictionless benchmark.
To specify more concretely the relation between capital intensity and unit costs, we as-
sume that the long-run technology is given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production function with σ the substitution elasticity between labor and capital. The output
of a plant with capital intensity ki is given by
yi =
h
αk
σ−1
σ
i + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
i σ
σ−1
Ni , (4.6)
where A captures (Harrod neutral) labor-augmenting technological change, and α is the dis-
tribution parameter. This implies that realized unit costs, ci =
RkiNi+WNi
yi
are minimal at capital
intensity k∗, given by
k∗ =

α
1 − α
W
R
σ
A1−σ. (4.7)
Now, to obtain an expression that allows us to relate the cross-sectional average unit costs
to the first two moments of the capital intensity distribution, we use a log second-order
approximation around that minimum:
Ex

log
c(ki ,R,W )
c(k∗,R,W )

≈ 1
2σ
s∗(1 − s∗)

Ex

log
ki
k∗
2
+ Vx(log ki)

, (4.8)
where s∗ is the capital expenditure share in the cost-minimizing optimum
s∗ = Rk∗ /(W + Rk∗),
and Ex denotes the cross-sectional average and Vx the cross-sectional variance.⁴ In words,
the efficiency loss is composed of the average relative difference of capital intensity from its
optimum, Ex log(ki / k∗), and the cross-sectional dispersion of capital intensity across plants,
Vx(log ki). Importantly, the higher the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital,
σ, the lower the efficiency loss from not re-setting capital intensities to their optimum.
⁴ See Appendix 4.A.2 for details.
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4.3 Empirical analysis
4.3.1 Data description
We document factor revenue productivity and capital intensity dispersion in firm-level data
from Germany, and plant-level data from Chile, Colombia and Indonesia. For Germany, we
use the balance sheet data base of the Bundesbank, USTAN, which is a private sector, annual
firm-level data available for 26 years (1973-1998).⁵ For Chile, Colombia and Indonesia, we
have plant level data from the ENIA survey for 1995-2007, the EAM census for 1977-1991
and the IBS dataset for 1988-2010, respectively. These datasets are focused on the manu-
facturing sector, with the exception of Germany, which provides information for the entire
private non-financial business sector.⁶
When preparing the data for our analysis, we make sure to treat the various data sets in
the most comparable way. From each survey, we use a firm’s/plant’s four-digit industry code,
wage bill, value-added and book or current value of capital stock. To obtain economically
consistent capital series for each firm/plant, we re-calculate capital stocks using the perpetual
inventory method whenever the data reports capital stocks in book values. In particular, we
exploit information of capital disaggregated into structures and equipment, which allows us
to control for heterogeneity in capital composition across firms/plants.
Our capital productivity measure requires information on depreciation and the real in-
terest rate. We do not rely on depreciation as reported by firms/plants, as it is potentially
biased for tax purposes. Instead we use economic depreciation rates by type of capital good
obtained from National Statistics. We then take the different capital good mixes across firms/
plants into account.⁷ We set the real rate to 5% for all economies. This implies user costs of
capital Ri t = 5%+δi t . In generating cross-sectional statistics, time variations in user costs
are controlled for by taking out four-digit industry-year fixed effects. The data treatment and
sample selection is described in detail in Appendix 4.A.1.2.
⁵ See Bachmann and Bayer (2014) for a detailed description.
⁶ In particular, private non-financial business sector includes Agriculture, Energy and Mining, Ma-
nufacturing, Construction, and Trade.
⁷ The economic depreciation rates of equipment and structures for Germany is obtained from Volks-
wirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung (VGR) while for Chile we obtain time series from Henriquez (2008).
As for Colombia and Indonesia, we consider the average depreciation in Chile for the available period
given the absence of national data sources. The depreciation rate values are 15.1% (equipment) and
3.3% (structures) in Germany, and on average 10.5% (equipment) and 4.4% (structures) for the other
three countries.
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4.3.2 Productivities and their transitory and persistent component
We compute average factor productivities for capital and labor per firm and year using the
reported value added per firm/plant at current prices, pi t yi t , labor expenses,WtNi t as repor-
ted in the profit and loss statements, and imputed capital expenses, Ri tKi t . Taking logs, we
define revenue productivities of labor and capital:
αNit := log(pi t yi t) − log(WtNi t); αKit := log(pi t yi t) − log(Ri tKi t). (4.9)
Using expenditures and value added implicitly controls for quality differences in both inputs
and outputs (c.f. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). In addition, we construct markups as value added
relative to total expenditures on labor and capital
mci t := log(pi t yi t) − log(Ri tKi t + WtNi t). (4.10)
Finally, we calculate the factor price-weighted capital intensity,
κi t := log(Ri tKi t) − log(WtNi t). (4.11)
For any of these variables, say x i t , we calculate 5-year moving averages, denoted x¯ i t :=
1
5
∑2
s=−2 x i t+s, to identify the persistent component. Deviations thereof, xˆ i t := x i t − x¯ i t , iden-
tify the transitory component.
We then take out four-digit industry-year fixed effects and calculate dispersions and cor-
relations between the factor productivities for the transitory and persistent component.
4.3.3 Empirical findings
Table 4.1 reports standard deviations and correlation for labor and capital productivity and
for all four countries. Three observations stand out: First, capital and labor productivity are
positively correlated in the transitory component (ρ ≈ 40%) while they are negatively corre-
lated in the persistent component (ρ ≈ −20%). Using the expressions for factor productivities
in Section 4.2, see (4.3) and (4.4), deviations from optimal size are more important in the
short run, while deviations from optimal capital intensity are more important in explaining
long-run productivity differences. Second, the persistent components in productivity explain
the vast majority of cross-sectional productivity differences (between 60% and 92% for la-
bor and between 79% and 94% for capital). Third, the developing economies show larger
productivity dispersions.
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Figure 4.1. Correlations of factor productivities by four-digit industry
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Notes: Transitory (Persistent) Correlation: Correlation between the transitory (persistent) com-
ponent of labor and capital productivity at the firm/plant level, controlling for time-fixed ef-
fects. Each circle represents a four digit industry, where the size of a circle reflects aggregate
employment in that industry. For this figure, we restrict industries to include at least 20 firms/
plants. The number of industries inside the upper-left quadrant is 99 (out of 125) in Germany,
45 (out of 61) in Chile, 62 (out of 73) in Colombia, and 85 (out of 90) in Indonesia.
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Table 4.1. Transitory and persistent components of factor productivities
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component Persistent Component
DE 0.066 0.119 0.352 0.229 0.456 -0.207
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
CL 0.184 0.281 0.449 0.232 0.577 -0.190
(0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.028) (0.021)
CO 0.144 0.172 0.517 0.257 0.568 -0.234
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018)
ID 0.211 0.369 0.343 0.255 0.669 -0.269
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Notes: Cross-sectional standard-deviations (std) and correlation (ρ) of transitory and persis-
tent components of labor- and capital productivity, αLi t and α
K
it as in (4.9). DE: Germany, CL:
Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: Indonesia. Transitory and persistent components are obtained by ap-
plying a five year moving average filter. Factor productivities are demeaned by 4-digit industry
and year, and expressed in logs. In parentheses: Clustered standard errors at the firm/plant
level.
As the positive/negative correlation pattern between labor and capital productivity is a
particularly important prediction of technology choice, we investigate whether this pattern
holds for individual four-digit industries. Figure 4.1 shows that this is the case for the vast
majority of industries.
In light of our results in Section 4.2, it is useful to look at markup and capital intensity
differences, see Table 4.2. In particular, (4.8) allows us to relate capital intensity differen-
ces across firms/plants directly to increases in unit costs, and thus to losses in productive
efficiency. For all countries, differences in capital intensity are very persistent. The transitory
component makes up only between 4% (Germany) and 17% (Indonesia) of the total variance.
At the same time, persistent differences in capital intensity are substantially more dispersed
in Chile, Colombia, and Indonesia than they are in Germany with variances being twice as
high in Indonesia than in Germany.
On the contrary, the dispersion of persistent cross-sectional markup differences is stri-
kingly similar across countries, and transitory differences in markups are an important com-
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Table 4.2. Transitory and persistent components of markup and capital intensity
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆc i t , κˆi t) std(m¯c i t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯c
L
i t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component Persistent Component
DE 0.064 0.114 -0.155 0.172 0.551 0.062
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
CL 0.177 0.258 -0.090 0.184 0.661 -0.085
(0.005) (0.009) (0.017) (0.005) (0.029) (0.022)
CO 0.134 0.157 -0.016 0.206 0.676 -0.232
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.025) (0.018)
ID 0.203 0.357 -0.120 0.195 0.778 -0.021
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.010)
Notes: Capital intensities, κi t , and markups, mci t , as defined in (4.10) and (4.11). See notes of Ta-
ble 4.1 for further explanation.
ponent of the total cross-sectional variance of markups – at least in the developing economies
(30% in Colombia, 50% in Chile and Indonesia) but less so in Germany (12%).⁸
Through the lense of the technlogy choice model, in particular (4.3) and (4.4), these
results suggest that a major component in the persistent differences in productivity is the
choice of capital intensities. Deviations in optimal scale are important but minor.
To understand to what extent firms actively take these unit cost increases into account,
we split the sample according to firm/plant characteristics – age, size, and importantly a
firm’s average markup – and compute again the dispersions of the persistent component of
capital intensity, see Table 4.3. While there are some differences in these dispersions accor-
ding to age and size, these are neither large nor systematic. What stands out is splitting the
sample according to the average markup. The highest markup quintile exhibits between 30%
and 60% higher capital intensity dispersions (in terms of variances) than the lowest markup
quintile. This is in line with the qualitative predictions of our model.
⁸ This might relate to the fact that demand is less stable in the developing economies. In fact,
the cross-sectional standard deviation of value-added growth is two to four times larger in these
economies than in Germany.
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Table 4.3. Persistent component of capital intensity by firm/plant characteristics
std(κ¯i t)
Markups Size Age
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Young Old
DE 0.545 0.622 0.610 0.509 n.a. n.a.
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
CL 0.568 0.713 0.749 0.622 n.a. n.a.
(0.042) (0.075) (0.068) (0.058)
CO 0.547 0.694 0.763 0.669 0.697 0.699
(0.035) (0.061) (0.051) (0.061) (0.100) (0.048)
ID 0.716 0.834 0.830 0.816 0.770 0.801
(0.028) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.058) (0.038)
Notes: Bottom (top) markup quintile: firm/plant average markup below the 20th percentile
(above the 80th percentile). Old (young): Plant age below 4 years (above 15 years). Bottom (top)
size quintile: firm/plant average employment below the 20th percentile (above 80th percentile).
The micro data from Germany and Chile does not include age. See notes of Table 4.1 and 4.2 for
further explanation.
4.3.4 Robustness
We conduct some robustness checks. First, we show that our empirical findings are robust
to alternative way of decomposing factor productivities into transitory and persistent compo-
nents (Table 4.4), and to weighting of the moments (Table 4.5). We also show that persistent
capital intensity differences are more dispersed for high-markup firms/plants even when con-
trolling for size and age (Table 4.6). In particular, we first remove cross-sectional differences
in log capital intensity that can be explained by markups, size and age in logs. Second, the
square unexplained component from the first stage is regressed on standarized markups,
size and age in logs. For all countries, except Colombia, markups are as important as size for
explaining persistent differences in capital intensity.
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Table 4.4. Robustness: Transitory and persistent components (HP-filtered) of factor
productivities, markups, and capital intensity
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component (HP) Persistent Component (HP)
DE 0.062 0.113 0.352 0.236 0.471 -0.223
CL 0.169 0.260 0.447 0.231 0.578 -0.191
CO 0.134 0.159 0.516 0.257 0.569 -0.234
ID 0.196 0.343 0.344 0.256 0.670 -0.270
std(mˆci t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆci t , κˆi t) std(m¯ci t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯ci t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component (HP) Persistent Component (HP)
DE 0.073 0.134 -0.184 0.157 0.490 0.089
CL 0.183 0.295 -0.123 0.152 0.552 -0.097
CO 0.145 0.186 -0.066 0.178 0.594 -0.230
ID 0.207 0.412 -0.130 0.160 0.672 -0.027
Notes: Labor productivity, aLi t , and capital productivity, a
K
it , as defined in (4.9).
Markups, mci t , and capital intensity, κi t , as defined in (4.10) and (4.11). HP: re-
sults based on the decomposing between transitory and persistent using a HP-filter
(λ= 6.25). Factor productivities are demeaned by 4-digit industry and year and
expressed in logs. Standard errors are clustered standard errors at the firm/plant
level. ρ denotes correlation. DE: Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: Indonesia.
4.4 Efficiency losses from a friction in technology choice
In this section, we quantify the efficiency losses from frictional technology choice. Based
on the results in Section 4.2, we can compute these losses by combining the dispersion in
capital intensity with the capital cost share and the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital.
We estimate the capital cost share as the ratio of capital expenditures to total expendi-
tures directly from the micro-data. We obtain a capital share of 21% (Germany), 40% (Co-
lombia), 32% (Chile), and 23% (Indonesia). The elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital can be recovered from time-series information of the aggregate capital intensity and
the relative factor price. In a frictionless economic environment, the elasticity is determined
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Table 4.5. Robustness: Weighted second moments of factor productivities, markups, and
capital intensity at different frequencies
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component (5Y MA) Persistent Component (5Y MA)
DE 0.050 0.101 0.316 0.196 0.457 -0.176
CL 0.187 0.281 0.457 0.239 0.551 -0.205
CO 0.143 0.170 0.520 0.260 0.562 -0.239
ID 0.216 0.370 0.349 0.263 0.672 -0.275
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆc i t , κˆi t) std(m¯c i t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯c i t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component (5Y MA) Persistent Component (5Y MA)
DE 0.052 0.090 -0.161 0.172 0.503 0.067
CL 0.179 0.259 -0.090 0.183 0.645 -0.087
CO 0.133 0.155 -0.016 0.209 0.670 -0.237
ID 0.207 0.356 -0.123 0.198 0.787 -0.021
Notes: abor productivity, aLi t , and capital productivity, a
K
it , as defined in (4.9).
Markups, mci t , and capital intensity, κi t , as defined in (4.10) and (4.11). Cross-
sectional standard-deviations (std) and correlation (ρ) of transitory and persistent
components. Transitory and persistent components are obtained by applying a five
year moving average filter (5Y MA). Moments are weighted based on the value-
added of the plant/firm. Variables under interest are demeaned by 4-digit industry
and year and expressed in logs. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered stan-
dard errors at the firm/plant level. DE: Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: In-
donesia.
by the contemporaneous correlation between these variables. However, the identification is
problematic in the presence of frictions which prevents immediate adjustment of production
factors: The contemporaneous response of capital intensity to price movements (short-run
elasticity) then differs from the long-run elasticity.
To uncover the long-run elasticity of substitution, we instrument observed relative fac-
tor prices with the top marginal income tax rate on domestic corporations at the country
level.⁹ As our instrumental variable is highly persistent, we capture movements in factor pri-
⁹Given that we do not have information on real interest rate from all countries, we approximate
the risk-free interest rate using the Federal Funds rate (yearly average). We consider country panel
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Table 4.6. Robustness: Dispersion of capital intensity and markups
DE CL CO ID
ε2κ¯i t
Log-Markup 0.024 0.069 0.036 0.057
(0.003) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011)
Log-Size -0.026 -0.068 -0.057 0.017
(0.003) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015)
Log-Age - 0.044 0.009
- (0.018) (0.011)
Notes: The results are obtained based on a two step pro-
cedure. First, we remove cross sectional differences in log
capital intensity (κi t) that can be explained by the log of
markups, size and age. Second, the squared estimated re-
sidual based on the first stage (ε2κ¯i t ), is regressed on the
standarized log of markups, size and age. Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the
firm/plant level. DE: Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia,
ID: Indonesia.
ces that are long-lived, and thus, we obtain a better approximation of the long-run elasticity
of substitution.¹⁰
Table 4.7 provides the results of this exercise. Once we instrument the relative factor
price with corporate taxes, we obtain an estimated elasticity of 1.28. In contrast, the simple
contemporaneous regression implies a 50% lower estimated elasticity.
Based on these elasticity estimates, we compute the efficiency losses from a friction in
technology choice. On average, unit costs increase by 5% compared to their minimum obtai-
ned by always setting capital intensity to the optimal level, the values range goes from 2.5%
in Germany to 6.3% in Indonesia.
data on labor, capital, and hourly wage from Feenstra et al. (2015). We impute hours worked at
those countries with missing information by the average hours worked at each year based on those
countries with available data. Finally, we construct tax series using the World tax Database available
at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/default.asp.
¹⁰Alternatively, the literature aims to estimate the long-run elasticity of substitution using cointegra-
tion properties, cross country variation in the trends of factor prices, or low-pass filters. See Chirinko
(2008) for more details.
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Table 4.7. Estimation of long-run elasticity of substitution
Dependent variable: log
 
K
N

log
 
W
R

0.68 0.43 1.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.35)
Constant 39.41 19.40 135.97
(1.82) (1.40) (48.24)
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes
Instrument No No Yes
R2 0.76 0.75 0.71
Countries 99 99 99
Obs 2609 2609 2609
Notes: Regressions based on country panel data for
the period 1956-2002. Period length differs by coun-
try due to data availability. We instrument relative fac-
tor price using the top marginal income tax rate on
domestic corporations at the country level. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
Notice that these efficience loss estimates do not consider the time-series component 
E xt log ki t − log k∗
2
. To do so, we require a dynamic version of the model described in
Section 4.2. Therefore, our estimates constitute a lower bound of the potential efficiency
losses from a friction in technology choice.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper asks whether productivity dispersions should be understood as a result of frictions
in technology choice. We have derived qualitative implications of such friction and show that
these are borne out empirically.
In line with the existing literature, we find large productivity differences across firms/
plants even within narrowly defined industries. We show that most of the differences are
long-lived and related to highly persistent differences in capital intensity. Despite the strong
relative differences across countries, our estimated efficiency losses from frictional technology
choice are modest, on average 5%.
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For future work it would be important to explore whether a dynamic model of technology
choice is able to explain our empirical results not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively.
Appendix 4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Empirics
4.A.1.1 Description of the data
German Firm Data: USTAN (Unternehmensbilanzstatistiken)
USTAN is itself a byproduct of the Bundesbank’s rediscounting and lending activity. The
Bundesbank had to assess the creditworthiness of all parties backing promissory notes or bills
of exchange put up for rediscounting (i.e. as collateral for overnight lending). It implemented
this regulation by requiring balance sheet data of all parties involved, which were then archi-
ved and collected, see Bachmann and Bayer (2013) for details. Our initial sample consists of
1,846,473 firm-year observations. We remove observations from East German firms to avoid
a break of the series in 1990. Finally, we drop the following sectors: hospitality (hotels and
restaurants), financial and insurance institutions, public health and education sectors. The
resulting sample covers roughly 70% of the West-German real gross value added in the pri-
vate non-financial business sector. In particular, it includes Agriculture, Energy and Mining,
Manufacturing, Construction, and Trade.
Chilean Plant Data: ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual)
ENIA is collected by the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de EstadÃŋsticas,
INE) and provides plant-level data from 1995 to 2007. ENIA contains information for all
manufacturing plants with total employment of at least ten. For the period under analysis,
we have a sample of 70,217 plant-year observations. According to INE, this sample covers
about 50% of total manufacturing employment.
Colombian Plant Data: EAM (Encuesta Anual Manufacturera)
EAM is a plant-level survey collected by National Institute of Statistics (Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estaditicas, DANE) for the period 1977 to 1991. The survey covers
information for all manufacturing plants during 1977-1982, while it only contains data on
plants above 10 employees for 1983-1984, and from 1985, small plants are included in small
proportion. This results in 103,011 plant-year observations.
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Indonesian Plant Data: IBS (Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan)
IBS is the Indonesian Manufacturing Survey of Large and Medium Establishments, provi-
ded by the National Institute of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). The survey covers all
plants with 20 or more employees in the manufacturing sector. Given that the capital stock is
reported since 1988 onwards, we exclude earlier years and focus on the period 1988-2010,
with 485,052 plant-year observations.
4.A.1.2 Sample selection
Starting from the raw data set, we concentrate on describing the general cleaning steps com-
mon to all countries, and we provide more information about country-specific cleaning steps
at Table 4.8.
To begin with, we remove observations where firms or plants report extraordinarily large
depreciation rates (e.g. due to fire or accident). The reason is that our dynamic model does
not capture such cases, and the perpetual inventory method (PIM) will inaccurately measure
the actual capital stock after such incidents occur.¹¹ Next, for those countries where current
values of capital stock is not provided (Germany and Colombia), we recompute capital stocks
using the PIM. In conducting the PIM, we drop a small amount of outliers, as explained in
Section 4.A.1.4. Further, we do not consider observations where value-added, capital stock,
or employment is non-positive or missing.
Moreover, we do not consider observations where firms/plants have missing values in
the changes of employment (N), real capital (K) and real value-added (VA).¹² To construct
capital productivity, we use the lagged value of capital stock, so we effectively discard the
first year of each micro unit. We remove outliers in the levels and in the relative changes of
employment, capital, value-added, and factor shares based on 3 standard deviations from the
industry-year mean. In addition, we drop firm/plant-year observations whenever the total
factor expenditures share is either below 1/3 or above 3/2, and whenever the firm/plant
¹¹At some cases in the ENIA, EAM, and IBS surveys, plants do not report depreciation conditio-
nal on positive capital stock. In order to not loose this observations, we impute the depreciation by
capital type and two-digit industry, estimating a random effect model, using as explanatory variable
the log-capital stock. To discard rare depreciation events, we drop observations whenever the repor-
ted depreciation rate in structures (equipment) is above 40% (60%) yearly. Additionally, we do not
consider those cases where the reported depreciation is below 0.1% (1%) in structures (equipment),
yearly.
¹² To construct measures of real capital stock we consider an index price by each capital type (when
available) using the information of gross fixed capital formation at current and constant prices from
National Accounts, while for for value added we use the GDP price deflator.
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average total factor expenditure share is above 1. These two cleaning steps should exclude
units from our analysis which report continuously unreasonably large markups or losses.
Finally, as our empirical results rely on a 5-year moving average filter, we do not consider
firm/plant-year observations that have less than 5 consecutive years.
Table 4.8. Sample selection
Criterion/Country Germany Chile Colombia Indonesia
Initial sample 1,846,473 70,217 103,006 485,052
East Germany -115,201 – – –
Additional cleaning steps – – – -32,618
Imputation capital stock – – – +37,341
Rare depreciation events -54,280 -8,197 -6,176 -8,775
Outliers in PIM -73,784 – -4,280 –
Missing values -422,739 -19,589 -29,804 -235,280
Outliers in factor variables -176,232 -12,375 -24,651 -86,070
Less than 5 consecutive years -312,452 -15,479 -14,264 -84,885
Final sample 689,665 14,307 23,831 74,765
Notes: Missing values denote the sum of missing values at log value added, log
capital, factor shares and log changes in employment, capital and value added.
Outliers in factor variables is the sum of all identified outliers at log changes
in employment, real capital and real value added, and factor shares. For more
information with respect to Additional cleaning steps and Imputation of capital
stock in Indonesia, see Section 4.A.1.3.
4.A.1.3 Specific cleaning and imputation steps for IBS
Before proceeding with the general cleaning steps applied to all datasets, we need to imple-
ment some specific corrections at the Indonesian micro-data. In doing so, we closely follow
Blalock and Gertler (2009). First, we correct for mistakes due to data keypunching. If the
sum of the capital categories is a multiple of 10n (with n being an integer) of the total repor-
ted capital, we replace the latter with the sum of the categories. Second, we drop duplicate
observations within the year (i.e. observations which have the same values for all variables
in the survey but differ in their plant identification number). Third, we re-compute value
added whenever their values are not consistent with the formula provided by BPS. Finally,
the survey changed their industry classification from ISIC Rev. 2 in 1998 to ISIC Rev. 3 in
1999 and to ISIC Rev. 4 in 2010. We use United Nations concordance tables to construct a
consistent time series of four digit industry classification.
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Further, the surveys from 1996 and 2006 provides only information on the aggregate ca-
pital stock, yet, not disaggregated by capital type (structure and equipment). To construct an
economically reasonable estimate of these variables for these years, we use the average repor-
ted investment share and capital share of capital type in the preceding and subsequent year,
and impute it, multiplying the aggregate capital stock and investment with the respective
share.
Finally, we impute capital stock for plants, whenever the survey presents missing values
for this variable in plants which reported information in previous and/or subsequent years.
Following Vial (2006), we impute capital by type (machinery, vehicles, land and buildings),
using the following regression by two-digit sectoral level:
logKi t = β0 + β1 logKi t−1 + θ lnX i t−1 + µi + εi t
where Ki t is the capital stock of type i, µi plant fixed effects and X i t−1 a set of explanatory
variables (total output, input, employees, wages, fuel costs and expenditures on materials,
leasing, industrial services and taxes).¹³
4.A.1.4 Perpetual inventory method
Whenever the dataset does not directly provide information on a firm’s/plant’s capital stock at
current values (USTAN and EAM), we re-calculate capital stocks using the perpetual inventory
method (PIM), in order to obtain economically meaningful capital series. In doing so, we
follow Bachmann and Bayer (2014). To begin with, we compute nominal investment series
using the accumulation identity for capital stocks:
pIt Ii,k,t = K
r
i,k,t+1 − K ri,k,t + Dri,k,t ,
where K ri,k,t and D
r
i,k,t are firm/plant i’s reported capital stock and depreciation for capital
type k at time t, respectively. Given that capital is reported at historical prices and does not
reflect the productive (real) level of capital stock, we apply the PIM to construct economic
real capital stock at each type of capital:
Ki,k,1 =
pI1
pIbase
Kai,k,1; Ki,k,t+1 = Ki,k,t(1 − δi,k,t) +
pIt
pIbase
Ii,k,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T]
¹³We evaluate the robustness of the imputation procedure, using linear interpolation as an alterna-
tive approach. Our empirical findings are robust to this alternative specification.
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where Kai,k,1 is the accounting value of the capital stock of type k for the first period we
observe the unit, ptpbase Ii,k,t is the real investments in capital k of firm/plant i at time t and
δi,k,t is the reported depreciation rate of capital k by firm/plant i at time t.¹⁴
Even though the aforementioned proceduremakes sure that values follows a economically
meaningful real capital stock series from second period onwards, it is not clear whether the
starting (accounting) input of capital at the unit, Kai,k,t , reflects the productive real value. To
account and adjust the first period value of capital we use an iterative approach. In specific,
we construct a time average factor φk for each type of capital. It the first iteration step, the
adjustment factor takes value of 1 while capital is equal to its balanced sheet value. That is,
Kni,k,t =
pIt
pIbase
Kai,k,1 for n= 1. For the subsequent iterations, capital is computed using PIM:
Kni,k,t+1 = K
n
i,k,t(1 − δi,k,t) + ptpbase Ii,k,t ,
while the ajdustment factor is constructed using the ratio between the capital of consecutive
iterations
φnk =
1
NT
∑
i,t
Kni,k,t
Kn−1i,k,t
.
Finally, the capital stock at the first period we observe the unit is adjusted by the factor φnk .
We apply the procedure iteratively until φk converges¹⁵
Kni,k,1 = φ
n−1
k K
n−1
i,k,1.
¹⁴ The reported depreciation rate is adjusted such that, on average, it coincides with the economic
depreciation rate given by National Accounts. To deflate investment series, we compute an investment
good price deflator from each country using the information of gross fixed capital formation at current
and constant prices from National Accounts.
¹⁵We stop whenenever the value of φk is below 1.1. At each iteration step we drop 0.1% from the
bottom and the top of the capital distribution. This cleaning stepmakes sure to not consider episodes of
extraordinary depreciation at the plant, which implies that using reported depreciation rate (adjusted
to have the same average value from National Accounts) do not reflect the capital stock given by the
PIM.
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4.A.2 Second order approximation of unit costs
For convenience, let us define the relative factor price by R˜t :=
Rt
Wt
and (physical) output per
worker by
f (ki t) :=
Yi t
Ni t
=
h
αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t
i σ
σ−1
.
Subsequently, marginal costs may be expressed as
ci t = Wt
1 + R˜tki t
f (ki t)
and the first derivative of (log) marginal costs with respect to (log) capital intensity,
∂ log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)
=
R˜tki t
1 + R˜tki t
− ki t f
′(ki t)
f (ki t)
=
(1 − α)R˜tki t − αk
σ−1
σ
i t
(1 + R˜tki t)(αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t )
Let us denote above denominator by D ≡ (1+ R˜tki t)(αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1−α)A
σ−1
σ
t ), and obtain the
second derivative as
∂ 2 log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)2
=
h
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜t − σ−1σ αk−
1
σ
i t
i
ki tD −
h
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜tki t − αk
σ−1
σ
i t
i
D′ki t
D2
.
The cost-minimizing capital intensity k∗ implies ∂ log(ci t)∂ log(ki t) ki t=k∗ = 0, and the second derivative
evaluated at ki t = k∗, where (1−α)A
σ−1
σ
t R˜tk
∗
i t = αk
∗σ−1σ
i t , is
∂ 2 log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)2 ki t=k∗
=
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜tk∗i t − σ−1σ αk∗
σ−1
σ
i t
D
=
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt 1σ R˜tk∗i t
(1 + R˜tk∗)((1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t R˜tk∗ + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t )
=
1
σ
R˜tk
∗
(1 + R˜tk∗)2
,
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where the second equation results again from (1−α)Aσ−1σt R˜tk∗ = αk∗σ−1σ . The 2nd order Tay-
lor expansion directly follows as
log(ci t) − log(c∗) ≈ σ−1 R˜tk
∗
(1 + R˜tk∗)2
1
2
(log(ki t) − log(k∗))2.
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5Delta-Method Inference for a Class of
Set-Identified SVARs
Joint with Bulat Gafarov and José Luis Montiel Olea
5.1 Introduction
An increasingly popular practice in empirical macroeconomics is to set-identify the parame-
ters of a Structural Vector Autoregression [SVAR]. This approach was pioneered by Faust
(1998), Canova and Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005). Most of the follow-up studies have re-
lied on Bayesian methods to construct posterior credible sets for the structural coefficients of
the impulse-response function.
There has been recent interest in studying non-Bayesian approaches to summarize uncer-
tainty in set-identified SVARs. Moon et al. (2013) [MSG13] propose Projection/Bonferroni
frequentist inference based on a moment-inequality-minimum-distance framework. Giaco-
mini and Kitagawa (2015) [GK14] propose robust-Bayesian inference using multiple priors
for rotation matrices. Gafarov et al. (2016) [GMM16] propose frequentist inference based
on the projection of a Wald ellipsoid for the SVAR reduced-form parameters. None of these
approaches requires the specification of prior beliefs by the researcher.
This paper contributes to the non-Bayesian analysis of set-identified SVARs by proposing
a novel delta-method confidence interval for the coefficients of the impulse-response function
[IRF]. Broadly speaking, our approach is based on a closed-form characterization of the end-
points of the identified set (given a vector of reduced-form parameters and a collection of
binding inequality constraints). Our delta-method confidence interval takes the form of a
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plug-in estimator for the identified set plus/minus standard errors. In terms of theoretical
results, we establish the pointwise consistency in level of our confidence interval. In terms
of practical considerations, we argue that the computational cost of our procedure compa-
res very favorably with other non-Bayesian procedures and also with the standard Bayesian
algorithm described in Uhlig (2005).
The main limitation of our approach is that the delta-method confidence interval is only
defined for SVAR models that impose equality and inequality restrictions on a single structu-
ral shock (e.g., a monetary shock). Admittedly, this is problematic, as some popular applica-
tions of set-identified SVARs feature restrictions on multiple structural innovations.¹ In spite
of this observation, single-shock set-identified models have been applied in several empirical
studies: the effects of monetary policy on output [Uhlig (2005)], the impact of monetary
policy on the housing market [Vargas-Silva (2008)], the effects of labor market shocks on
worker flows [Fujita (2011)], the effects of exchange rates on aggregate prices [An and
Wang (2012)], and the effect of optimism shocks on business cycles fluctuations [Beaudry
et al. (2014)]. Thus, we think there is room for our results to have an impact on empirical
work.
Empirical Application—Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks: To illustrate the
usefulness of ourmain results, we estimate amonetary Structural Vector Autoregression using
monthly U.S. data from July 1979 to December 2007 (a sample that deliberately ends one
semester before the financial crisis begins). The goal of our exercise is to use pre-crisis data
to learn about the responses of macroeconomic variables to shocks that have effects similar
to the ‘unconventional’ monetary policy interventions implemented after the crisis.
In ‘conventional’ descriptions of monetary policy, the short-term nominal interest rate is
assumed to be the central bank’s policy instrument. Following any adjustment by the mone-
tary authority, the market participants—households and firms, both domestic and foreign—
use available information to form expectations about the future level of longer-term real
interest rates relevant for their consumption and investment decisions.
The recent Great Recession has forced the Federal Reserve to consider alternative me-
chanisms to affect market beliefs about the future of real interest rates. Two examples of
such unconventional policies are the Federal Open Market Committee’s forward guidance an-
¹ SVAR applications for the oil market set-identify both demand and supply shocks using sign
restrictions and elasticity bounds [Kilian and Murphy (2012b)]. The same is true for recent labor
market applications [Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a)]. Mountford and Uhlig (2009)—one of the
most cited applications of set-identified SVARs—use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue
shock as well as a government spending shock, while controlling for a generic business cycle shock
and a monetary policy shock.
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nouncements and the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases program. Broadly speaking,
through forward guidance “the Federal Open Market Committee provides an indication to
households, businesses, and investors about the stance of monetary policy expected to prevail
in the future”.² In a similar fashion, the asset purchase program of the Federal Reserve in-
tends to “put downward pressure on yields of a wide range of longer-term securities, support
mortgage markets, and promote a stronger economic recovery”.³
With this motivation in mind, we set-identify an unconventional monetary policy [UMP]
shock as an innovation that decreases the two-year government bond rate upon impact, but
has no effect over the nominal federal funds rate.⁴ We consider two additional sign restricti-
ons on the contemporaneous responses of inflation and output. Namely, we assume that—
upon impact—neither inflation nor output can respond negatively to a UMP shock. Since
the model is only set-identified, our analysis effectively captures the effects of any historical
economic shock that affected the economy in the same way as an UMP shock.
We apply our delta-method approach to construct a confidence interval for the dynamic
responses of Industrial Production, inflation, the two-year government bond rate, and the
nominal federal funds rate. We use our confidence bands to assess the effects of the announ-
cement of the second part of the so-called Quantitative Easing program (QE2) in August
2010. Pre-crisis data turns out to be extremely useful to learn about the post-crisis response
of macroeconomic aggregates to unconventional monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents an overview
of the main methodological results in this paper. Section 5.3 introduces our empirical appli-
cation, which is used as a running example throughout the paper. Section 5.4 presents our
algorithm to evaluate the endpoints of the identified set. Section 5.5 establishes the diffe-
rentiability properties of the endpoints. Section 5.6 presents our delta-method approach and
establishes its asymptotic validity. Section 5.7 presents the confidence intervals for the dyna-
mic responses to the QE2 program. Section 5.8 concludes. All the proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
Generic Notation: If A is a matrix, Ai j denotes the i j-th element of A, vec(A) denotes the
vectorization of A, and vech(A) denotes half-vectorization (applicable only if A is symmetric).
The Kronecker product between matrices A and B is denoted by A⊗ B. The vector emi ∈ Rm
² Link: http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_19277.htm
³ Link:http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-are-the-federal-reserves-large-scale-asset-
purchases.htm
⁴ The paper focuses on the two-year rate as this variable changed considerably after the announ-
cement of the second round of the Quantitative Easing program. See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011)
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denotes the i-th column of the identity matrix of dimension m. If B is a matrix of dimension
n× n, Bi ≡ Beni denotes its i-th column. If the dimension of eni is obvious, we ignore the
superscript n.
5.2 Model and overview of the main theoretical results
This section introduces notation, the class of SVAR models we consider, and presents a brief
overview of the main methodological results in the paper. It is our hope that this brief sum-
mary (which contains references to the main propositions and lemmas in the paper) con-
tributes to the understanding of the theoretical basis behind our delta-method confidence
interval.
Notation: This paper studies the n-dimensional Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)
with p lags; i.i.d. structural innovations distributed according to F ; and unknown n× n struc-
tural matrix B:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + . . . + ApYt−p + B"t , EF["t] = 0n×1, EF["t"′t] ≡ In, (5.1)
see Lütkepohl (2007), p. 362.
The object of interest is the k-th period ahead structural impulse response function of
variable i to a particular shock j (e.g., a monetary shock). In the SVAR model this parameter
is given by the (k, i, j)-coefficient of the structural impulse-response function:
λk,i, j(A,B) ≡ e′iCk(A)B j , (5.2)
where B j ≡ Be j and ei and e j denote the i-th and j-th column of the identity matrix In.⁵
An auxiliary object in the estimation of the structural parameters is the vector of reduced-
form parameters in the SVAR model:
µ ≡ (vec(A)′,vec(Σ)′)′ ∈ M ⊆ Rd , A ≡ (A1,A2, . . . ,Ap), Σ ≡ BB′. (5.3)
⁵ The transformation Ck(A) that appears in equation (5.2) is defined recursively by the formula
C0 ≡ In:
Ck(A)≡
k∑
m=1
Ck−m(A) Am, k ∈ N,
Am = 0 if m> p; see Lütkepohl (1990), p. 116.
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The parameter A denotes the autoregressive coefficients in the VAR model, while Σ de-
notes the covariance matrix of residuals. These parameters can be estimated directly from
the data by Ordinary Least-Squares. The (reduced-form) parameter space isM .
Set-Identifying Restrictions: Let R(µ) ⊆ Rn be a set of inequality and equality re-
strictions imposed on B j .⁶ A common practice in empirical macroeconomics is to use the
restrictions in R(µ) to set-identify the structural parameter in (5.2) as a function of the
reduced-form parameters in (5.3). In our paper, the set R(µ) takes the form:
R(µ) ≡ ¦B j ∈ Rn  Z(µ)′B j = 0mz×1 and S(µ)′B j ≥ 0ms×1©, (5.4)
where Z(µ) is a matrix of dimension n×mz matrix and S(µ) is a matrix of dimension n×ms.
The matrix Z(µ) collects the equality restrictions specified by the researcher (we assume
there are mz of them). The matrix S(µ) collects the inequality restrictions (we assume there
are ms of them). We assume that both Z(µ) and S(µ) are differentiable functions of µ.
Scope: The simple formulation in (5.4) allows the researcher to incorporate any
restriction of the form R(µ)′B j ≥ 0, where R(µ) is differentiable. Thus, our analysis allows
for the following identifying restrictions:
1. Restrictions on the responses of variable i at horizon k to an impulse on the j-th shock:
e′iCk(A)B j ≥ or = 0,
as in Uhlig (2005).
2. Long-run restrictions on the response of variable i to an impulse on the j-th shock:
e′i(In − A1 − . . .− Ap)−1B j ≥ or = 0,
as in Blanchard and Quah (1989).
3. Restrictions on the j-th column of (H ′)−1:
e′i(H ′)−1e j = e′iΣ−1B j ≥ or = 0,
as in Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2015).
⁶ For example, a contractionary monetary policy shock increases interest rates and does not affect
prices upon impact.
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4. Elasticity bounds as in Kilian and Murphy (2012b); for example, for some b ∈ R :
e′iB j / e′i′B j ≥ b ⇐⇒ (ei − bei′)′B j ≥ 0,
provided e′i′B j > 0.
Endpoints of the identified Set: The main results in this paper concern the end-
points of the identified set for the structural parameters, given µ. The endpoints of the
identified set (which we sometimes refer to as the maximum and minimum response) are
defined as follows:
Definition (Endpoints of the identified set): Given a vector of reduced-form para-
meters µ we define the endpoints of the identified set for λk,i, j as the functions:
vk,i, j(µ) ≡ sup
B∈Rn×n
e′iCk(A)Be j , s.t. BB′ = Σ and Be j ∈ R(µ), (5.5)
and
vk,i, j(µ) ≡ infB∈Rn×n e
′
iCk(A)Be j , s.t. BB
′ = Σ and Be j ∈ R(µ). (5.6)
The function vk,i, j(µ) corresponds to the largest value of the structural parameter, λk,i, j
subject to the restriction that B j ∈ R(µ) and also that B j is the j-th column of a square root
of Σ. The lower bound is defined analogously.
Overview of the main results: Our delta-method confidence interval is supported
by the three theoretical results described in the abstract. Our results can be summarized as
follows:
• Summary of Lemma 1 (Characterization of the maximum and minimum response given a
fixed set of active constraints): We show that vk,i, j(µ) and vk,i, j(µ) are the value functions of
a mathematical program whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker points can be described analytically—
up to a set of ‘active’ inequality constraints.⁷ More concretely, we show that the maximum
⁷ The term ‘active constraints’ or ‘active set of is constraints’ is the common terminology used in
numerical optimization; see p. 308 in Nocedal and Wright (2006).
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response for λk,i, j is equal to either plus or minus the function:
vk,i, j(µ; r)≡

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
,
where
MΣ1/2r ≡ In −Σ1/2r(r ′Σr)−1r ′Σ1/2,
and r ′ is a matrix collecting the gradient vectors of the constraints inR(µ) that are active at
a maximum. The minimum response is obtained analogously.
• Summary of Proposition 1 (Algorithm to evaluate the maximum and minimum response):
We use the closed-form expressions of Lemma 1 to present an algorithm that allows a resear-
cher to evaluate the endpoints of the identified set given a vector of reduced-form parameters.
The algorithm evaluates different collections of active constraints (different matrices r) and
selects the constraints that generate the largest (or smallest) value function—after checking
that the inequality constraints not included in r are satisfied.
• Summary of Lemma 2: (Differentiability of the maximum and minimum response for a fixed
set of active constraints)We establish the differentiability of the function vk,i, j , which depends
on a fixed set of active constraints. We allow the constraints in the n× l matrix r (with
l ≤ n− 1) to depend on the reduced-form parameters. We show that the derivative of vk,i, j
w.r.t. µ is given by:
v˙k,i, j(µ)≡

∂ vk,i, j(µ;r)
∂ vec(A)
∂ vk,i, j(µ;r)
∂ vec(Σ)
=

∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(A) (x
∗ ⊗ eni )−
∑l
k=1 w
∗
k
∂ rk
vec(A) x
∗
λ∗(Σ−1x∗ ⊗Σ−1x∗)−∑lk=1 w∗k ∂ rkvec(Σ) x∗
 ,
where rk is the k-th column of r, w
∗
k is the k-th component of w
∗, and
x∗ ≡Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′eiÀvk,i, j(µ; r),
λ∗ ≡ 1
2
vk,i, j(µ; r), w
∗ ≡ [r ′Σr]−1r ′ΣCk(A)′ei .
We argue that λ∗ and w∗ can be interpreted as the Lagrange multipliers associated to the
constraints BB′ =Σ and to the active constraints in r.
• Summary of Proposition 2 (Directional Differentiability of the endpoints): We use the
formula in Lemma 2 to show that the functions vk,i, j(·) and vk,i, j(·) are directionally diffe-
rentiable, in a sense we make precise. We relate the expression of the directional derivative
with the generalized versions of the envelope theorems in the work of Fiacco and Ishizuka
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(1990) and Bonnans and Shapiro (2000). We argue that directional differentiability of the
value functions (as opposed to full differentiability) arises due to the possibility that diffe-
rent structural models lead to the maximum (or minimum) response. In particular, let R∗(µ)
denote the sets of active restrictions that yield the same maximum response and assume, for
simplicity, that vk,i, j(µ)> 0. We show that:
p
n

vk,i, j(µ+ hn /
p
n)− vk,i, j(µ)
→ max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ; r)
′h

.
• Summary of Proposition 3 (Delta-Method Confidence Interval): We establish the pointwise
consistency in level of a delta-method confidence interval, which takes the form:
CST (1−α;λk,i, j)≡

vk,i, j(bµT )− z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT , vk,i, j(bµT )+ z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT,
where bµT is the typical OLS estimator for the VAR reduced-form parameters, z1−α/2 is the
(1−α/2) quantile of a standard normal, and bσ(k,i, j),T is our formula for the standard errors
based on the directional derivatives.
Outline: In the remaining part of the paper, we formalize these propositions and apply
them to conduct inference about the responses to an unconventional monetary shock.
5.3 Running example: unconventional monetary policy
shocks
This section introduces our empirical application, which will be used as a running example
to illustrate our assumptions and results.
Monetary Svar: We consider a simple 4-variable model that includes the Consumer Price
Index (CPIt), the Industrial Production Index (I Pt), the 2-year Treasury Bond rate (2yTBt),
and the Federal Funds rate (F Ft).⁸ We take a logarithmic transformation of CPIt , I Pt and
then work with first differences for all variables. Thus, our vector of macro variables is:
Yt ≡

lnCPIt − lnCPIt−1, ln I Pt − ln I Pt−1, 2yTBt − 2yTBt−1, F Ft − F Ft−1
′
.
⁸All these variables are sourced from the data set of Gertler and Karadi (2015). We thank Peter
Karadi for making their data set available to us.
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We set the number of lags equal to 11 using the Bayesian Information Criterion (p = 11).
The time span of the monthly series is July 1979 to August 2008 (T = 342). To keep our ex-
position as simple as possible, we ignore potential co-integration issues between short-term
and long-term interest rates. Without loss of generality, we assume that column of B corre-
sponding to an UMP shock is the first column; B1 ≡ Be1. Our equality/inequality restrictions
are summarized in the following Table:
Table 5.1. Set-identification of an unconventional monetary policy shock: restrictions
Series Acronym UMP Notation
Consumer Price Index CPI + e′1B1 ≥ 0
Industrial Production IP + e′2B1 ≥ 0
2-year Treasury Bond rate 2yTB − e′3B1 ≤ 0
Fed Funds Rate FF 0 e′4B1 = 0
Description: Restrictions on contemporaneous respon-
ses to a UMP shock. ‘0’ stands for a zero restriction, ‘−’
stands for a negative sign restriction and ‘+’ for positive
sign restriction. These sign restrictions can be justified by
the DSGE model calibrated in the work of Bhattarai et al.
(2014).
The suggested set-identification strategy in this paper is not new. Baumeister and Benati
(2013) study an analogous ‘spread’ monetary shock that leaves the short-term nominal rate
unchanged, but affects the spread between the ten-year Treasury-bond yield and the policy
rate. They consider a Bayesian SVAR with time varying parameters and stochastic volatility
combined with demand and supply structural shocks that satisfy zero/sign restrictions as in
Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010). Their main result is that the long-term yield spread exerts a
powerful effect on both output growth and inflation. All their inference is Bayesian, while
ours is frequentist. In addition, our SVAR model does not consider time-varying parameters,
stochastic volatility, and restrictions on other nonmonetary shocks.
5.4 The endpoints of the identified set
In this section we formalize Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. We consider the problem of finding
the maximum response to an impulse in the j-th structural shock subject to mz equality
(‘zero’) restrictions and ms inequality (‘sign’) restrictions. The focus on the maximum and
the minimum is an intermediate step to conduct frequentist inference about the coefficients
of the impulse-response function.
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This section makes two assumptions on the sign and zero restrictions allowed in the mo-
del. First, we require the number of zero restrictions to be less than n− 1. Second, we assume
that every collection of n− 1−mz inequality restrictions and the mz equality restrictions are
linearly independent everywhere in the parameter space.
Just as before, the set R(µ) is given by
R(µ)≡ ¦B j ∈ Rn  Z(µ)′B j = 0mz×1 and S(µ)′B j ≥ 0ms×1©,
where Z(µ) is a matrix of dimension n×mz matrix and S(µ) is a matrix of dimension n×ms.
Running Example—R(µ): In the UMP example, the set of restrictions R(µ) corrre-
sponds to (see Table I):
¦
B1 ∈ R4
 e′4B1 = 0, (e1, e2,−e3)′B1 ≥ 03×1©.
Consequently:
Z(µ)=

0
0
0
1
 and S(µ)=

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1
0 0 0
 .
We note that the equality and inequality restrictions in our example do not depend on
the reduced-form parameters (neither Z nor S depend on µ).
Main Assumptions: The first assumption in this section requires the number of zero
restrictions to be strictly smaller than n− 1. The rationale behind Assumption 1 is as follows:
if mz > n− 1, then R(µ)= {0n×1} for every µ for which there are n linearly independent
equality restrictions. This is problematic, as the latter implies there is no B j ∈ Rn such that
B j ∈ Rn and B j = Be j for some BB′ =Σ (provided B is invertible).⁹
Assumption 1. mz ≤ n− 1.
Our second assumption imposes a ‘linear independence’ condition on the equality and
inequality restrictions on the model (given a particular value of the reduced-form parameter
µ). Let ems1 , e
ms
2 , . . . e
ms
ms denote the ms different columns of the identity matrix Ims . Let e(k)
⁹ If B is invertible, then Σ is invertible and B′Σ−1B = In, which implies B′jΣ−1B j = 1. Therefore, if
B j = Be j for some square root of Σ then B j must be different from 0n×1.
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denote an ms × k matrix formed by collecting any of the k ≤ n− 1−mz columns of Ims . Note
that for any matrix S, the matrix Se(k) selects k columns of S.
Definition. We say that Z(µ) and S(µ) are linearly independent at µ if for any k ∈ N, k ≤
n− 1−mz and any e(k) the matrix
R(µ; e(k))≡ [Z(µ),S(µ)e(k)] ∈ Rn×(mz+k),
is assumed to have full column rank (rank mz + k).
We use this definition to state our following assumption:
Assumption 2. The parameter spaceM is such that Z(µ) and S(µ) are linearly independent
at every µ ∈M .
This ‘linear independence’ property plays an important role in the characterization of
the maximum and minimum response in terms of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Running Example—Assumption 1 and 2: In our application mz = 1, so we only need
to verify Assumption 2. As we mentioned before, the matrix e(k) is a selector matrix. For
example, let e(2) be given by the first and third column of I3; that is
e(2)=
1 00 0
0 1
 .
This implies that
S(µ)e(2)=

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1
0 0 0

1 00 0
0 1
=

1 0
0 0
0 −1
0 0
 ,
and moreover:
R(µ; e(2))≡ [Z(µ),S(µ)e(2)]=

0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 −1
1 0 0
 ∈ R4×(2+1).
Thus, the matrix R(µ; e(2)) is formed by collecting the gradient of the unique equality
restriction and the first and third inequality restrictions in S. Note that regardless of the
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number of k columns selected from S—and regardless of whatM is—the resulting matrix
R(µ, e(k)) will always have full column rank.
Verifying Assumption 2 with more general restrictions requires additional work. For ex-
ample, suppose that the researcher is interested in including the restriction:
e′2C1(A)B1 ≥ 0.
This restriction says that the UMP shock cannot decrease the growth rate in Industrial Pro-
duction even one-period after the shock. Since C1(A)= A1, the vector e′2C1(A) is equal to the
second row of A1, which we can denote as (A1,(2,1),A1,(2,2),A1,(2,3),A1,(2,4)). The matrix S(µ)
is now given by:
S(µ)=

1 0 0 A1,(2,1)
0 1 0 A1,(2,2)
0 0 −1 A1,(2,3)
0 0 0 A1,(2,4)
 .
Hence, we conclude that Assumption 2 will be satisfied as long asM is such that A1,(2, j) 6= 0
for all j = 1, . . . 4, which means that each of the entries in the first lag of Yt−1 has predictive
power on Yt after controlling for the rest of the lags.
The third assumption is the following:
Assumption 3. The matrices Z(µ) and S(µ) are differentiable functions of the reduced-form
parameter µ.
We are not aware of equality/inequality restrictions in the SVAR literature that does
not satisfy this property. In particular, all the examples given in p. 5 of this paper satisfy
Assumption 3.
5.4.1 Lemma 1: Closed-form solution for the maximum response
given an active set of constraints
In this section we show that that given a collection r ∈ Rm×n of ‘active’ constraints (m≤ n− 1)
the maximum response is determined in closed-form (and up to sign) by the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions of the program (5.5) and (5.6).
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Lemma 1. Let r be a matrix of dimension n×m, m≤ (n− 1) collecting the gradients of the
‘active’ (binding) constraints at a solution of the mathematical program (5.5). Suppose that
Assumption 1 holds and suppose that Z(µ) and S(µ) are linearly independent at µ. Then, if
vk,i, j(µ) 6= 0:
a) vk,i, j(µ) is given by either plus or minus the norm of the residual of the projection of
Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei into the space spanned by the columns of Σ1/2r; that is:
vk,i, j(µ) =

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
, (5.7)
or
vk,i, j(µ) = −

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
, (5.8)
where
MΣ1/2r ≡ In −Σ1/2r(r ′Σr)−1r ′Σ1/2.
b) In addition, there is a unique maximizer x∗(µ; r) such that r ′x∗(µ; r)= 0m×1 and is given
by:
x∗(µ; r)=Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
vk,i, j(A,Σ).
Consequently, the sign of vk,i, j(µ) depends on which of the two solutions x
∗(µ; r) (the one with
(5.7) in the denominator or the one with (5.8)) satisfies the sign restrictions that are not in r.
Proof: See Appendix 5.A.1 for the proof, which uses the necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions of the optimization problem to characterize the maximizers given a set r of active
constraints.¹⁰ Figure 5.1 presents a graphical representation of the mathematical program of
interest. Figure 5.2 presents an intuitive description of the solution.
One way to think about the solution to the problem of interest is explained in Figure
5.2. Suppose there are only equality constraints. Note that Z ′B j = 0m×1 implies that re-
parameterized choice variable ex ≡Σ−1/2B j must lie on the orthogonal space ofΣ1/2Z . That
is, the selected value of ex should be of the form:
ex = MΣ1/2Z y, MΣ1/2Z ≡ In −Σ1/2Z(Z ′ΣZ)−1Z ′Σ1/2, y ∈ Rn.
¹⁰ To guarantee the existence of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multipliers we use the fact that Z(µ) and S(µ)
are linear independence at µ. Our assumption implies that the mathematical program defining the
endpoints of the identified set satisfies a linear independence constraint qualification (see Fiacco and
Ishizuka (1990), p. 224).
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Figure 5.1. The mathematical program defining vk,i, j(A,Σ) (n= 3) with one zero restriction.
Figure 5.1 provides a graphical representation of the mathematical program (5.5), where BB′ =Σ has
been replaced by the ‘ellipsoid’ constraint x ′Σ−1x = 1, x ≡ B j ∈ R3 (this equivalence will not hold, in
general, if there are restrictions on multiple shocks). The objective function corresponds to the hyper-
plane with normal vector Ck(A)
′ei ∈ R3. In this example, there is only one equality restriction with
normal vector given by the (blue, solid) line. This restriction requires the contemporaneous impact
of the j-th shock on the third variable to be zero. Note that without the equality restriction the maxi-
mizer and minimizer will be given by the point at which the hyperplane is tangent to the ellipsoid.
The quadratic equality constraint also restricts the choice variable ex to satisfy ex ′ex = 1. Con-
sequently, the problem can be re-written as
max
y∈Rn e
′
iCkΣ
1/2MΣ1/2Z y s.t. y
′MΣ1/2Z y = 1.
An application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality shows that the positive value in (5.7) gives
the maximum response in (5.5).¹¹
¹¹Using the fact that MΣ1/2Z is idempotent and using the assumption that
e′iCkΣ1/2MΣ1/2ZΣ1/2C ′kei
1/2 6= 0,
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Figure 5.2. Solving for vk,i, j(A,Σ) (n= 3, Σ = I3) with one equality restriction.
Figure 5.2 provides a graphical representation of the solution to the mathematical program (5.5)
when Σ = I3 and there is only one zero restriction. The solution to the program must lie in the ortho-
gonal complement of Z (blue, thin, solid). In this picture the orthogonal complement corresponds
to the space spanned by the blue, thick, solid lines. This implies that the rotated solution, deno-
ted ex ≡Σ−1/2x , must be of the form MΣ1/2Z y for some y ∈ R3. Hence, the only relevant part of
x ′Σ−1x = 1 becomes the projected version of it: y ′MΣ1/2 y = 1, represented by the black, solid el-
lipsoid. One can find the value of this problem by projecting the gradient of the objective function on
the orthogonal complement of Σ1/2z (arrow) and selecting a direction in the ellipsoid proportional
to it. The value function vk,i j(A,Σ) will be given by the norm of the arrow.
the problem of interest becomes:
max
y∈Rn

e′iCkΣ1/2MΣ1/2ZΣ1/2C ′kei
1/2 e′iCkΣ1/2MΣ1/2Z
e′iCkΣ1/2MΣ1/2ZΣ1/2C ′kei
1/2 MΣ1/2Z y,
s.t. y ′MΣ1/2Z y = 1. By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality this program is bounded above by
(e′iCkΣ1/2MΣ1/2ZΣ1/2C ′kei)1/2. This value can be achieved by x∗(A,Σ; Z) in Lemma 1.
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5.4.2 Proposition 1: Algorithm to evaluate the maximum and
minimum response
We have provided a closed-form expression (up to a sign) for the maximum response vk,i, j(µ),
given a collection r of active restrictions. We now answer the following question: how does
one compute the maximum response vk,i, j(µ) for a given value of µ?
We use the result in Lemma 1 to state the solution of the mathematical program (5.5)
that includes both equality and inequality restrictions. The main result in this section is that
such problem can be solved by ‘activating’ different combinations of inequality constraints.
In other words, the problem in (5.5) can be solved by finding the largest value among the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker points that satisfy a feasibility constraint.
Additional Notation Illustrated with our Example—1) Collection of Active Con-
straints: Fix (A,Σ) and, in a slight abuse of notation let Z and S denote Z(µ) and S(µ).
Define first:
R0 ≡ Z ,
as the Rn matrix that collects all of the mz zero restrictions. Hence, in our empirical applica-
tion:
R0 =

0
0
0
1
 .
Define also:
R0 ≡
¦
R ∈ Rn×(mz+1)
 R= [R0,Semsi ], i ∈ {1, . . .ms}©,
as the collection of all matrices that activate one of the ms inequality restrictions; analgously,
R1 corresponds to the collection of matrices that impose one of the inequality restrictions as
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an equality restriction. In our example:
S =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1
0 0 0
 .
Therefore,
R1 =


0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
 ,

0 0
0 1
0 0
1 0
 ,

0 0
0 1
0 −1
1 0

 .
More generally, for l ≤ n−mz − 1, consider the collection:
Rl ≡
¦
R ∈ Rn×(mz+l)
 R= [R0,Semsm1 , . . .Semsml ], {mi}li=1is a subsequence of {1, . . .ms}©.
The matrix rl ∈ Rl activates l of the ms sign-restrictions in the SVAR model. Note that the
collection Rl has ms!/(l!(ms − l)!) elements and Rms has a unique element in which all the
sign restrictions of the model are active (provided ms ≤ n−mz − 1). In our example, n−
mz − 1 = 2. There are 3 different subsequences of two elements from the sequence {1, 2,3}:
{1,2},{1,3}, and {2,3}. Therefore,
R2 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
 ,

0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 −1
1 0 0
 ,

0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −1
1 0 0

 .
Thus, R1 and R2 denote the different collection of active constraints formed by choosing
one and two of the elements of S, respectively.
Additional Notation Illustrated with our Example—2) Feasibility: We define the
feasibility of a vector x ∈ Rn (with respect to the sign restrictions) as the indicator function
1ms(x) = 1
¦
S′x ≥ 0ms×1
© ∈ R, (5.9)
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where, following convention, ≥ is taken component-wise whenever the binary relation is
applied to vectors. Hence, x ∈ Rn is a feasible point for the mathematical program (5.5) if
and only if 1ms(x)= 1 and x satisfies the equality restrictions in Z .¹² In the context of our
example:
x =

4
3
−2
0
 =⇒ 1ms(x)= 1, but y =

4
3
2
0
 =⇒ 1ms(y)= 0.
The point x is a feasible point for the mathematical program in (5.5) as it satisfies both the
equality and inequality restrictions.
Proposition 1 (Algorithm to evaluate the maximum and minimum response). For µ≡
(vec(A)′, vec(Σ)′)′ consider the mathematical programs
vk,i, j(µ)≡maxB j e
′
iCk(A)B j , vk,i, j(µ)≡minB j e
′
iCk(A)B j ,
with each program subject to
BB′ =Σ,
with equality and inequality restrictions:
Z ′B j = 0mz×1, S
′B j ≥ 0ms×1.
Let
R≡
min{n−1−mz ,ms}⋃
l=0
Rl ,
denote all possible combinations of up to n− 1 active constraints and for r ∈ R define vk,i, j(µ; r)
as the function:
vk,i, j(µ; r)=

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
,
and let c be a positive and large constant (penalty term) such that −c < vk,i, j(A,Σ)≤
vk,i, j(A,Σ)< c and such that −c < −vk,i, j(A,Σ, r)< vk,i, j(A,Σ, r)< c for all r ∈ R.
¹²We use the term primal feasibility in contrast with dual feasibility, which obtains whenever the
Lagrange multipliers for the sign restrictions that are not active are all positive (or negative).
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Consider the candidate value functions:
v+k,i, j(µ; r)= vk,i, j(A,Σ; r), v
−
k,i, j(µ; r)= −vk,i, j(A,Σ; r).
If vk,i, j(µ; r) 6= 0, set:
f +max(µ; r) ≡ v+k,i, j(µ; r) − 2(1 − 1ms(x∗+(µ; r)))c,
f −max(µ; r) ≡ v−k,i, j(µ; r) − 2(1 − 1ms(x∗−(µ; r)))c,
f +min(µ; r) ≡ v+k,i, j(µ; r) + 2(1 − 1ms(x∗+(µ; r)))c,
f −min(µ; r) ≡ v−k,i, j(µ; r) + 2(1 − 1ms(x∗−(µ; r)))c,
where
x∗+(µ; r)=Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
vk,i, j(µ),
x∗−(µ; r)= −Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
vk,i, j(µ).
If vk,i, j(µ; r)= 0 and there is a point x∗ 6= 0 satisfying the equality restrictions in r and also
the inequality restrictions that are not included in r, set:
f +max(µ; r)= f
−
max(µ; r)= f
+
min(µ; r)= f
−
min(µ; r)= 0.
If vk,i, j(µ; r)= 0 and there is no point x∗ 6= 0 satisfying the equality restrictions in r and
the inequality restrictions that are not in r, set:
f +max(µ; r)= f
−
max(µ; r)= −c and f +min(µ; r)= f −min(µ; r)= c.
Then:
vk,i, j(µ)= maxr∈R

max{ f +max(µ; r), f
−
max(µ; r)}

,
and
vk,i, j(µ)= minr∈R

min{ f +min(µ; r), f
−
min(µ; r)}

.
That is, the value function vk,i, j(µ) is obtained by computing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker points in
Lemma 1 for each r, penalizing the value vk,i, j(µ; r) if unfeasible, and maximizing over all the
possible values of r. The minimum value is obtained analogously.
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Proof: The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Note that any combination of active
sign restrictions r for which x∗+(A,Σ; r) (or x∗−(A,Σ; r)) is well-defined and feasible
must be, by definition, no larger than vk,i, j(A,Σ). Thus, we only have to show that
maxr∈R

max{ f +max(A,Σ; r), f
−
max(A,Σ; r)}
≥ vk,i, j(A,Σ). Since Lemma 1 showed that the
value of the program (5.5) should be of the form f +max(A,Σ, r) or f
−
max(A,Σ, r) for some
r ∈ R, the result must follow. The proof is formalized in Appendix 5.A.2.
Algorithm to evaluate the endpoints of the identified-set: The proposition above
shows that in order to solve the mathematical problem in (5.5) it is sufficient to apply the
following algorithm:
1. Activate different combinations of thems sign restrictions. Collect the originalmz equa-
lity restrictions and the inequality restrictions that were activated in the matrix r. The
matrix should have nomore than n− 1 columns. Note that the total number of matrices
r will be given by:
min{ms ,n−1−mz}∑
k=0

ms
k

.
2. Compute the candidate value functions ±vk,i, j(A,Σ; r) for each of the elements r ∈ R.
3. If vk,i, j(A,Σ; r) 6= 0, verify if x∗+(A,Σ; r) satisfies the sign restrictions that were not
included in r. That is, verify the feasibility of the solution x∗+(A,Σ; r). If the primal
feasibility condition is satisfied set
f +max(A,Σ; r)= f
+
min(A,Σ; r)= vk,i, j(A,Σ; r).
If the primal feasibility condition is violated penalize vk,i, j(A,Σ; r) to guarantee that
it is never a solution by setting:
f +max(A,Σ; r)≡ vk,i, j(A,Σ; r)− 2c,
and
f +min(A,Σ; r)≡ vk,i, j(A,Σ; r)+ 2c.
Check the feasibility of x∗−(A,Σ, r) and proceed in the same way. If vk,i, j(A,Σ; r)= 0
do the adjustment described in Proposition 1.
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4. Select the maximum value of max{ f +max(A,Σ; r), f
−
max(A,Σ; r)} over r ∈ R; that is,
consider the different combinations of active restrictions and select the maximum
value ±vk,i, j(A,Σ, r) over them. This gives vk,i, j(A,Σ). Taking the minimizer over
f +min(A,Σ; r), f
−
min(A,Σ; r) gives the smallest value.
Using the algorithm in the UMP example: We use the algorithm to evaluate the
identified set in the running example. We fix µ at its estimated OLS values, denoted bµT ,
and we report vk,i, j(bµT ) and vk,i, j(bµT ) for the cumulative IRFs.¹³ The scale in Figure 5.3
corresponds to a one standard deviation structural UMP shock.
We consider first the equality/inequality restrictions in Table I. We note that evaluating
the endpoints of the identified for the 4 variables in the VAR, over 40 horizons, takes around
.1 seconds. We then include an additional inequality restriction on the response of output to
an expansionary UMP shock. Namely, we assume that even one period after the shock, the
cumulative effect on IP cannot be negative (e′2(C0 + C1(A))B1 ≥ 0). A comparison between
the two collections of restrictions suggests that, in this example, the noncontemporaneous
constraint has almost no additional identification power.
Of course, one could use the Bayesian algorithm in Uhlig (2005) to approximate the va-
lue of the endpoints. Given D draws of the reduced-form parameters (A,Σ) and a unit vector
q ∈ Rn, one could report the maximum and minimum value for {λdk,i, j(A,Σ,q)}Dd=1 over the
different draws. This algorithm is a random grid search approach to solve the programs (5.5)
and (5.6). Figure 5.6 in the appendix presents a comparison between the different approa-
ches. The grid search takes around 300 seconds to run and underestimates the identified
set.
¹³ The formula for the maximum (minimum) k-th period ahead cumulative IRF replaces Ck(bAT ) by
C0(bAT )+ C1(bAT )+, . . . ,+Ck(bAT ).
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Figure 5.3. Identified set for the cumulative impulse response functions to a one standard deviation UMP shock (given bµT )
(Solid, Blue Line) Endpoints of the identified set for the cumulative responses given bµT and the equality/inequality restrictions in Table I.
(Blue, Crosses) Endpoints of the identified set with the additional restriction e′2(C0 + C1(A))B1 ≥ 0.
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5.5 Directional differentiability of the endpoints
Once again, let
R(µ)≡
min{n−1−mz ,ms}⋃
l=0
Rl(µ),
denote the set of all possible combinations up to n− 1 active constraints.¹⁴ Let us denote the
typical element in R(µ) as r(µ), which we take to be an n× l matrix with l ≤ n− 1. We will
continue working with the auxiliary function:
vk,i, j(µ; r(µ))=

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2r(µ)Σ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
,
where we now explicitly acknowledge the possible dependence of r on µ. In Lemma 1 we
have shown that if r(µ) is the active set of constraints at a solution of the program (5.5),
then:
vk,i, j(µ)= vk,i, j(µ; r(µ)) or vk,i, j(µ)= −vk,i, j(µ; r(µ));
as long as vk,i, j(µ) 6= 0. In order to establish the differentiability of vk,i, j(µ) we prove the
following intermediate result.
Lemma 2 (Differentiability results for a given active set of constraints). If r(µ) is dif-
ferentiable with respect to µ and vk,i, j(µ; r(µ)) 6= 0, then vk,i, j(µ; r(µ)) is differentiable with
respect to µ with derivative v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ)) given by:

∂ vk,i, j(µ;r(µ))
∂ vec(A)
∂ vk,i, j(µ;r(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
=

∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(A) (x
∗(µ; r(µ))⊗ ei)−∑lk=1 w∗k ∂ vec(rk(µ))vec(A) x∗(µ, r(µ))
λ∗(Σ−1x∗(µ, r(µ))⊗Σ−1x∗(µ, r(µ)))−∑lk=1 w∗k ∂ vec(rk(µ))vec(Σ) x∗(µ, r(µ))
 ,
where rk(µ) denotes the k-th column of r(µ),
x∗(A,Σ; r(µ))=Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r(µ)

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
vk,i, j(A,Σ; r(µ)),
λ∗ ≡ 1
2
vk,i, j(A,Σ; r(µ)), w
∗ ≡ [r(µ)′Σr(µ)]−1r(µ)′ΣCk(A)ei ,
¹⁴ The dependence of the set R on the parameter µwas omitted in the previous section for notational
simplicity.
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and w∗k is the k-th component of the vector w∗.
Proof: See Appendix 5.A.3.
The envelope theorem sheds light on the derivative formula in Lemma 2. Note first that
vk,i, j(µ, r(µ))= maxx∈Rn e
′
iCk(A)x s.t. x
′Σ−1x = 1 and r ′(µ)x = 0l×1.
The auxiliary Lagrangian function of this problem is given by:
L (x;µ, r(µ))= (x ′ ⊗ e′i)vec(Ck(A))−λ

(x ′ ⊗ x ′)vec(Σ−1)− 1−w′(r(µ)′x),
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the quadratic equality restriction and
w ∈ Rl is the vector of Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the l equality restrictions. The
envelope theorem suggests that v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ)) is given by the formula in Lemma 2. We con-
firm this intutition in the prove of Lemma 2; provided vk,i, j(µ; r(µ)) 6= 0.
We now establish the differentiability of vk,i, j(µ). Without loss of generality, assume that
vk,i, j(µ)> 0 (and also that vk,i, j(µ)< 0). For a fixed vector of reduced-form parameters de-
fine the sets:
R∗(µ)≡ ¦r(µ) ∈ R(µ) | vk,i, j(µ)= vk,i, j(µ, r(µ))©,
and
R∗(µ)≡
¦
r(µ) ∈ R(µ) | vk,i, j(µ)= −vk,i, j(µ, r(µ))
©
.
The set R∗(µ) collects the different active constraints that could lead to the maximum
value. The set R∗(µ) is a singleton if and only if the program (5.5) has a unique solution. The
set R∗(µ) is defined analogously.
Proposition 2 (Directional differentiability of the endpoints of the identified set). Sup-
pose, w.l.o.g., that vk,i, j(µ)> 0 and vk,i, j(µ)< 0. Then, for any sequence hn ∈ Rd such that
hn→ h and any sequence tn→∞:
tn

vk,i, j(µ+ hn / tn)− vk,i, j(µ)
→ max
r(µ)∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ))
′h

,
and
tn

vk,i, j(µ+ hn / tn)− vk,i, j(µ)
→ min
r(µ)∈R∗(µ)
− v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ))′h.
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Thus, vk,i, j and vk,i, j are directionally differentiable functions of the reduced-form parameters
with directional derivative:
max
r(µ)∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ))
′h

,
and
min
r(µ)∈R∗(µ)
− v˙k,i, j(µ; r(µ))′h,
respectively.
Whenever R∗(µ) is a singleton—i.e., R∗(µ)= {r(µ)}—the value function vk,i, j(µ) is fully
differentiable with derivative v˙k,i, j(µ, r(µ)). Likewise if R∗(µ) is a singleton, the value function
vk,i, j(µ) is differentiable with derivative −v˙k,i, j(µ, r(µ)).
Proof: See Appendix 5.A.4.
Theorem 4.2, p. 223 in Fiacco and Ishizuka (1990) and Theorem 4.24, p. 280 in the book
of Bonnans and Shapiro (2000) present a generalized version of the envelope theorem. They
show that—under suitable constraint qualifications—the directional derivative (in direction
h and evaluated at parameter µ) of the largest and smallest value in a mathematical program
with equality and inequality constraints is given by:
sup
r∈R∗(µ)
∇µL (x∗(µ; r);µ)h,
and
inf
r∈R∗(µ)
∇µL (x∗(µ; r);µ)h,
provided there is a unique set of Lagrange Multipliers supporting the optimal solutions
x∗(µ; r). Proposition 2 uses the results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to verify this formula.
Delta-Method vs. Bootstrap: We also note that directionally differentiable functions
have been a topic of recent research. Fang and Santos (2015) show that the standard boot-
strap is not consistent when applied to parameters of the form v(µ), where v is a directionally
differentiable function. Kitagawa et al. (2016) show that Bayesian credible sets based on the
quantiles of the posterior distribution of v(µ) will be asymptotically equivalent to the fre-
quentist bootstrap (which is not consistent in this case).
These results imply that typical frequentist and Bayesian inference for directionally dif-
ferentiable functions is problematic. The next section shows that the special form of the di-
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rectional derivative in the class of SVARs models studied in this paper allows the researcher
to conduct delta-method inference, with a slight adjustment on the standard errors.
5.6 Delta-method inference
This section proposes a delta-method confidence interval of the form
CST (1−α)≡

vk,i, j(bµT )− z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT , vk,i, j(bµT )+ z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT,
where bµT ≡ (vec(bAT )′,vec(ÒΣT )′),
is the OLS estimator for µ defined as:
bAT ≡  1T T∑
t=1
YtX
′
t
 1
T
T∑
t=1
X tX
′
t
−1
, ÒΣT ≡ 1T T∑
t=1
bηt bη′t ,
with
X t ≡ (Y ′t−1, . . . ,Y ′t−p)′, bηt ≡ Yt − bATX t .
We work under the assumption that
p
T(bµT −µ) is asymptotically normal with some covari-
ance matrix Ω. A common formula to estimate the asymptotic variance of bµT is:
ÒΩT ≡  1T T∑
t=1
vec

[bηtX ′t , bηt bη′t − ÒΣT ]vec[bηtX ′t , bηt bη′t − ÒΣT ]′.
We use the results in Proposition 2 and the asymptotically normality of bµT to suggest the
following formula for bσ(k,i, j),T :
bσ(k,i, j),T ≡ max
r∈R(bµT )

v˙k,i, j(bµT ; r)′ÒΩT v˙k,i, j(bµT ; r), (5.10)
where R(bµT ) is the set of all possible active constraints evaluated at bµT .
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Main Result in this section: Let P denote the data generating process and let
IRk,i, j(µ(P)) denote the identified set for the structural parameter λk,i, j given the equa-
lity/inequality restrictions inR(µ). This section shows that under our proposed specification
of bσ(k,i, j),T :
lim inf
T→∞ infλ∈I R(µ(P)) P

λ ∈ CST (1−α)
≥ 1−α.
Consequently, the delta-method confidence interval presented in this paper is pointwise
consistent in level. We now describe the main large-sample assumptions concerning P.
Data Generating Process: The SVAR parameters (A1, . . . ,Ap,B, F) define a probability
measure, denoted P, over the data observed by the econometrician. Our main assumption
concerning P is as follows:
Assumption 4 (Asymptotic Normality of bµT ). The data generating process P is such that
for µ(P) ∈ Rd : p
T(bµT −µ(P)) d→ ζ(P)∼Nd0 , Ω(P),
and ÒΩT p→ Ω(P).
Thus, our only restriction on (A1,A2, . . . ,Ap,B, F) is that, whatever these parameters are,
the OLS estimator bµT is asymptotically normal with a covariance matrix that can be estimated
consistently.
Delta-method for Directionally Differentiable functions: Dümbgen (1993),
Shapiro (1991), and Fang and Santos (2015) have shown if v is a directionally differenti-
able function with directional derivative v˙µ(h) (in direction h evaluated at µ) then:
p
T(v(bµ)− v(µ)) d→ v˙µ(ζ),
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whenever Assumption 4 holds.¹⁵ Proposition 2 in the previous section established that the
directional derivative of vk,i, j—in direction h evaluated at µ—is given by:
max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ; r))
′h

.
where R∗(µ) collects the active constraints that generate vk,i, j(µ). Thus, Proposition 2 and
Assumption 4 imply that:
p
T(vk,i, j(bµ)− vk,i, j(µ)) d→ max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ

,
where
v˙k,i, j(µ, r(µ))
′ζ∼N1

0, v˙k,i, j(µ, r(µ))
′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r(µ))

.
Inference for Directionally Differentiable Functions:How can we use the delta-
method result above to construct a confidence set for λk,i, j? Our suggestion—which exploits
the specific form of the directional derivative in the SVAR context—is to consider:
bσ(k,i, j),T ≡ max
r∈R(bµT )

v˙k,i, j(bµT ; r)′ÒΩT v˙k,i, j(bµT ; r),
where R(bµT ) is the set of all the different collections of active constraints evaluated at bµT . The
resulting standard error will then be used to enlarge the plug-in estimator of the endpoints
of the identified set. The suggested confidence interval is shown to be pointwise consistent
in level.¹⁶ This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Pointwise Consistency in Level of the Delta-Method Confidence Interval).
Let bσ(k,i, j),T be defined as in (5.10). Suppose there are at most n− 1 equality restrictions and
¹⁵ The map v : Rr → R is said to be Hadamard directionally differentiable at µ ∈ µ ⊆ Rr , tangenti-
ally to Rr , if there is a continuous (not necessarily linear) map v˙(·,µ) : Rr → R such that:
lim
T→∞
 v(µ+ tThT )− v(µ)
tT
− v˙(h;µ)
= 0,
for all sequences {hT} ⊆ Rr and {tT} ⊆ R+ such that tT → 0+, hT → h ∈ Rr and µ+ tThT ∈ µ for all
T . The function v(·) is Fully Differentiable at µ if and only if the mapping v˙(·;µ) is linear. See Fang
and Santos (2015) for a recent elegant exposition on directionally differentiable functions. See also
Shapiro (1990).
¹⁶ The question of how to build a uniformly consistent in level, delta-method confidence set for a set-
identified parameter is beyond the scope of this paper. For the readers interested in uniform inference
for set-identified parameters in SVARs our suggestion is to apply the projection approach developed
in Gafarov et al. (2016). Compared to GMM16, the delta-method approach described in this paper is
faster to implement.
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that data generating process P is such that Z(µ(P)) and S(µ(P)) are linearly independent at
µ(P) as defined in Section 4, and also differentiable. Suppose in addition that:
min
r∈R(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)
′Ω(P)v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)

> 0.
Then, under Assumption 4:
lim inf
T→∞ infλ∈IRk,i, j(µ(P))
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT ,
vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT ≥ 1 − α
Proof: See Appendix 5.A.5.
The intuition behind our proof is as follows. Note first that if λ belongs to the identi-
fied set, (i.e., λ ∈ IRk,i, j(µ(P)), then such parameter must lie between the maximum and the
minimum response; that is λ ∈ [vk,i, j(µ(P)), vk,i, j(µ(P))]. Consequently, one can show that:
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT , vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT,
is larger than or equal to
P

vk,i, j(µ(P)), vk,i, j(µ(P)) ∈

vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT ,
vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T /pT.
Thus, a sufficient condition for the validity of the delta-method confidence interval is
that it covers the identified set with probability at least 1−α. Note that the probability of
covering the identified set can be written as one minus the sum of the following two terms:
P
p
T(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ(P)))> z1−α/2bσ(k,i, j),T,
and
P
p
T(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ(P))< −z1−α/2 bσ(k,i, j),T >).
Using our large sample assumptions and the delta-method for directional differentiable functi-
ons, these probabilities are approximately equal to:
P

min
r∈R∗(µ(P))
[−v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)′Zd]> z1−α/2σ(k,i, j)

,
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and
P

max
r∈R∗(µ(P))[v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)
′Zd]< −z1−α/2σ(k,i, j)

,
where:
σk,i, j ≡ max
r∈R(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)
′Ω(P)v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)

, Zd ∼N (0,Ω).
Take any r∗ ∈ R∗(µ(P)) for which σ(k,i, j)(r∗)≡ v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r∗)′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r∗)> 0. (we
have assumed that such r∗ exists). It follows that:
P

min
r∈R∗(µ(P))
[−v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)′Z]> z1− α2σ(k,i, j)
≤ Pσk,i, j(r∗)N(0,1)> z1− α2σ(k,i, j),
and the last term is bounded above by α/2. Analogously, we can select an r∗ ∈ R∗(µ(P)) for
which σ(k,i, j)(r
∗)≡ v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r∗)′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r∗)> 0 and we can show that:
P

max
r∈R∗(µ(P))[v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)
′Z]< −z1− α2σ(k,i, j)
≤ Pσk,i, j(r∗)N(0, 1)< −z1− α2σ(k,i, j),
which is also bounded above by α/2. These inequalities suffice to establish the pointwise
validity of our delta-method approach.
Monte-Carlo Evidence: We conduct a simple Monte-Carlo exercise to study the co-
verage probability of our delta-method confidence set. We set (1−α)= .68, which im-
plies that z1−α/2 = .9945. We generate 10, 000 draws from the multivariate normal model
Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T) and for each draw (denoted µ∗) we compute the confidence interval:
vk,i, j(µ
∗)− .9945σ∗(k,i, j),T /
p
T , vk,i, j(µ
∗)+ .9945σ∗(k,i, j),T /
p
T

.
We check whether [vk,i, j(bµT ), vk,i, j(bµT )] is contained in the confidence interval or not. The
estimated probability provides a lower bound on the coverage of the identified parameter.
The results are reported in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4. Monte-Carlo coverage probability based on the model µ∗ ∼N (bµT ,ÒΩT / T), T = 342.
(Blue, Circles) Monte-Carlo estimate of the probability P

[vk,i, j(bµT ), vk,i, j(bµT )] ∈ [vk,i, j(µ∗)− .9945σ∗(k,i, j),T /pT , vk,i, j(µ∗)+
.9945σ∗(k,i, j),T /
p
T]

for the model µ∗ ∼N (bµT ,ÒΩT ), with T = 342. The values bµT and ÒΩT correspond, respectively, to the estimators of the
reduced-form parameter and its asymptotic covariance matrix in the UMP application. (Blue, Solid Line) Nominal confidence level for the
delta-method confidence interval (68%).
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5.7 Unconventional monetary policy shocks
As we mentioned before, the identification strategy in this paper was motivated by two me-
chanisms used by the Federal Reserve to affect market beliefs during the Great Recession:
forward guidance announcements and the large-scale asset purchase program. We will focus
on one particular episode of the Great Recession illustrating the role of forward guidance.
In August 2010 the Federal Open Market Committee announced: “The Committee will keep
constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting princi-
pal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury
securities.” This announcement was an important prelude for the second part of the Quan-
titative Easing program (QE2) (see p. 244 in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
for a detailed discussion). In addition, this announcement generated a drop in the intraday
yield for two- and ten- year treasury bond. In fact, from the end of July 2010 to the end of
August 2010 the 2 year Treasury bond rate fell by 10 basis points.
Figure 5.5 uses our delta-method approach to construct confidence bands for the evo-
lution of the levels of the four variables in the monetary SVAR. We fix all the variables at
their level on July 2010 and we trace their evolution (over a 12-month window) according
to the confidence set for their cumulative responses. The motivation for this exercise is as fol-
lows. Suppose that—back in August 2010—an econometrician is asked to provide confidence
bands for the evolution of IP, CPI, 2YTB, and FF after the August 2010 announcement of the
Federal OpenMarket Committee (FOMC). The econometrician observes the realization of the
macroeconomic variables from July 1979 until August 2010, but decides to deliberately ig-
nore the two years of data after the crisis (to avoid introducing structural changes, stochastic
volatility, or any other feature that will complicate the estimation of the VAR).
The econometrician uses the data until December 2007—one semester before the finan-
cial crisis—to conduct delta-method inference on the cumulative responses to a one standard
deviation unconventional monetary policy shock. The econometrician then uses these cumu-
lative responses to get a rough idea of the evolution of the variables (in levels) following the
announcement of the Federal Reserve in August 2010. The econometrician assumes there is a
linear trend for CPI/IP, and ignores sampling uncertainty coming from the trend estimation
in reporting the bands.
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An ex-post evaluation of this exercise (over a window of 12 months) is reported in Figure
5.5.¹⁷ We note that the observed dynamics for CPI, IP, GS2, and FFR from August 2010 to
July 2011 fall within the bounds motivated by our delta-method confidence interval. We also
note that our delta-method confidence interval misses the observed value at most three out
of 12 months, which means that our 68% confidence-set covers each of these variables at
least 75% of the time. We also report the 68% Bayesian credible sets.
¹⁷ The reason to focus in a 12-month window is to cover the period between the QE2 announ-
cement and the announcement of the so-called “Operation Twist” in September 2011. See http:
//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110921a.htm.
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Figure 5.5. Delta-method confidence interval for CPI, IP, 2yTB, FF after the August 2010 announcement
Consumer Price Index Industrial Production Index
2-year Treasury Bond Rate Federal Funds Rate
(Shaded, Blue Area) Evolution of the Levels CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF based on our 68% delta method confidence bands for the coefficients of
Cumulative Impulse-Response Functions. (Gray, Solid Line) Observed Levels of CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF from December 2009 to July 2011. Both
the CPI index and the IP index were normalized to have a starting value of 100. (Gray, Dashed Line) Evolution of the Levels CPI, IP, 2yTB,
and FF based on the 68% credible set constructed using the priors in Uhlig (2005).
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Computational Cost: We close this section with some comments regarding the com-
putational cost of our delta-method procedure. Most of the work to compute the endpoints
of the identified set and its derivatives is analytical. Consequently, practitioners can expect
the computational burden of our procedure to be low. We note that the implementation of
our delta-method confidence interval in the running example takes only around .15 seconds
(using a standard Laptop @2.4GHz IntelCore i7). With the same equipment, the standard
Bayesian implementation required around 327 seconds for 10,000 draws (which means that
we could have constructed 2,000 delta-method confidence intervals while we generated the
Bayesian credible set).
Comparison with the Projection Approach: Figure 5.7 presents a comparison bet-
ween the delta-method approach and the projection confidence interval recently proposed
by Gafarov et al. (2016) [GMM16]. The projection confidence interval has three theoretical
properties that we were not able to verify for the delta-method approach. First, the projection
confidence interval is uniformly consistent in level. Second, the projection confidence interval
yields valid inference for the whole impulse-response function and not only its scalar coeffi-
cients. Third, the projection confidence interval has—in large samples—Bayesian credibility
of at least the nominal level (for a large class of priors).
In order to exploit our formulas for the endpoints of the identified set, we followed a
different algorithm to the one suggested in GMM16. We used a random grid over the Wald
ellipsoid for the reduced-form parameters and reported the range of IRFs over this grid. The
implementation of the projection confidence set (based on a random grid of 10,000 points)
took around 1300 seconds (4 times slower than the Bayesian credible set and 8,000 times
slower than the delta-method). We note that the projection confidence interval (which is
wider than the delta-method bands) contains the realized value of IP, CPI, 2YTB, and FF for
every horizon under consideration.
Comparison with Calibrated Projection: The projection confidence interval covers
the structural parameters more often than necessary. GMM16 show that when the endpoints
of the identified set are differentiable, one can project a Wald ellipsoid with a radius given by
z21−α to eliminate projection bias. The calibrated confidence set will be approximately given
by: 
vk,i, j(bµT )− z1−α bσ(k,i, j),T /pT , vk,i, j(bµT )+ z1−α bσ(k,i, j),T /pT,
where bσ(k,i, j),T , bσ(k,i, j),T are estimators of the asymptotic variance of the plug-in estimators
for the endpoints of the identified set. Figure 5.8 reports the calibrated projection.
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Under the differentiability assumption, both bσ(k,i, j),T , bσ(k,i, j),T are smaller (for every data
realization) than bσ(k,i, j),T . This suggests that—whenever the endpoints of the identified set
are fully differentiable—the calibrated projection should deliver smaller confidence intervals
than our delta-method approach, as our formula for the standard error takes into account the
possibility that the endpoints are only directionally differentiable. In terms of computation
time, the calibrated projection takes approximately 109,365 seconds (solving the nonlinear
program described in GMM16).
Comparison with the Robust Approach: Finally, Figure 5.6 in the Appendix reports
the robust-Bayesian credible set in Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015). The implementation of
the robust-Bayes credible set (based on 10,000 posterior draws and using our algorithm to
evaluate the endpoints) took around 9,106 seconds.¹⁸
5.8 Conclusion
This paper focused on set-identified SVARs that impose equality and inequality restrictions to
set-identify only one structural shock. For this class of models, the endpoints of the identified
set have special properties that allow an intuitive and computationally simple approach to
conduct frequentist inference. Specifically, the paper made three contributions:
(i) We presented an algorithm to compute—for each horizon, each variable, a fixed
vector of reduced-form parameters, and a given collection of equality and/or inequality
restrictions—the largest and smallest value of the coefficients of the structural IRF (see Pro-
position 1). Our algorithm does not require random sampling from the space of rotation
matrices or unit vectors. Instead, we treated the bounds of the identified set as the maxi-
mum and minimum value of a mathematical program whose solutions we can characterize
analytically.
(ii) We provided sufficient conditions under which the largest and smallest value of the
structural parameters are directionally differentiable functions of the reduced-form parame-
ters (see Proposition 2). This result seems to be of interest in its own right, and for example,
could be used to explore the frequentist properties of the robust-Bayesian procedure in Gia-
comini and Kitagawa (2015).
(iii) We proposed a computationally convenient delta-method confidence interval for the
set-identified coefficients of the structural IRF. We presented sufficient conditions to guaran-
¹⁸Out of which 1,266 seconds were used just to compute the identified set for each posterior draw,
and the remaining time to translate the posterior bounds into the GK robust bounds
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tee the pointwise consistency in level of the suggested inference approach. The delta-method
in this paper exploited the structure of the directional derivative.
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Appendix 5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Lemma 1
Let S(µ) denote the n×ms matrix of ms ‘sign’ restrictions and let Z(µ) denote the mz × n
matrix of ‘zero’ restrictions. For notational simplicity, we deliberately ignore the dependence
of the equality/inequality restrictions on µ. The problem in equation (5.5) is equivalent to:
vk,i, j(A,Σ) ≡ maxx∈Rn e′iCk(A)x
s.t. x ′Σ−1x = 1, S′x = 0ms×1, Z
′x = 0mz×1. (5.11)
The auxiliary Lagrangian function is given by:
L (x ,w1,w2,w3;A,Σ) = e′iCkx − w1(x ′Σ−1x − 1) − w′2(S′x) − w′3(Z ′x).
Since Z(µ) and S(µ) are linearly independent at µ we can characterize the maximum re-
sponse using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the mathematical program in (5.5). The
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for this problem are as follows:
Stationarity : C ′k(A)ei − 2w1Σ−1x − Sw2 − Zw3 = 0n×1,
Primal Feasibility : x ′Σ−1x = 1,
S′x ≥ 0ms×1,
Z ′x = 0mz×1,
Complementary Slackness : ω2i(e
′
iSx) = 0 ∀ i = 1 . . .ms,
plus the additional dual feasibility constraint requiring the Lagrange multipliers, ω2i , to be
smaller than or equal to zero.
Let x∗(A,Σ, r) be one (out of possibly many) maximizer of the program of interest and sup-
pose that the m× nmatrix (m≤ n− 1) r collects all the restrictions that are active (binding).
Because of Assumption 1 and the fact that Z and S are linearly independent at µ, the matrix
r is of full rank m and m must be smaller than or equal n− 1. Using stationarity, primal
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feasibility, and complementary slackness at x∗ we get:
0 = x∗′[Ck(A)′ei − 2w∗1Σ−1x∗ − Sw2 − Zw3]
= x∗′Ck(A)′ei − 2w∗1x∗′Σ−1x∗ − x∗′Sw2 − x∗′Zw3
= x∗′Ck(A)′ei − 2w∗1 − x∗′Sw2 − x∗′Zw3
(where we have used x∗′Σ−1x∗ = 1)
= x∗′Ck(A)′ei − 2w∗1
(where we have used x∗′Z = 0mz×1 and complementary slackness)
= vk,i, j(A,Σ) − 2w∗1.
where vk,i, j(A,Σ) denotes the value of the maximum response when the constraints in r are
active. Thus, the Lagrange multiplier w∗1 is unique and given by:
w∗1 =
1
2
vk,i, j(A,Σ).
Note also that w∗1 6= 0 if and only if vk,i j(A,Σ) 6= 0. We now show that if vk,i, j(A,Σ) 6= 0
there are unique w∗2 and w∗3 that satisfy the Karush-Kuhn Tucker conditions. Note that left
multiplying the stationarity condition by Σ we have:
2w∗1x∗
′ =

Ck(A)
′ei − rw
′
Σ.
where w collects the nonzero components of ω2 and all the components of ω3.
Ck(A)
′ei − rw
′
Σ

Ck(A)
′ei − rw

= 4w21x
′Σ−1x (5.12)
= 4w21
(where we have used x∗′Σ−1x∗ = 1)
= 4
1
2
vk,i, j(A,Σ)
2
= vk,i, j(A,Σ)
2.
Consequently the value function given active constraints z is given by either:
vk,i, j(A,Σ)=

Ck(A)
′ei − rw
′
Σ

Ck(A)
′ei − rw
1/2
,
or
vk,i, j(A,Σ)= −

Ck(A)
′ei − rw
′
Σ

Ck(A)
′ei − rw
1/2
.
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We will use the first order conditions to find the vector of Lagrange multipliers w and show
that they are unique given vk,i, j(A,Σ) 6= 0. Note that
0 = 2w∗1r ′x∗ = vk,i, j(A,Σ)

r ′Σ(Ck(A)′ei − rw)

= vk,i, j(A,Σ)

r ′ΣCk(A)′ei − r ′Σrw

.
Under the assumptions of the Lemma, r is of rank m. If vk,i, j(A,Σ) 6= 0, the equation above
holds if and only if
w∗ = (r ′Σr)−1r ′ΣCk(A)′ei .
Consequently, the Lagrange multipliers for the active restrictions are unique. To conclude the
proof, we get an explicit expression of the value function in terms of (A,Σ). To do so, note
that:
Σ1/2

Ck(A)
′ei − rw

= Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei − Σ1/2rw
= Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei − Σ1/2r(r ′Σr)−1r ′ΣCk(A)′ei
=

In − Σ1/2r(r ′Σr)−1r ′Σ1/2

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
=

In − PΣ1/2r

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
= MΣ1/2rΣ
1/2Ck(A)
′ei .
Therefore, the equation above and (5.12) imply that if vk,i, j(A,Σ) 6= 0 then either:
vk,i, j(A,Σ)=

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
or
vk,i, j(A,Σ)= −

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
.
Furthermore, since any solution for which z is the set of binding constraints satisfies 2w∗1x∗′ =
(Ck(A)
′ei − rw)′Σ, then the solution vectors for which the constraints in r are binding are:
x∗ =Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
,
or
x∗ = −Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′eiÀe′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rΣ1/2Ck(A)′ei1/2.
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In any case the lagrange multipliers for the active constraints are given (as shown above) by,
w∗ = (r ′Σr)−1r ′ΣCk(A)′ei .
Remark to the proof of Lemma 1: If vk,i, j(A,Σ)= 0, then neither the maximizer x∗ nor
the Lagrange multipliers w∗ are unique. Note that any x ∈ Rn orthogonal to Ck(A)′ei sa-
tisfying the ellipsoid constraint x ′Σ−1x = 1 and the sign/zero restrictions is a solution. In
addition, any vector of Lagrange multipliers satisfying the equation C ′kei − rw= 0n×1, satis-
fies the F.O.C.
5.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let x∗ ∈ Rn be a solution to the program (5.5) and let r∗ be the set of constraints that are
active at x∗.
Step 1: We show first that
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≥maxr∈R

max{ f +max(A,Σ; r), f
−
max(A,Σ; r)}

.
We do so by considering two different cases. Case 1.1: Take any r ∈ R, and assume first that
vk,i, j(A,Σ, r) 6= 0. If 1ms(x∗+(A,Σ, r))= 0, then
f +max(A,Σ, r)= vk,i, j(A,Σ, r)− 2c ≤ c − 2c = −c < vk,i, j(A,Σ).
If, however, r ∈ R is such that 1ms(x∗+(A,Σ, r))= 1, then x∗+(A,Σ, r) satisfies all the equality
and inequality restrictions in (5.5) and, by construction, also satisfies the ellipsoid constraint
x∗+(A,Σ, r)′Σ−1x∗+(A,Σ, r)= 1.
Consequently, vk,i, j(A,Σ)≥ f +max(A,Σ, r) for all r ∈ R. An analogou argument shows that
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≥ f −max(A,Σ, r). This implies that:
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≥max{ f +max(A,Σ, r), f −max(A,Σ, r)},
for all r ∈ R such that vk,i, j(A,Σ, r) 6= 0.
Case 1.2: Consider now any r such that vk,i, j(A,Σ, r)= 0. If there is no feasible point x∗
that gives such value, then f +max(A,Σ, r)= f
−
max(A,Σ, r)= −c ≤ vk,i, j(A,Σ). If there is such
a feasible point x∗ 6= 0 then f +max(A,Σ, r)= f −max(A,Σ, r)= 0 Since x∗ is in the choice set
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of the program 5.5, then f +max(A,Σ, r)= f
−
max(A,Σ, r)= 0≤ vk,i, j(A,Σ). Therefore, Case 1.1
and 1.2 imply that:
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≥max{ f +max(A,Σ, r), f −max(A,Σ, r)} for all r ∈ R.
Step 2: We now show that
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≤maxr∈R max{ f +max(A,Σ, r), f −max(A,Σ, r)}.
Again, we consider two cases.
Case 2.1: Assume first that vk,i, j(A,Σ) 6= 0. Without loss of generality, let vk,i, j(A,Σ)> 0. Let
r∗ ∈ R denote the set of active sign restrictions at the solution x∗. By Lemma 1, we know that
vk,i, j(A,Σ)=

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2r∗Σ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
,
and
x∗(A,Σ; r∗)=Σ1/2

MΣ1/2r∗

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2r∗Σ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
.
Since this point satisfies the sign restrictions not in r∗, then
e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2r∗Σ1/2Ck(A)′ei
1/2
= f +max(A,Σ, r
∗).
Consequently,
vk,i, j(A,Σ)≤maxr∈R max{ f +max(A,Σ, r), f −max(A,Σ, r)}.
Case 2.2: If vk,i, j(A,Σ)= 0, there is an x∗ 6= 0 in the choice set. Hence, the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions implies that Ck(A)
′ei is a linear combination of the
active constraints that generate the value of zero (which means there is an r∗
such that f +max(A,Σ; r
∗)= f −max(A,Σ; r∗)= 0). Therefore, vk,i, j(A,Σ)= f (A,Σ, r∗)≤
maxr∈R max{ f +max(A,Σ, r), f −max(A,Σ, r)}. Step 1 and Step 2 shows that the value function
vk,i, j(A,Σ) is obtained by computing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker points in Lemma 1 for each r,
penalizing the value vk,i, j(A,Σ; r) if unfeasible, and maximizing over all the possible values
of r. The proof for the lower bound is analogous.
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5.A.3 Lemma 2
Note that if rl(µ) is differentiable and vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ)) 6= 0, then the function:
vk,i, j(µ; rl(µ))=

e′iCk(A)Σ1/2MΣ1/2rl(µ)Σ
1/2Ck(A)
′ei
1/2
,
is differentiable as well. Moreover, the function
x∗(µ; rl(µ))≡Σ1/2

MΣ1/2rl(µ)

Σ1/2Ck(A)
′ei
À
vk,i, j(µ; rl(µ))
is also differentiable. Therefore,
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ µ
=
∂ [e′iCk(A)x∗(µ, rl(µ))]
∂ µ
(since vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ)) = e
′
iCk(A)x
∗(µ, rl(µ)))
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ µ
C ′k(A)ei +
∂ (x∗(µ; rl(µ))′ ⊗ e′i)vec(Ck(A))
∂ µ
,
(where we have re-written e′iCk(A)x∗ as (x∗
′ ⊗ e′i)vec(Ck(A)))
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ µ
C ′k(A)ei +
∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ µ
(x∗(µ; rl(µ)) ⊗ ei)
(where we have applied the chain rule for matrix derivatives).
We now use the envelope theorem to compute this derivative. Note that we have shown the
existence of unique multipliers λ∗ ∈ R and w∗ ∈ Rl such that:
Ck(A)
′ei = λ∗2Σ−1x∗(µ; rl(µ))+ rl(µ)w∗.
Therefore:
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)

λ∗2Σ−1x∗(µ; rl(µ)) + rl(µ)w∗

+
∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(A)
(x∗(µ; rl(µ)) ⊗ ei).
and
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)

λ∗2Σ−1x∗(µ; rl(µ)) + rl(µ)w∗

+
∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(Σ)
(x∗(µ; rl(µ)) ⊗ ei).
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Note also that:
0 =
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))′Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
= 2
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ))
and
0 =
∂ rl(µ)
′x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
rl(µ)
+

∂ r1,l(µ)
vec(A) x
∗(µ, rl(µ)), · · · , ∂ rl,l(µ)vec(A) x∗(µ, rl(µ))

,
where rk,l(µ) denotes the k-th column of rl(µ). Consequently:
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
=
∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(A)
(x∗(µ; rl(µ)) ⊗ ei)
−
l∑
k=1
w∗k
∂ vec(rk,l(µ))
vec(A)
x∗(µ, rl(µ)),
where w∗k is the k-th entry of the vector of lagrange multipliers w∗. This gives the partial
derivative of vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ)) with respect to vec(A). We note that this derivative can also be
written as:
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(A)
=
∂ vec(Ck(A))
∂ vec(A)
(x∗(µ; rl(µ)) ⊗ ei)
−∂ vec(rl(µ)
′)
vec(A)
(x∗(µ, rl(µ)) ⊗ Il)w∗,
which is the expression given in the overview. Finally, to get the derivative with respect to
vec(Σ) we note that:
0 =
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))′Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
= 2
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ))
− (Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ)) ⊗ Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ))),
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and
0 =
∂ rl(µ)
′x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
=
∂ x∗(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
rl(µ) +

∂ r1,l(µ)
vec(Σ) x
∗(µ, rl(µ)), · · · , ∂ rl,l(µ)vec(Σ) x∗(µ, rl(µ))

.
Consequently,
∂ vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))
∂ vec(Σ)
= λ∗(Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ)) ⊗ Σ−1x∗(µ, rl(µ)))
−
l∑
k=1
w∗k
∂ vec(rk,l(µ))
vec(Σ)
x∗(µ, rl(µ)).
5.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let r1(µ), r2(µ), . . . rM(µ) denote the elements of R(µ). Each of these elements activate a
different collection of sign restrictions. Without loss of generality, assume that R∗(µ) contains
the first L elements r1(µ), . . . , rL(µ) of R(µ). Consider any sequence (AT ,ΣT ) such that
(vecAT
′,vechΣ′T )′ = (vecA′,vechΣ′)′ + hT / rT ,
where hT → h, rT →∞ and such that for large enough T , (vecAT ,vechΣT ) belongs to the
parameter space µ. Suppose that vk,i, j(µ)> 0. Note that by Proposition 1:
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT ) =
f (AT ,ΣT , r1(µT )) if f (AT ,ΣT , r1(µT )) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
f (AT ,ΣT , rL(µT )) if f (AT ,ΣT , rL(µT )) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
f (AT ,ΣT , rM(µT )) if f (AT ,ΣT , rM(µT )) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r).
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Since each rl(µ) is assumed to be continuous and only the first L elements of R(µ) belong to
R∗(µ) then (for T large enough):
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT ) =
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT )) if v(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT )) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rL(µT )) if v(AT ,ΣT , rL(µ)) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rL+1(µT )) if v(AT ,ΣT , rL+1(µ)) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
−2(1 − 1ms(x∗+(µ, rL+1(µ)))
...
...
...
vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rM(µT )) if f (AT ,ΣT , rM(µ)) = maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r).
−2(1 − 1ms(x∗+(µ, rM(µ))))
Note that vk,i, j(µ)= vk,i, j(µ; rl(µ)) for all rl(µ) ∈ R∗(µ) and vk,i, j(µ)> vk,i, j(µ; rl(µ)) for
all rl(µ) /∈ R∗(µ). Therefore, the equation above implies that rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT )− vk,i, j(A,Σ))
equals
rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, r1(µT ))) if v(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT ))= maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rL(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, rL(µ))) if v(AT ,ΣT , rL(µ))= maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rM(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, rM(µ))) if f (AT ,ΣT , rM(µ))= maxr∈R(µT ) f (AT ,ΣT , r).
+rT (vk,i, j(µ, rM(µ))− vk,i, j(µ))
−rT2(1− 1ms(x∗(µ, rM(µ))))
For T large enough, this implies that rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT )− vk,i, j(A,Σ)) equals
rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, r1(µ))) if v(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT ))= maxr∈R∗(µT ) vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r),
...
...
...
rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , rL(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, rL(µ))) if v(AT ,ΣT , rL(µ))= maxr∈R∗(µT ) vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r).
Since each of rT (vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT , r1(µT ))− vk,i, j(µ, rl(µ))) in the previous expression is, by
Lemma 2, approximately equal to
v˙k,i, j(µ; rl(µ))
′h.
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Then
rT

vk,i, j(AT ,ΣT )− vk,i, j(A,Σ)
→ max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ; r)
′h

.
5.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let P denote the data generating process. For notational simplicity we write µ instead of
µ(P) and Ω instead of Ω(P) whenever convenient. Note first that
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσT /pT , vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσT /pT (5.13)
equals
P
p
T(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ))≤ z1−α/2 bσT +pT(λ− vk,i, j(µ)) and
p
T(λ− vk,i, j(µ))− z1−α/2bσT ≤pT(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ)).
Since p
T(λ− vk,i, j(µ))≥ 0 and
p
T(λ− vk,i, j(µ))≤ 0,
(5.13) is bounded from below by
P
p
T(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ))≤ z1− α2 bσT and − z1− α2 bσT ≤pT(vk,i, j(bµT )− vk,i, j(µ)),
which is itself bounded from below by:
P
p
T(vk,i, j(bµT ) − vk,i, j(µ)) ≤ z1− α2 bσT ,
and − z1− α2 bσT ≤ pT(vk,i, j(bµT ) − vk,i, j(µ)),
and ||pT(bµT − µ)|| ≤ Mε,
where Mε is such that
P
||ζ(P)||> Mε≤ ε.
Since, by Proposition 2, both vk,i, j(·) and vk,i, j(µ) are directionally differentiable with directi-
onal derivatives:
min
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′h

,
and
max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′h

.
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The directional differentiability implies that for any compact set K there is T large enough
such that for any h ∈ K:
−ε≤pT(vk,i, j(µ+ h/
p
T)− vk,i, j(µ))− minr∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′h
≤ ε,
and
−ε≤pT(vk,i, j(µ+ h/pT)− vk,i, j(µ))− max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′h
≤ ε.
Therefore, for T large enough:
inf
λ∈IRk,i, j(µ(P))
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσT /pT , vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσT /pT
is bounded from below by:
P

min
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′pT(bµT −µ)≤ z1−α/2 bσT and
−z1−α/2bσT ≤ max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′pT(bµ−µ), and ||pT(bµT −µ)|| ≤ Mε,
which, by Assumption 4, converges in distribution to:
P

min
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)
≤ z1−α/2 σ and
−z1−α/2σ ≤ max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)

, and ||ζ(P)|| ≤ Mε

,
where σ is the probability limit of bσT :
σ ≡ max
r∈R(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r)

,
and where we have used the fact that σ > 0.¹⁹ Consequently,
lim inf
T→∞ infλ∈IRk,i, j(µ(P))
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1− α2 bσT /pT ,
vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1− α2 bσT /pT
¹⁹ This follows from the fact that:
σ ≡ max
r∈R(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
≥ min
r∈R(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)
′Ω(P)v˙k,i, j(µ(P), r)

> 0,
which we have assumed to be strictly bigger than zero.
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is larger than or equal:
1− P min
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)

> z1− α2 σ
− P max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)

< −z1− α2 σ

−P||ζ(P)||> Mε.
Take some r ∈ R∗(µ) for which σ(r)≡ v˙k,i, j(µ, r)′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r)> 0 (one such r must exist for
we have assumed that minr∈R(µ)[v˙k,i, j(µ, r)′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r)]> 0). Therefore:
P

min
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)

> z1−α/2 σ
 ≤ Pv˙k,i, j(µ, r)′ζ(P) > z1−α/2σ
≤ PN(0,1) > z1−α/2 σ
σ(r)

,
which is at most α/2 since σ ≥ σ(r).
Now, take some r ∈ R∗(µ) for which σ(r)≡ v˙k,i, j(µ, r)′Ω v˙k,i, j(µ, r)> 0. Note that
P

max
r∈R∗(µ)

v˙k,i, j(µ, r)
′ζ(P)

< −z1−α/2 σ
 ≤ Pv˙k,i, j(µ, r)′ζ(P) < −z1−α/2σ
≤ PN(0, 1) < −z1−α/2 σ
σ(r)

,
which is less than or equal to ≤ α/2 as σ > σ(r). We conclude that
lim inf
T→∞ infλ∈IRk,i, j(µ(P))
P

λ ∈ vk,i, j(bµT ) − z1−α/2 bσT /pT ,
vk,i, j(bµT ) + z1−α/2 bσT /pT ≥ 1 − α − ε.
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, the desired result follows.
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Figure 5.6. Identified set for the cumulative impulse response functions to an UMP shock (given bµT )
(Solid, Blue Line) Endpoints of the identified set for the cumulative responses given bµT and the equality/inequality restrictions in Table I. (Blue, Dashed) Grid search approach
to evaluate the identified set (10,000 uniform draws from a unit vector q ∈ R4).
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Figure 5.7. Projection confidence interval for CPI, IP, 2yTB, FF after the August 2010 announcement
Consumer Price Index Industrial Production Index
2-year Treasury Bond Rate Federal Funds Rate
(Shaded, Blue Area) Evolution of the Levels CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF based on our 68% delta method confidence bands for the coefficients of Cumulative Impulse-Response Functi-
ons. (Gray, Solid Line) Observed Levels of CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF from December 2009 to July 2011. Both the CPI index and the IP index were normalized to have a starting value
of 100. (Gray, Dashed Line) 68% credible set constructed using the priors in Uhlig (2005). (Gray, Dotted Line) Gafarov et al. (2016)’s 68% confidence interval based on the
projection approach.
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Figure 5.8. Calibrated projection confidence interval for CPI, IP, 2yTB, FF after the August 2010 announcement
Consumer Price Index Industrial Production Index
2-year Treasury Bond Rate Federal Funds Rate
(Shaded, Blue Area) Evolution of the Levels CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF based on our 68% delta method confidence bands for the coefficients of Cumulative Impulse-Response Functi-
ons. (Gray, Solid Line) Observed Levels of CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF from December 2009 to July 2011. Both the CPI index and the IP index were normalized to have a starting value
of 100. (Gray, Dashed Line) 68% credible set constructed using the priors in Uhlig (2005). (Gray, Dotted Line) Gafarov et al. (2016)’s 68% differentiable projection.
5.A
Appendix
|
161
Figure 5.9. Robust credible set for CPI, IP, 2yTB, FF after the August 2010 announcement
Consumer Price Index Industrial Production Index
2-year Treasury Bond Rate Federal Funds Rate
(Shaded, Blue Area) Evolution of the Levels CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF based on our 68% delta method confidence bands for the coefficients of Cumulative Impulse-Response Functi-
ons. (Gray, Solid Line) Observed Levels of CPI, IP, 2yTB, and FF from December 2009 to July 2011. Both the CPI index and the IP index were normalized to have a starting value
of 100. (Gray, Dashed Line) 68% credible set constructed using the priors in Uhlig (2005). (Gray, Dotted Line) Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015)’s 68% robust-Bayes credible
set constructed using the priors for the reduced-form parameters in Uhlig (2005).
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6Projection Inference for Set-Identified
SVARs
Joint with Bulat Gafarov and José Luis Montiel Olea
6.1 Introduction
A Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) (Sims (1980, 1986)) is a time series model that
brings theoretical restrictions into a linear, multivariate autoregression. The theoretical re-
strictions are used to transform reduced-form parameters (regression coefficients and the
covariance matrix of residuals) into structural parameters that are more amenable to po-
licy interpretation. Depending on the restrictions imposed, the map between reduced-form
and structural parameters can be one-to-one (a point-identified SVAR) or one-to-many (a
set-identified SVAR).
It is now customary for empirical macroeconomic studies to impose sign and/or exclusion
restrictions on structural dynamic responses in SVARs in order to set-identify the model, as
in the pioneering work of Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005). The vast majority of these studies
use numerical Bayesian methods to construct posterior credible sets for the coefficients of
the structural impulse-response function.
Despite the popularity of the Bayesian approach, a practical concern is the fact that poste-
rior inference for the structural parameters continues to be influenced by prior beliefs even if
the sample size is infinite. This point has been documented—in detail and generality—in the
work of Poirier (1998), Gustafson (2009), and Moon and Schorfheide (2012). More recently,
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Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) provided an explicit characterization of the influence of
prior beliefs on posterior distributions for structural parameters in set-identified SVARs.
This paper studies the properties of the projection method—which does not rely on the
specification of prior beliefs for set-identified parameters—to conduct simultaneous inference
about the coefficients of the structural impulse-response function (and their identified set).
The proposal is to ‘project’ a typical Wald ellipsoid for the reduced-form parameters of a VAR.
The suggested nominal 1−α projection region consists of all the structural parameters of
interest compatible with the reduced-form parameters in a nominal 1−αWald ellipsoid.
The attractive features of the projection approach—explained in more detail in the next
section—are its general applicability, its computational feasibility, and the fact that a nominal
1−α projection region has—asymptotically and under mild assumptions—both frequentist
coverage and robust Bayesian credibility of at least 1−α.¹ Moreover, building on Kaido et al.
(2016), we show that our baseline projection can be ‘calibrated’ to eliminate excessive robust
Bayesian credibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents an overview of
the projection approach. Section 6.3 presents the SVAR model and establishes the frequentist
coverage of projection. Section 6.4 establishes the asymptotic robust Bayesian credibility of
the projection region. Section 6.5 presents the ‘calibration’ algorithm designed to eliminate
the excess of robust Bayesian credibility and shows that, under regularity conditions, our
calibration also removes the excess of frequentist coverage. Section 6.6 discusses the imple-
mentation of projection in the context of the demand/supply SVAR for the U.S. labor market.
Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Overview and related literature
6.2.1 Overview
Let µ denote the parameters of a reduced-form vector autoregression; i.e., the slope coef-
ficients in the regression model and the covariance matrix of residuals. Let λ denote the
structural parameter of interest; i.e., the response of some variable i to a structural shock j
at horizon k (or a vector of responses). In set-identified SVARs there is a known map bet-
ween µ and the lower and upper bound for λ; see Uhlig (2005). Consequently, the smallest
¹ The robustness is relative to the choice of prior for the so-called ‘rotation’ matrix as in the recent
work of Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015).
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and largest value of a particular structural coefficient of interest can be written, simply and
succinctly, as v(µ) and v(µ).
Our projection region for λ (and for its identified set) is based on a straightforward ap-
plication of the classical idea of projection inference; see Scheffé (1953), Dufour (1990), and
Dufour and Taamouti (2005, 2007). Let bµT denote the sample least squares estimator for
µ and let CST (1−α;µ) denote its nominal 1−α Wald confidence ellipsoid. If, asymptoti-
cally, CST (1−α;µ) covers the parameter µ with probability 1−α, then, asymptotically, the
interval
CST (1 − α;λ) ≡

inf
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
v(µ) , sup
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
v(µ)

(6.1)
covers the set-identified parameter λ (and its identified set) with probability at least 1−α
(uniformly over a large class of data generating processes).²,³
In many applications there is interest in conducting simultaneous inference on h structural
parameters; for example, if one wants to analyze the response of variable i to a structural
shock j for all horizons ranging from period 1 to h as in Jordà (2009), Inoue and Kilian (2013,
2016), and Lütkepohl et al. (2015). In this case, the projection region given by:
CST (1 − α; (λ1, . . . ,λh)) ≡ CST (1 − α;λ1) × . . . × CST (1 − α;λh), (6.2)
covers the structural coefficients (λ1, . . .λh) and their identified set with probability at least
1−α as the sample size grows large. The only assumption required to guarantee the frequen-
tist coverage of our projection region is the asymptotic validity of the confidence set for the
reduced-form parameters, µ.
General Applicability: The validity of our projection method requires no regularity
assumptions (like continuity or differentiability) on the bounds of the identified set v(·) and
v(·). This means we can handle the typical application of set-identified SVARs in the em-
pirical macroeconomics literature (exclusion restrictions on contemporaneous coefficients,
long-run restrictions, elasticity bounds, and of course sign/zero restrictions on the responses
of different variables at different horizons for different shocks).
² Formally, we show that the confidence interval described in (6.1) is uniformly consistent of level 1−
α for the structural parameter λ (and its identified set) over some class of data generating processes.
³ The application of projection inference to SVARs was first suggested by Moon and Schorfheide
(2012) (p. 11, NBER working paper 14882). The projection approach is also briefly mentioned in
the work Kline and Tamer (2015) (Remark 8) in the context of set-identified models. None of these
papers established the properties for projection inference discussed in our work.
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Computational Feasibility: The implementation of our projection approach requires
neither numerical inversion of hypothesis tests nor sampling from the space of rotation ma-
trices. Instead, we use state-of-the-art optimization algorithms to solve for the maximum and
minimum value of a mathematical program to compute the two end points of the confidence
interval in (6.1).
Robust Bayesian Credibility: In the spirit of making our results appealing to Bayesian
decision makers, we show that our suggested nominal 1−α projection region will have—as
the sample size grows large—robust Bayesian credibility of at least 1−α. This means that the
asymptotic posterior probability that the vector of structural parameters of interest belongs to
the projection region will be at least 1−α; for a fixed prior on the reduced-form parameters,
µ, and for any prior on the set-identified parameters. A sufficient condition to establish the
robust Bayesian credibility of projection is that the prior for µ used to compute credibility
satisfies the Bernstein-von Mises theorem.
‘Calibrated’ Projection: Despite the features highlighted above, projection inference
is conservative both for a frequentist and a robust Bayesian. That is, both the asymptotic
confidence level and the asymptotic robust credibility of projection can be strictly above 1−α.
Kaido et al. (2016) [henceforth, KMS] refer to the excess of frequentist coverage as projection
conservatism and develop an innovative calibration approach to eliminate it.⁴
The calibration exercise in KMS requires, in the SVAR context, the computation of Monte-
Carlo coverage probabilities for the projection region over an exhaustive grid of values for the
reduced-form parameters, µ. In several SVAR applications, the dimension of µ compromises
the construction of an exhaustive grid.
Instead of insisting on removing excessive frequentist coverage, we suggest practitioners
to calibrate projection to attain a robust Bayesian credibility of exactly 1−α. The calibra-
tion of robust credibility is computationally feasible even if µ is of large dimension, as no
exhaustive grid for µ is needed. We provide a detailed description of our calibration proce-
dure in Section 6.5. Broadly speaking, the calibration consists of drawing µ from its posterior
distribution (or a suitable large-sample Gaussian approximation); evaluating the functions
v(µ), v(µ) for each draw of µ; and decreasing the radius defining the projection region until
it contains exactly (1−α)% of the values of v(µ), v(µ) (for different horizons and different
⁴Another recent paper proposing a procedure to eliminate the frequentist excess coverage in
moment-inequality models is Bugni et al. (2014). Adapting their profiling idea to our set-up could
be of theoretical interest and of practical relevance. We leave this question open for future research.
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shocks if desired).⁵ We show that if v(µ), v(µ) are differentiable, our suggested calibration
also removes the excessive frequentist coverage of the identified set.
Illustrative Example: The illustrative example in this paper is a simple demand and
supply model of the U.S. labor market. We estimate standard Bayesian credible sets for the
dynamic responses of wages and employment using the Normal-Wishart-Haar prior specifi-
cation in Uhlig (2005) and also the alternative prior specification recently proposed by Bau-
meister and Hamilton (2015a). The main set-identifying assumptions are sign restrictions
on contemporaneous responses: an expansionary structural demand shock increases wages
and employment upon impact; an expansionary structural supply shock decreases wages but
increases employment, also upon impact.⁶
The Bayesian credible sets for this application illustrate the attractiveness of set-identified
SVARs. The data, combined with prior beliefs, and with the (set)-identifying assumptions
imply that the initial responses to demand and supply shocks persist in the medium-run,
which was not restricted ex-ante.
The Bayesian credible sets for this application also illustrate how the quantitative results
in set-identified SVARs could be affected by the prior specification. For example, under the
prior in Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) the 5-year ahead response of employment to a
demand shock could be as large as 4%; whereas under the priors in Uhlig (2005) the same
effect is at most 2%.
Our baseline projection approach (which takes around 15 minutes) allows us to get a
prior-free assessment about the magnitude (and direction) of the structural responses of
interest. For example, the largest value in our projection region for the 5-year response of
employment to a structural demand shock is around 2.5%. This effect is larger than the
one implied by the prior in Uhlig (2005), but smaller than the one implied by the priors in
Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a).
Our baseline projection approach—though informative about the effects of demand
shocks—is not conclusive about the medium-run effects of structural supply shocks on wages
and employment (the projection region allows for both positive and negative responses). This
could be a consequence of either the robustness of projection or its conservativeness. To di-
sentangle these effects, we calibrate projection to guarantee that it has exact robust Bayesian
credibility. The calibrated projection shows that an expansionary supply shock will decrease
⁵ In Section 6.6 we provide more detials on the computation time of our calibrated projection
(which is around 5 hours in our illustrative example).
⁶ Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) we also consider elasticity bounds on the wage
elasticity of both labor demand and labor supply, and also bounds on the long-run impact of a demand
shock over employment.
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wages in each quarter over a 5 year horizon. However, the qualitative effects of supply shocks
on employment remain undetermined. The simple SVAR for the labor market illustrates the
usefulness of both the baseline and the calibrated projection to analyze the robustness of
quantitative and qualitative results in SVARs to prior beliefs.
6.2.2 Related literature
There has been recent interest in departing from the standard Bayesian analysis of set-
identified SVARs in an attempt to provide robustness to the choice of priors. Belowwe provide
a short description of the similarities and differences between our projection approach and
three alternative methods available in the literature. It is worth mentioning that our baseline
projection approach is the only procedure (among the three alternative methods discussed)
that has both a frequentist and a robust Bayes interpretation. In addition, none of the other
approaches allow for simultaneous inference on a vector of impulse-response coefficients (a
feature that has been deemed desirable in point-identified SVARs). Our baseline projection
achieves all these properties while retaining computational tractability (we solve two mathe-
matical programs per coefficient of interest).
a) In a pioneering paper, Moon et al. (2013) [MSG] proposed both projection and Bonfer-
roni frequentist inference using a moment-inequality, minimum distance framework based
on Andrews and Soares (2010). In terms of applicability, their procedures are designed for
set-identified SVARs that impose restrictions on the dynamic responses of only one structural
shock. It is possible to extend their approach to the same class of modes that we consider;
there is, however, a serious issue regarding computational feasibility. Specifically, both the
projection and Bonferroni approaches require the researcher to compute—by simulation—a
critical value for each single orthogonal matrix of dimension n× n, where n is the dimension
of the SVAR. Our baseline implementation of the projection method does not require any
type of grid over the space of orthogonal matrices and does not require the simulation of any
critical value.
b) Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015) [GK] develop a novel and generally applicable robust
Bayesian approach to conduct inference about a specific coefficient of the impulse-response
function in a set-identified SVAR. In terms of our notation, their procedure can be described as
follows. One takes posterior draws from µ and evalutes, at each posterior draw, the functions
v(µ), v(µ) by solving a nonlinear program. Their credible set is a numerical (grid-search)
approximation to the smallest interval that covers 100(1−α)% of the posterior realizations
of the identified set.
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GK and Baseline projection: In terms of properties, our baseline projection is shown to
admit both a frequentist and a robust Bayes interpretation (the GK approach has only been
shown to admit the latter). In terms of implementation, GK solve as many nonlinear programs
as posterior draws for µ. This means that our baseline procedure will be typically faster to
implement than the GK robust procedure (since our baseline projection only needs to solve
two nonlinear programs). The price to pay for the reduced computational cost is the excess
of robust Bayesian credibility.
GK and Calibrated projection: Our calibrated projection requires a similar amount of work
as the GK robust method (both procedures evaluate the bounds of the identified set for each
posterior draw). There are two differences remaining between the two approaches. First, our
calibrated projection allows for simultaneous credibility statements over different horizons,
different variables, and different shocks. Second, our calibrated projection is guaranteed to
have correct frequentist coverage whenever the bounds of the identified set are differentiable
in µ.
c) Gafarov et al. (2015) [GMM1] establish the differentiability of the bounds of v(µ), v(µ)
for a class of SVAR models that impose restrictions only on the responses to one structural
shock. Based on the differentiability results, they propose a ‘delta-method’ confidence inter-
val given by the plug-in estimators of the bounds plus/minus r times standard errors. In
Appendix 6.A.3 we show that, in large samples, the ‘delta-method’ procedure in GMM1 is
equivalent to a projection region based on a Wald ellipsoid for µ with radius r2.
6.3 Basic model, main assumptions, and frequentist
results
6.3.1 Model
This paper studies the n-dimensional Structural Vector Autoregression with p lags; i.i.d. struc-
tural innovations—denoted "t—distributed according to F ; and unknown n× n structural
matrix B:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + . . . + ApYt−p + B"t , EF["t] = 0n×1, EF["t"′t] ≡ In. (6.3)
see Lütkepohl (2007), p. 362.
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The reduced-form parameters of the SVAR model are defined as the vectorized autoregres-
sive coefficients and the half vectorized covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals:
µ≡ (vec(A)′,vech(Σ)′)′ ∈ Rd , where A≡ (A1,A2, . . . ,Ap), Σ ≡ BB′.
In applied work, these reduced-form parameters are estimated directly from the data
using least squares. That is:
bµT ≡ (vec(bAT )′,vech(ÒΣT )′)′,
where
bAT ≡  1T T∑
t=1
YtX
′
t
 1
T
T∑
t=1
X tX
′
t
−1
, ÒΣT ≡ 1T T∑
t=1
bηt bη′t ,
and
X t ≡ (Y ′t−1, . . . ,Y ′t−p)′, bηt ≡ Yt − bATX t .
A common formula for the asymptotic variance of bµT in stationary models is:
ÒΩT ≡ VT 1T T∑
t=1
vec

[bηtX ′t , bηt bη′t − ÒΣT ]vec[bηtX ′t , bηt bη′t − ÒΣT ]′V ′T
where
VT ≡
 
In ⊗

1
T
∑T
t=1 X tX
′
t
−1
0
0 Ln
!
,
and Ln is the matrix of dimension n(n+ 1) /2× n2 such that vech(Σ)= Lnvec(Σ), see Lüt-
kepohl (2007), p. 662 equation A.12.1.
6.3.2 Assumptions for frequentist inference
The SVAR parameters (A1, . . . ,Ap,B, F) define a probability measure, denoted P, over the
data observed by the econometrician. The measure P is assumed to belong to some class P
which we describe in this section.
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We state a simple high-level assumption concerning the asymptotic behavior of the 1−α
Wald confidence ellipsoid for µ, which is defined as:
CST (1 − α;µ) ≡
¦
µ ∈ Rd | T(bµT − µ)′ÒΩ−1T (bµT − µ) ≤ χ2d,1−α©.⁷ (6.4)
The first assumption requires the uniform consistency in level (over the class P ) of the Wald
confidence set for the reduced-form parameters. This is:
Assumption 1. lim infT→∞ infP∈P P

µ(P) ∈ CST (1−α;µ)
≥ 1−α.
Assumption 1 holds if the class P under consideration contains only uniformly stable
VARs where the error distributions, F , have uniformly bounded fourth moments.⁸ Assump-
tion 1 turns out to be sufficient to conduct frequentist inference on the structural parameters
of a set-identified SVAR, defined as follows.
Coefficients of the Structural Impulse-Response Function: Given the autore-
gressive coefficients A≡ (A1,A2, . . . ,Ap) define, recursively, the nonlinear transformation
Ck(A)≡
k∑
m=1
Ck−m(A) Am, k ∈ N,
where C0 = In and Am = 0 if m> p; see Lütkepohl (1990), p. 116.
Definition (Coefficients of the Structural IRF). The (k, i, j)-coefficient of the structural
impulse-response function is defined as the scalar parameter:
λk,i, j(A,B)≡ e′iCk(A)Be j ,
where ei and e j denote the i-th and j-th column of the identity matrix In.
⁷The radius χ2d,1−α in equation (6.4) denotes the 1−α quantile of a central χ2 distribution with d
degrees of freedom.
⁸A classP that satisfies Assumption 1 could be written by using a uniform version of the conditions
in Lütkepohl (2007), p. 73. This is, there are positive constants c1, c2, c3, c4 such that:
P = {(A1,A2, . . . ,Ap,B, F) | det(In − A1z − . . .Apzp) /∈ (−c1, c1) for z ∈ C, |z| ≤ 1;
B is such that 0 < c2 < eigmin(BB
′) < eigmax(BB′) < c3,
and EF[|"n1,t"n2,t"n3,t"n4,t |] < c4 for all t, and n1,n2,n3,n4 ∈ {1, . . .n},
and EF["t] = 0n×1, EF["t"′t] = In }.
Other possible definitions of P can be given by generalizing Theorem 3.5 in Chen and Fang (2015)
to either multivariate linear processes with i.i.d. innovations or to martingale difference sequences.
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6.3.3 Main result concerning frequentist inference
In this section we show that, under Assumption 1, it is possible to ‘project’ the 1−α Wald
confidence set for µ to conduct frequentist inference about the coefficients of the structural
impulse-response function and the function itself in set-identified models.
Set-Identified SVARs: As mentioned in the introduction, the SVAR allows researchers
to transform the reduced-form parameters, µ≡ (vec(A)′,vech(Σ)′)′, into the structural pa-
rameters of interest, λk,i, j(A,B). The parameter µ determines a unique value of A; however,
several values of B are compatible with Σ (any B such that BB′ =Σ). This indeterminacy of
B implies there are multiple values of λk,i, j(A,B) that are compatible with one value of µ.
The Identified Set and its Bounds: It is common in applied macroeconomic work to
impose restrictions on the matrix B ∈ Rn×n in order to limit the range of a structural coeffi-
cient of interest, λk,i, j (taking µ as given). Mathematically, a set of restrictions on B—that
we denote as R(µ)—can be interpreted as a subset of Rn×n. This leads to the following
definition:
Definition (Identified Set and its bounds). Fix a vector of reduced-form parameters, µ,
and a set of restrictions R(µ) on B.
1. The identified set for the structural parameter λk,i, j(A,B) is defined as:
IRk,i, j(µ) ≡
¦
v ∈ R
 v = λk,i, j(A,B), BB′ = Σ, and B ∈ R(µ)©.
2. The upper bound of the identified set vk,i, j(µ) is defined as the value function of the
program:
vk,i, j(µ) ≡ sup
B∈Rn×n
e′iCk(A)Be j , s.t. BB′ = Σ, and B ∈ R(µ). (6.5)
The lower bound, vk,i, j(µ), is defined analogously.
3. Consider any collection λH ≡ {λkh,ih, jh}Hh=1 of structural coefficients and let its identi-
fied set be given by:
IRH (µ)≡
¦
(v1, . . . , vH) ∈ RH
 vh = λkh,ih, jh(A,B), BB′ =Σ, and B ∈ R(µ)©.
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The main elements in the previous definition can be illustrated as follows:
SVAR
BB′ =Σ and B ∈ R(µ)
(Theoretical Restrictions on B)
λH(A,B)µ
Identified Set-Identified
IRH (µ) ⊆ RH : The identified-Set for λH(A,B).
Table 6.1 presents a list of the most common restrictions, R(µ), used in SVAR analysis
(all of which can be handled by our frequentist approach described below).
Projection Approach: A key feature of set-identified SVARs is that the bounds of the
identified set depend on a finite-dimensional parameter. ‘Projecting’ down the 1−α Wald
ellipsoid for µ seems a natural approach to conduct inference on the structural impulse re-
sponse function. The first result in this paper establishes the frequentist uniform validity of
projection inference.
Result 1 (Frequentist Coverage of Projection Inference for λH). Consider the projection
region for the collection of structural coefficients λH ≡ {λkh,ih, jh}Hh=1 given by:
CST (1 − α,λH) ≡ CST (1 − α,λk1,i1, j1) × . . . × CST (1 − α,λkH ,iH , jH ) ⊆ RH , (6.6)
where
CST (1 − α;λk,i, j) ≡

inf
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vk,i, j(µ) , sup
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vk,i, j(µ)

, (6.7)
and CST (1−α;µ) is the 1−α Wald confidence ellipsoid for µ. If the class of data generating
processes P satisfies Assumption 1, then:
lim inf
T→∞ infP∈P infλH∈I RH (µ(P))
P

λH ∈ CST (1−α;λH)
≥ 1−α.
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That is, the projected confidence interval in (6.6) covers the vector of structural coefficients λH
with probability at least 1−α, uniformly over the class P .
Proof. The proof of Result 1 uses a standard and conceptually straightforward projection
argument. Take an element P ∈ P and let λH ∈ RH be any given element of the identified
set IRH (µ(P)). Note that:
P

λH ∈ CST (1−α;λH)

= P

(λk1,i1, j1 , . . . ,λkH ,iH , jH )
∈ CST (1 − α;λk1,i1, j1) × . . . × CST (1 − α;λkH ,iH , jH )

by definition of our confidence interval for λH

≥ P[vkh,ih, jh(µ(P)) , vkh,ih, jh(µ(P))]
⊆  inf
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vkh,ih, jh(µ) , sup
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vkh,ih, jh(µ)
 ∀h = 1, . . . ,H,
since λkh,ih, jh ∈ [vkh,ih, jh(µ(P), vkh,ih, jh(µ(P))]

≥ Pµ(P) ∈ CST (1 − α;µ).
The desired result follows directly from Assumption 1. This shows that the projection region
for λH is uniformly consistent in level.
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Table 6.1. Common restrictions used in set-identified SVARs
Restrictions Description Notation Examples
Short-run Exclusion restrictions imposed e′iBe j = 0 or e′iB′
−1e j = 0 Sims (1980)
on B or B′−1 (Note that B′−1 =Σ−1B) Christiano et al. (1996)
Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2015)
Long-run A zero constraint on the long-run e′i(In − A1 − A2 − . . .Ap)−1Be j = 0 Blanchard and Quah (1989)
impact matrix
Sign Sign restrictions on IRFs e′iCk(A)Be j ≥,≤ 0 Uhlig (2005)
Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
Elasticity Bounds Bounds on the elasticity of a variable
e′iCk(A)Be j
e′˜
i
Ck(A)Be j
≥,≤ c, i˜ 6= i Kilian and Murphy (2012b)
Shape Constraints Shape constraints on IRFs e.g., e′iCk(A)Be j ≤ e′iCk+1(A)Be j Scholl and Uhlig (2008)
(e.g., monotonicity)
Other Sign Restrictions on Long-Run Impacts e′i(In − A1 − A2 − . . .Ap)−1Be j ≥,≤ 0
Noncontemporaneous Zero Restrictions e′iCk(A)Be j = 0
General equalities/inequalities on B g(B,µ)≥,≤,= 0
The projection approach can handle SVAR models with any of the restrictions described on this table
(imposed on one or multiple shocks).
(i denotes the variable, j denotes the shock, and k the horizon)
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Remark 1: The idea of ‘projecting’ a confidence set for a parameter µ to conduct inference
about a lower dimensional parameter λ has been used extensively in econometrics; see
Scheffé (1953), Dufour (1990), and Dufour and Taamouti (2005, 2007) for some examples.
In addition to its conceptual simplicity, one advantage of the projection approach is that
its validity does not require special conditions on the identifying restrictions that can be
imposed by practitioners.⁹
Remark 2: The problem of conducting inference on the whole impulse-response function
(and not only on one specific coefficient) has been a topic of recent interest, both from the
Bayesian and frequentist perspective.
For Bayesian set-identified SVARs with only sign restrictions, Inoue and Kilian (2013)
report the vector of structural impulse-response coefficients with highest posterior density
(based on a prior on reduced-form parameters and a uniform prior on rotation matrices).
They propose a Bayesian credible set (represented by shotgun plots) that characterizes the
joint uncertainty about a given collection of structural impulse-response coefficients.
For frequentist point-identified SVARs, Inoue and Kilian (2016) propose a bootstrap pro-
cedure that allows the construction of asymptotically valid confidence regions for any subset
of structural impulse responses. To the best of our knowledge, our projection approach is the
first frequentist procedure for set-identified SVARs that provide confidence regions for any
collection of structural coefficients (response of different variables, to different shocks, over
different horizons).
It is important to note that Uhlig (2005)’s approach to conduct inference on set-identified
SVARs does not provide credible sets for vectors of the structural parameters. The same is
true for the Bayesian approaches described in the recent work of Arias et al. (2014) and
Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a), as well as the approaches of Moon et al. (2013) and
Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015).
Remark 3: A common concern in set-identified models is whether the suggested inference
approach is valid only for the identified parameter, λH , or also for its identified set IRH (µ).
Note that the second to last inequality in the proof of Result 2 imply that our projection
region covers the identified set of any vector of coefficients λH .
⁹ For instance, we do not need to assume that vk,i, j(·) and vk,i, j(·) are continuous or differentiable
functions of the reduced-form parameters.
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6.4 Robust Bayesian credibility
This section analyzes the robust credibility of projection as the sample size grows large.
Bayesian Set-up: In a Bayesian SVAR the distribution of the structural innovations is
fixed and treated as a known object. A common choice—which we follow in this section—is
to assume that F ∼Nn(0, In).We discuss how to relax this restriction after stating Assumption
5.
Let P∗ denote some prior for the structural parameters (A1, . . . ,Ap,B) and let λH(A,B) ∈
RH denote the vector of structural coefficients of interest. For a given square root of Σ ≡ BB′
define the ‘rotation’ matrix Q ≡Σ−1/2B. It is well known that a prior P∗ can be written as
(P∗µ, P∗Q|µ), where P∗µ is a prior on the reduced-form parameters, and P∗Q|µ is a prior on the
rotation matrix, conditional on µ.¹⁰ Following this notation, let P (P∗µ) denote the class of
prior distributions such that µ∼ P∗µ.
We are interested in characterizing the smallest posterior probability that the set CST (1−
α;λH) could receive, allowing the researcher to vary the prior for Q:
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1 − α;λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT. (6.8)
The event of interest is whether the structural coefficients λH(A,B) (treated as random vari-
ables in the Bayesian Set-up) belong to the projection region, after conditioning on the data.
This event would typically be referred to as the credibility of CST (1−α;λH) (see Berger
(1985), p. 140). We would like to find the smallest credibility of projection when different
priors over Q are considered as in the pioneering work of Kitagawa (2012). We follow the
recent work of Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015) and refer to (6.8) as the robust Bayesian
credibility of the set CST (1−α,λH).
Let f (Y1, ...,YT |µ) denote the Gaussian statistical model for the data (which depends
solely on the reduced-form parameters) and let op(1;Y1, . . .YT |µ) denote a random variable
such that limT→∞ PY1,...,YT |µ(|op(1;Y1, . . .YT |µ)| > ε)= 0 for all ε > 0 when the distribution
of the data is conditioned on µ.
Main Assumption for Bayesians:Robust credibility can be viewed as a random variable
(as it depends on Y1, . . . ,YT ). We use the following high-level assumption to characterize its
asymptotic behavior:
¹⁰Arias et al. (2014) refer to this parameterization of the SVAR model as the orthogonal reduced-
form.
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Assumption 5. Whenever Y1, . . . ,YT ∼ f (Y1, . . . ,YT |µ0), the prior P∗ is such that:
P∗

µ(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α;µ)
 Y1, . . . ,YT= 1−α+ op(1;Y1, . . . ,YT |µ0).
Assumption 5 requires the prior over the reduced-form parameters (and the statistical
model) to be regular enough to guarantee that the asymptotic Bayesian credibility of the
1−α Wald ellipsoid converges in probability to 1−α. Thus, our high-level assumption is
implied by the Bernstein von-Mises Theorem (DasGupta (2008), p. 291) for the reduced-
form parameter µ.
Since the Gaussian statistical model f (Y1, . . .YT |µ0) can be shown to be Locally Asympto-
tically Normal (LAN) whenever A0 is stable and Σ0 has full rank, Theorem 1 and 2 in Ghosal
et al. (1995) (GGS) imply that Assumption 5 will be satisfied whenever P∗µ has a continu-
ous density at µ0 with polynomial majorants.¹¹ In fact, the same theorems could be used to
establish Assumption 5 for non-Gaussian SVARs that are LAN and satisfy the regularity con-
ditions of Ibragimov and Has’ minskii (2013) (IH), as long as CST (1−α;µ) is centered at the
Maximum Likelihood estimator of µ and ÒΩT is replaced by the model’s inverse information
matrix. An alternative approach to establish Assumption 5 using a different set of primitive
conditions can be found in the recent work of Connault (2016).
We now establish the robust Bayesian credibility of projection as T →∞.
Result 2. [Asymptotic Robust Bayesian Credibility of Projection] Suppose that the prior P∗
for (A,B) satisfies Assumption 5 at µ0. Then:
inf
P∗∈P ∗(µ) P
∗λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α;λH)  Y1, . . . ,YT≥ 1−α+ op(1;Y1, . . .YT |µ0).
Proof. Note that:
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α;λH)
 Y1, . . .YT
= P∗

λkh,ih, jh(A,B) ∈ CST (1 − α;λkh,ih, jh) ∀ h = 1 . . . ,H
 Y1, . . . ,YT
by definition of the projection region for λH

¹¹ In Appendix 6.A.1.1 we verify an ‘almost sure’ version of Assumption 5 for a Gaussian SVAR for
the Normal-Wishart priors suggested in Uhlig (1994) and Uhlig (2005) and a confidence set for µ
based on the formula for the asymptotic variance ÒΩT that obtains in the Gaussian model [Lütkepohl
(2007) p. 93].
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≥ P∗[vkh,ih, jh(µ(A,B)) , vkh,ih, jh(µ(A,B))] ∈ CST (1 − α;λkh,ih, jh)
∀ h = 1 . . . ,H
 Y1, . . . ,YT,
since λkh,ih, jh(A,B) ∈ [vkh,ih, jh(µ(A,B)), vkh,ih, jh(µ(A,B))] for any A,B

≥ P∗µ(A,B) ∈ CST (1 − α;µ)  Y1, . . . ,YT.
This implies that in any finite sample:
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α;λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT
is at least as large as
P∗

µ(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α;µ)
 Y1, . . . ,YT.
Assumption 5 gives the desired result.
This means that—given any prior that satisfies Assumption 5—our projection region can
be interpreted, in large samples, as a robust 1−α credible region for the impulse-response
function and its coefficients.
6.5 Calibrated projection for a Robust Bayesian
The projection approach generates conservative regions for both a frequentist and a robust
Bayesian. For a frequentist, the large-sample coverage may be strictly above the desired con-
fidence level. For a robust Bayesian, the asymptotic robust credibility of the nominal 1−α
projection region may be strictly above 1−α.
This section applies the approach in Kaido et al. (2016) to eliminate the excess of robust
Bayesian credibility in a computationally tractable way. We focus on calibrating the robust
credibility of our projection region to be exactly equal to 1−α (either in a finite sample for
a given prior on µ, or in large samples for a large class of priors on µ).¹²
Given a vector ΛH = {λkh,ih, jh}
H
h=1 of structural coefficients of interest and its correspon-
ding nominal 1−α projection region, the calibration exercise is based on the following result:
¹²We also discuss the calibration of projection in SVARs from the frequentist perspective (see Ap-
pendix 6.A.2). We argue that the computational feasibility of the frequentist calibration might be
compromised when µ is of large dimension.
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Result 3. (Calibration of Robust Credibility) Let P∗µ denote a prior for the reduced-form para-
meters. Suppose there is a nominal level 1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ) such that for every data realization:
P∗µ
×Hh=1[vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ),λH)|Y1, . . . ,YT
equals 1−α. Then, for every data realization:
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT= 1−α.
Proof. See Appendix 6.A.1.2.
This means that in order to calibrate the robust credibility of projection, it is sufficient
to choose 1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ) to guarantee that exactly α% of the bounds of the identified set
for the different structural coefficients in λH fall outside the projection region.
Calibration Algorithm: The calibration algorithm we propose consists in finding a
nominal level 1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ) such that the posterior probability of the event:
[vk1,i1, j1(µ), vk1,i1, j1(µ)]× . . .× [vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗,λH)
equals 1−α under the posterior distribution associated to the prior P∗µ or under a suitable
large-sample approximation for the posterior such as µ|Y1, . . .YT ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T).¹³
The calibration algorithm is the following:
1. Generate M draws (for example, M = 1,000) from the posterior of the reduced-form
parameters. If desired, one could use the large-sample approximation of the posterior
given by:
µ∗m ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T).
2. Let λH = {λkh,ih, jh}
H
h=1 denote the structural coefficients of interest. For each h=
1, . . .H and for each m= 1, . . .M evaluate:
[vkh,ih, jh(µ
∗
m), vkh,ih, jh(µ
∗
m)],
as defined in equation (6.5). We provide Matlab code to evaluate these bounds.
¹³ The Gaussian approximation for the posterior will eliminate projection bias asymptotically provi-
ded a Berstein von-Mises Theorem for µ holds. We establish this result in Appendix 6.A.1.4.
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3. Fix an element αs on the interval (α, 1). Set a tolerance level η > 0.
4. For each m= 1, . . .M generate the indicator function zm that takes the value of 0 whe-
never there exists an index h ∈ {1, . . .H} such that:
[vkh,ih, jh(µ
∗
m), vkh,ih, jh(µ
∗
m)] /∈ CST (1−αs,λkh,ih, jh).
The projection region CST (1−αs,λkh,ih, jh) is defined in equation (6.7) in Result 3
and implemented using the SQP/IP algorithm that will described in the next section
(Section 6.6).
5. Compute the robust credibility of the nominal 1−αs projection as:
RCT (αs)=
1
M
M∑
m=1
zm.
If such quantity is in the interval [1−α−η, 1−α+η] stop the algorithm. If RCT (αs)
is strictly above 1−α+η, go back to Step 3 and choose a larger value of αs. If
RCT (αs) is strictly below 1−α−η go back to Step 3 and choose a smaller value of αs.
We now show that whenever the bounds of the identified set for eachλh are differentiable,
our calibration algorithm also removes the excess of frequentist coverage.
Result 4 (Robust Bayes Calibration and the Frequentist Coverage of the Identified Set).
Suppose that for each h= 1, . . .H the bounds of the identified set vh(µ) and vh(µ) are differen-
tiable at µ0. Suppose in addition that at µ0:
1.
p
T(bµ−µ0) d→N (0,Ω),
2. ÒΩT p→ Ω, where Ω is positive definite,
3. The prior for the reduced-form parameters used in the calibration satisfies the Bernstein
von-Mises Theorem in Ghosal et al. (1995):
sup
B∈B(Rd)
P∗  pT(µ∗ − bµT ) ∈ B | Y1, . . . ,YT − P (Z ∈ B) p→ 0,
where Z ∼Nd(0,Ω), andB(Rd) is the set of all Borel measurable sets in Rd .
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Then:
Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λh), ∀h= 1, . . .H
→ 1−α.
Proof. See Appendix 6.A.1.3. The heuristic argument behind this result is the following. We
show that the differentiability of vh and vh at µ0 implies that:
Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λh), ∀h= 1, . . .H

is approximately the same as:
Pµ0

[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆

vh(bµT )− r∗Tσh(µ0)pT , vh(bµT )+ r∗Tσh(µ0)pT , ∀h≤ H

.
where r∗T be the radius that calibrates robust Bayesian credibility. The Bernstein-von Mises
Theorem implies that such probability is approximately the same as:
P∗

[vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)] ⊆

vh(bµT )− r∗Tσh(µ0)pT , vh(bµT )+ r∗Tσh(µ0)pT , ∀h≤ H

,
which, by the calibration of robust Bayesian credibility is approximately 1−α.
6.6 Implementation of baseline and calibrated projection
6.6.1 Projection as a mathematical optimization problem
This subsection discusses the implementation of the baseline projection region:
CST (1−α;λk,i, j)≡

inf
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vk,i, j(µ) , sup
µ∈CST (1−α,µ)
vk,i, j(µ)

.
We note that both the upper bound and lower bound of this confidence interval can be
thought of as solutions to a pair of ‘nested’ optimization problems.
The first optimization problem—that we refer to as the inner optimization—solves for
vk,i, j(µ) and vk,i, j(µ). These functions correspond to the largest and smallest value of the
structural impulse response λk,i, j given a set of restrictions and a vector of reduced-form
parameters µ.
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The second optimization problem—that we refer to as outer optimization—solves for
the maximum value of vk,i, j(·) and the minimum value of vk,i, j(·) over the (1−α) Wald
Confidence ellipsoid, CST (1−α,µ).
Implementation: Our proposal is to combine the inner and outer problem into a single
mathematical program that gives the bounds of the projection confidence interval directly.
The upper bound can be found by solving:
sup
A,Σ,B
e′iCk(A)Be j subject to BB′ = Σ, B ∈ R(µ), and (6.9)
T(bµT − µ(A,Σ))′ÒΩ−1T (bµT − µ(A,Σ)) ≤ χ2d,1−α.
The lower bound of the projection confidence interval can be found analogously. Importantly,
the simple reformulation in (6.9) allows us to base the implementation of our projection
region upon state-of-the-art solution algorithms for optimization problems. Our suggestion
is to use a simple SQP/IP algorithm.
6.6.2 Solution algorithms for baseline projection
The nature of the optimization problem: The nonlinear mathematical program in (6.9)
has two challenging features. On the one hand, the optimization problem is non-convex;
this complicates the task of finding a global minimum with algorithms designed to detect
local optima. On the other hand, the number of optimization arguments and constraints
increases quadratically in the dimension of the SVAR; this compromises the feasibility of
some optimization routines designed to detect global optima (for example, brute-force grid
search on CST (1−α,µ) to optimize vk,i, j(µ) and vk,i, j(µ)).
Our Approach: Taking these two features into consideration, we first implemented pro-
jection by running a local optimization algorithm followed by a global algorithm that used
the local solution as an input. The algorithms and the functions used to implement the pro-
jection confidence interval are described below. In the application analyzed in this paper, the
global stage of the algorithm did not have any impact on the local solution. We thus suggest
researchers to implement our approach using only the SQP/IP routine described below.
Local Algorithms: Although no standard classification exists for local optimization al-
gorithms, themost common procedures are often grouped as follows: penalty and Augmented
Lagrangian Methods; Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP); and Interior Point Methods
(IP); see p. 422 of Nocedal and Wright (2006) for more details.
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Within this class of algorithms, we focus on the IP and SQP algorithms, both of which are
considered as the “most powerful algorithms for large-scale nonlinear programming”, Nocedal
and Wright (2006), p. 563.¹⁴ Conveniently, IP and SQP are included in Matlab®’s fmincon
function, which comes with the Optimization toolbox. We run the SQP algorithm—which is
usually faster than IP—and in case it does not find a solution, we switch to IP, an algorithm
which we denote by SQP/IP.
Global Algorithms: IP and SQP are well adjusted to handle various degeneracy pro-
blems in order to find a local minimum for large-scale non-convex problems. There is now a
large body of literature on global optimization strategies; see Horst and Pardalos (1995) and
Romeijn and Pardalos (2013). Popular global optimization algorithms include adaptive sto-
chastic search; branch and bound methods; homotopy methods; Genetic algorithms (GA);
simulated annealing and two-phase algorithms such as MultiStart and GlobalSearch.¹⁵We
focus on the two-phase algorithms MultiStart, GlobalSearch and on the genetic algorithm
available in Matlab.¹⁶
6.6.3 Implementing baseline projection in an example
As an example, we consider the demand-supply SVAR model studied in Section 5 of Baumeis-
ter and Hamilton (2015a) [henceforth, BH]. We fit a 6-lag VAR to U.S. data on growth rates
of real labor compensation, ∆wt , and total employment, ∆nt , from 1970:Q1 to 2014:Q2.¹⁷
Using our notation, the demand-supply SVAR can be written as:
∆wt
∆ηt

= A1

∆wt−1
∆ηt−1

+ . . .+ A6

∆wt−6
∆ηt−6

+ B

εdt
εst

,
¹⁴ Furthermore, these algorithms exploit the existence of second-order derivatives which are well-
defined in our problem.
¹⁵ For a more detailed list and classification of global methods see p. 519 of Chapter 15 in Romeijn
and Pardalos (2013). For a description of two-phase algorithms see Chapter 12 in Romeijn and Par-
dalos (2013).
¹⁶Genetic algorithms are a well developed field of computing and they have been used in many
applications; see the introduction to Chapter 9 in Romeijn and Pardalos (2013). A very interesting
application in economics that motivated our focus on GA is given in Qu and Tkachenko (2015).
¹⁷Our selection is based on the fact that 6 is the smallest number of lags such that CS(68%;µ)
does not contain unstable VAR coefficients and non-invertible reduced-form covariance matrices. 68%
confidence sets correspond to a single standard deviation and are frequently used in applied macroe-
conomic research. The Bayes Information Criteria and the Information Criteria both select less than
six lags.
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BH set-identify an expansionary demand and supply shock by means of the following sign
restrictions:
B ≡

b1 b3
b2 b4

satisfies

+ −
+ +

.
The sign restrictions state that a demand shock increases both real labor compensation and
total employment, while a supply shock lowers wages but raises employment.
In this model, the short-run wage elasticity of labor supply (identified from a demand
shock) is defined as:
α≡ b2 / b1
Likewise, the short-run wage elasticity of labor demand (identified from a supply shock) is
defined as:
β ≡ b4 / b3
Finally, the long-run impact of a demand shock over employment is given by:
γ≡ e′2(In −
6∑
p=1
Ap)
−1Be1.
BH impose three additional restrictions. The first two of them are elasticity bounds moti-
vated by the findings of different empirical studies. Hamermesh (1996), Akerlof and Dickens
(2007), Lichter et al. (2014) provide bounds on the wage elasticity of labor demand. Chetty
et al. (2011), Reichling and Whalen (2012) provide bounds on the wage elasticity of labor
supply. The third and final restriction arises from imposing lower and upper bounds on the
long-run impact of a demand shock on employment.
BH incorporate the restrictions in the form of priors on the structural parameters, but we
treat the constraints as additional sign restrictions. Let tv denote the standard t distribution
with v degrees of freedom. The following table summarizes the way in which BH incorporate
prior information:
Thus, summarizing, our version of the BH model has 10 sign restrictions:
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Table 6.2. Additional identifying restrictions
Restrictions Motivation BH This paper
Bounds on α Empirical studies α∼max{.6+ .6t3, 0} .27≤ α≤ 2
report α ∈ [.27,2]
Bounds on β Empirical studies β ∼min{−.6+ .6t3, 0} −2.5≤ β ≤ −.15
β ∈ [−2.5,−.15]
Bounds on γ γ= 0 is too strong γ∼N (0,V ) −2V ≤ γ≤ 2V
Demand and Supply Shocks: : b1 ≥ 0, b2 ≥ 0,−b3 ≥ 0, b4 ≥ 0,
Elasticity Bounds : 2b1 − b2 ≥ 0, b2 − .27b1 ≥ 0,
b4 + .15b3 ≥ 0,−2.5b3 − b4 ≥ 0,
Long-Run : e′2(In −
6∑
p=1
Ap)
−1Be1 + 2V ≥ 0,
− e′2(In −
6∑
p=1
Ap)
−1Be1 + 2V ≥ 0,
where the parameter V is allowed to take the values {.01, .1, 1} as in p. 1992 of BH.
6.6.4 Results of the implementation of baseline projection
Using our SQP/IP local solution algorithm, we compute the 68% projection confidence inter-
vals for the cumulative response of wages and employment to the structural shocks in the
model (20 consecutive quarters and setting V = 1). In addition to the projection region, we
compute the 68% Bayesian credible set following the implementation in both Uhlig (2005)
and BH.
Figure 6.1 shows the projection region as solid blue line and the standard Bayesian cre-
dible set (based on BH priors) as a grey-shaded area.
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Figure 6.1. 68% projection region and 68% credible set.
(Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) priors)
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(a) Expansionary Demand Shock (b) Expansionary Supply Shock
(Solid, Blue Line) 68% Projection Region; (Shaded, Gray Area) 68% Bayesian Credible Set based
on the priors in Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a).
Figure 6.2 shows the boundaries of the projection region as solid blue line and the Baye-
sian credible set based on Uhlig (2005)’s priors as a grey-shaded area.
Comment about Credible Sets: The 68% credible sets differ substantially depending
on the specification of prior beliefs. Such sensitivity is the main motivation for our projection
approach. In this example, the length of the credible sets for the cumulative response of
employment seems to differ by a factor of at least two. The projection region seems quite
large compared to the credible sets. This could be a consequence of either the robustness
of projection or its conservativeness. To disentangle these effects, we calibrate projection to
guarantee that it has exact robust Bayesian credibility in the next subsection.
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Figure 6.2. 68% projection region and 68% credible set.
(Uhlig (2005) priors)
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(a) Expansionary Demand Shock (b) Expansionary Supply Shock
(Solid, Blue Line) 68% Projection region; (Shaded, Gray Area) 68% Bayesian Credible Set based
on the Nornal-Wishart-Haar priors suggested in Uhlig (2005) and the inequality constraints summa-
rized below Table 6.2. The credible set is implemented following Arias et al. (2014).
Concrete comments regarding computational feasibility: Table 6.3 compares
computing time for the projection (which has both a frequentist and a Robust Bayes inter-
pretation) and the standard Bayesian methods.¹⁸ Since the global methods are initialized at
the local solution, these procedures take as least as much time as SQP/IP. Among the three
global methods considered, the Genetic Algorithm takes the longest. Brute-force grid search
(which refers to grid search on CST (1−α,µ) to optimize vk,i, j(µ) and vk,i, j(µ)) with only
¹⁸ To get a fair sense of the computational cost, none of the global algorithms were parallelized.
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1,000 draws from µ ∈ R27 takes about 6 times longer than the baseline SQP/IP and generates
substantially smaller bounds (see Appendix 6.A.4.2).¹⁹
Table 6.3. Computational time in seconds
Algorithm Details Time
SQP/IP 734
SQP/IP + MultiStart 100 initial points 33,314
SQP/IP + GlobalSearch 100 trial points (20 in Stage 1) 1,359
Genetic Algorithm population of 100, 500 generations 76,863
Grid Search on CST (1−α,µ) 1,000 draws from µ 4,548
Bayesian, BH 1,000,000 Metropolis-Hastings draws 3,992
Bayesian, Uhlig 100,000 accepted posterior draws 2,338
Notes: Laptop @2.4GHz IntelCore i7.
Comments Regarding Local and Global algorithms: Figure 6.6 in Appendix 6.A.4.1
compares the bounds of the projection confidence interval for the first four algorithms listed
in Table 6.3. For this application, it seems that none of the global algorithms improve on the
local solution obtained from SQP/IP.²⁰
6.6.5 Implementing calibrated projection in our example
The key restriction used to set-identify an expansionary demand shock in the illustrative ex-
ample is that it must increase wages and employment, upon impact. According to the credible
sets in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, the expansionary shock has—in fact—noncontemporaneous ef-
fects over these two variables (every quarter over a 5 year horizon). Our calibrated projection
confirms that there are medium-run effects of demand shocks over employment, but sugge-
sts that the non-zero effects over wages beyond the first two quarters could be an artifact of
prior beliefs.
¹⁹ Instead of pseudo-random draws from the multi-variate normal distribution, we use quasi-
random Sobol sequences, which have the property of being a low-discrepancy sequence in the hy-
percube. We translate the sequence into multivariate-normal draws using Cholesky decomposition. In
our experience, this improves the performance of grid search substantially for a given number of grid
points.
²⁰ In our Matlab code to implement projection we take SQP/IP as the default algorithm to construct
the projection region.
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Figure 6.3. 68% projection region and 68% calibrated projection.
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(a) Expansionary Demand Shock (b) Expansionary Supply Shock
(Solid Line) 68% Projection region; (Dotted Line) 68% Projection region calibrated to guarantee
68% robust Bayesian credibility of the IRF functions jointly (100,000 draws from the Gaussian ap-
proximation to the posterior of µ); (Box) 68% Projection region calibrated horizon by horizon and
shock by shock; (Black Dashed Line) Support of the bounds of the identified set given the 100,000
posterior draws.
A similar observation is true for supply shocks. Our calibrated projection suggests that the
decrease in wages five years after an expansionary supply shock is robust to the choice of prior
on the set-identified parameters. The medium-run effects of supply shocks over employment
lack this robustness.
Implementation of our Calibrated Projection: We close this subsection providing
further details about the computational demands of our calibration exercise.
Instead of working with a specific posterior for µ, we calibrated projection relying on the
large-sample approximation µ|Y1, . . . ,YT ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T). Taking draws from this model
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is straightforward and does not require any special sampling technique (as a Monte-Carlo
Markov Chain). Figure 6.3 used M=100,000 draws.
As described in our calibration algorithm, for each of the draws of µ (denoted µ∗m),
and for each horizon k ∈ {0,1, 2, . . . 20}, variable i ∈ {wage,employment} and shock j ∈
{demand shock, supply shock} we solved two mathematical programs to generate:
[vk,i, j(µ
∗
m), vk,i, j(µ
∗
m)].
Computing the bounds of the identified set for all the combinations (k, i, j) given µ∗m took
approximately 9 seconds. Generating the boxes and the black dashed lines in Figure 6.3
took approximately 5 hours using 50 parallel Matlab ‘workers’ on a computer cluster at the
University of Bonn.²¹ Notice that we choose M=100,000 for illustrative purposes and the
calibration results are barely different for M=1,000, which takes 3 minutes using the same
computer cluster (or 2.5 hours not using parallelization at all).
After generating the bounds of the identified set, the calibration exercise adjusts the
nominal level of projection to simulatenously contain 68% of the draws from the bounds of
the identified set for each combination (k, i, j).²² The calibrated confidence level for theWald
ellipsoid is 1.85 · 10−4% instead of the original 68%. This means that instead of projecting a
Wald ellipsoid with radius χ268%,27 we are using a χ
2
68%,4.5.
6.7 Conclusion
A practical concern regarding standard Bayesian inference for set-identified Structural Vec-
tor Autoregressions is the fact that prior beliefs continue to influence posterior inference
even when the sample size is infinite. Motivated by this observation, this paper studied the
properties of projection inference for set-identified SVARs.
A nominal 1−α projection region collects all the structural parameters of interest that
are compatible with the VAR reduced-form parameters in a nominal 1−α Wald ellipsoid.
²¹ Calibrating projection to guarantee frequentist coverage at one point in the parameter space took
us 76 hours using the 50 parallel Matlab workers in the same computer cluster.
²² To do this, we ran the baseline projection SQP/IP algorithm for different nominal confidence
levels. An efficient calibration algorithm that requires only few iterations over the nominal level is the
combination of bisection with secant and interpolation as provided by Matlab’s fzero function. For
reasonably low tolerance of η= 0.001, we need 15 iteration steps. With each step taking about 734
seconds, see Table 6.3, steps 3 through 5 take about 1 hour.
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By construction, projection inference does not rely on the specification of prior beliefs for
set-identified parameters.
We argued that the projection approach is general, computationally feasible, and—under
mild assumptions concerning the asymptotic behavior of estimators and posterior distri-
butions for the reduced-form parameters—produces regions with frequentist coverage and
asymptotic robust Bayesian credibility of at least 1−α.
The main drawback of our projection region is that it is conservative. For a frequentist,
the large-sample coverage is strictly above the desired confidence level. For a robust Bayesian,
the asymptotic robust credibility of the nominal 1−α projection region is strictly above 1−α.
We used the calibration idea described in Kaido et al. (2016) to eliminate the excess of
robust Bayesian credibility. The calibration procedure consists of drawing the reduced-form
parameters, µ, from its posterior distribution (or a suitable large-sample Gaussian approx-
imation); evaluating the functions v(µ), v(µ) for each draw of µ; and, finally, decreasing
the nominal level of the projection region until it contains exactly (1−α)% of the values of
v(µ), v(µ). The calibration exercise required more work than the baseline projection, but it
is computationally feasible (and easily parallelizable). Moreover, if the bounds of the identi-
fied set are differentiable, our calibrated projection covers the identified set with probability
1−α.
We implemented our projection confidence set in the demand/supply SVAR for the U.S.
labor market. The main set-identifying assumptions were sign restrictions on contemporane-
ous responses. Standard Bayesian credible sets suggested that the medium-run response of
wages and employment to structural shocks behave in the same way as the contemporaneous
responses. Our projection region (baseline and calibrated) showed that only the qualitative
effects of demand shocks over employment and the qualitative effects of supply shocks over
wages are robust to the choice of prior. Our projection approach is a natural complement for
the Bayesian credible sets that are commonly reported in applied macroeconomic work.
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Appendix 6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Proof of main results
6.A.1.1 Verification of Assumption 5 for the Gaussian SVAR with a Normal-Wishart
prior.
Consider the SVAR in (6.3) and assume that F ∼N (0, In). Let P∗ denote a prior on the SVAR
parameters (A,B).
Note first that Assumption 5 depends only on the distribution that P∗ induces over
the reduced-form parameters, µ. Thus, we abuse notation and refer to P∗ as the prior
distribution on (A,Σ).
The analysis in this section focuses on the Normal-Wishart prior P∗ used in Gaussian
SVAR analysis. We establish an almost sure version of Assumption 5.
Prior for µ: Consider the hyper-parameters:
A¯0 ∈ Rn×np, S0 ∈ Rn×n, N0 ∈ Rnp×np, v0 ∈ R.
Definition. The Normal-Wishart Prior P∗ over the parameters (vec(A),vech(Σ))—defined
by hyper parameters (A¯0,S0,N0, v0)—is given by:
vec(A)|Σ ∼N vec(A¯0) , N−10 ⊗Σ,
and
Σ−1 ∼Wishartn

S−10 / v0 , v0

.
Posterior in the Gaussian SVAR: Let
QT ≡ 1T
T∑
t=1
X tX
′
t ,
and define the updated hyperparameters:
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A¯T = bATQTN0T + QT−1 + A¯0 N0T N0T + QT−1
ST =
v0
T + v0
S0 +
T
T + v0
ÒΣT + 1T + v0 A¯T − A¯0N0N0T + QT−1QTA¯T − A¯0′
where bAT and ÒΣT are ordinary least squares estimators for A and Σ defined in Section 6.3.1.
From p. 410 in Uhlig (1994) and p. 410 in Uhlig (2005) the posterior distribution for the
vector (vec(A)′,vech(Σ)′)′ can be written as:
vec(A)|Y1, . . . ,YT = vec(A¯T )+
N0
T
+QT
−1 ⊗ Σ
T
1/2
W, W ∼Nn2p(0, In2p),
Σ|Y1, . . . ,YT = S1/2T
 1
T
T∑
t=1
ZtZ
′
t
−1
S1/2T , Zt ∼Nn(0 , In), i.i.d,
where both random vectors are independent of the data and {Zt}
T
t=1 independent ofW . Note
that for a given data realization, the posterior distribution of (A,Σ) is a measurable function
of W ≡ (W, Z1, . . . ZT ). We use the term oW (1) to denote any sequence that converges to
zero as T →∞ for almost every realization of W .
Asymptotic Behavior of the posterior for µ: We now show that all of the Normal-
Wishart priors in the Gaussian model satisfy our Assumption 5. Note first that for almost
every data realization (Y1, . . . ,YT ) and almost every realization of the random vector Zt we
have that
Σ − ÒΣT → 0,
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by applying the strong law of large numbers to (1/ T)
∑T
t=1 ZtZ
′
t . Consequently:
p
T(vec(A) − vec(bAT ))
= bATpTQTN0T + QT−1 − In2p + A¯0 N0pT N0T + QT−1
+
N0
T
+ QT
−1 ⊗ ÒΣT1/2W + oP∗|Y1,...YT (1),
= bATpTQTQ−1T + Q−1T N0T Q−1T + O(1/ T2) − In2p
(by a first-order Taylor expansion)
+A¯0
N0p
T
N0
T
+ QT
−1
+
N0
T
+ QT
−1 ⊗ ÒΣT1/2W + oW (1),
=

Q−1T ⊗ ÒΣT1/2W + oW (1).
This implies that the posterior distribution of
p
T(vec(A)− vec(bAT )) converges in distribution,
for almost every data realization (Y1, . . . ,YT ), to the random vector:
[Q−1/2T ⊗ ÒΣ1/2T ]W, where W ∼ Nn2p(0, In2p). (6.10)
Note now that
p
T(vech(Σ) − vech(ÒΣT ))
=
p
Tvech

S1/2T
 1
T
T∑
t=1
ZtZ
′
t
−1
S1/2T − ÒΣT,
=
p
Tvech
ÒΣ1/2T  1T T∑
t=1
ZtZ
′
t
−1ÒΣ1/2T + O(1/ T) − ÒΣT,
=
p
Tvech
ÒΣ1/2T  1T T∑
t=1
ZtZ
′
t
−1 − InÒΣ1/2T  + o(1).
This implies that the posterior distribution of
p
T(vech(Σ)− vech(ÒΣT )) converges in distri-
bution, for almost every data realization (Y1, . . . ,YT ), to the random vector:
2D+(ÒΣT ⊗ ÒΣT )D+1/2Z , where Z ∼ Nn(n+1) /2(0, In(n+1) /2), Z⊥W, (6.11)
and D+ ≡ (D′D)−1D′ is the Moore-Penrose inverse of the duplication matrix D such that
vec(Σ)= Dvech(Σ).
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Now, assume that the confidence set for the reduced-form parameters is constructed using
the Gaussian Maximum Likelihood asymptotic variance of bµT as in p.93 of Lütkepohl (2007);
that is:
ÒΩT ≡  Q−1T ⊗ ÒΣT 0n2p×(n(n+1) /2)
0(n(n+1) /2)×n2p 2D+(ÒΣT ⊗ ÒΣT )D+′

. (6.12)
Let G denote the joint distribution of (W, Z), which is a standard multivariate normal inde-
pendently of the data. Then, combining (6.10), (6.11), (6.12)
P∗

µ ∈ CST (1 − α,µ)|(Y1, . . . ,YT )

= P∗
p
T(µ − bµT )′ÒΩ−1T pT(µ − bµT ) ≤ χ2d,1−α|(Y1, . . .YT )
→ GW
Z
′
W
Z

≤ χ2d,1−α | Y1, . . . ,YT

for a.e. data realization
= G
W
Z
′
W
Z

≤ χ2d,1−α

= (1 − α).
6.A.1.2 Proof of Result 3 (Finite-sample calibration for a Robust Bayesian)
Proof. The proof of Result 2 has already established that for any data realization:
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT.
is at least as large as:
P∗µ
×Hh=1[vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ),λH)|Y1, . . . ,YT .
Hence, it is sufficient to show that for any data realization:
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT≤ 1−α.
In order to establish this upper bound for each data realization, we will find a prior on Q
(conditional on µ) that gives credibility of exactly 1−α to the calibrated projection region.
Fix the data, and denote the set CST (1−α(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH) simply by C (Y T ). Before the
realization of the data, the set C (Y T ) is just some subset of RH , so the prior can depend
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on this set. Let vh(µ) abbreviate vkh,ih, jh(µ) and define vh(µ) analogously. Let Qmax(µ;h)
denote the rotation matrix for which the structural parameter achieves its upper bound; i.e.,
λ(µ,Qmax(µ;h))= vh(µ) (the matrix Qmin is defined analogously).
For each µ such that ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] /∈ C (Y T ), let h(µ) denote the smallest horizon
for which vh(µ)(µ) is not contained in the h(µ)-th coordinate of the region C (Y T ). If no up-
perbound falls outside C (Y T ) set h(µ)= 0. Define h(µ) analogously. Consider the following
prior for Q|µ that depends on the set CT (Y T ):
Q|µ=

Qmax(µ; 1) if ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] ⊆ CT (Y T ),
Qmax(µ,h(µ)) if ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] 6⊆ C (Y T ) and h(µ)≥ h(µ),
Qmin(µ,h(µ)) if ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] 6⊆ C (Y T ) and h(µ)< h(µ),
Finally, let P∗∗ denote the prior induced by P∗µ and Q|µ as defined above. Note that for each
data realization (Y1, . . . ,YT ) :
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α(Y1, . . .YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT
is—by definition of infimum—smaller than or equal
P∗∗

λH(µ,Q) ∈ CST (1−α(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT.
By construction, the prior for Q|µ is such that λH(µ,Q) ∈ CST (1−α(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH) if and
only if ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] ⊆ CT (Y T ). To see this, note that whenever the bounds of the
identified set ×Hh=1[vh(µ), vh(µ)] 6⊆ CT (Y T ), either h(µ) 6= 0 or h(µ) 6= 0 implying that the
structural parameter λh(µ,Q) takes the value of vh(µ)(µ) or vh(µ)(µ) (whichever horizon is
largest). Since these bounds are not contained in CT (Y T ):
P∗∗

λH(µ,Q) ∈ CST (1−α(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT.
equals
P∗µ
×Hh=1[vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)] ∈ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ),λH)|Y1, . . . ,YT= 1−α.
This means that:
1−α≤ inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λH)
 Y1, . . . ,YT≤ 1−α.
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6.A.1.3 Proof of Result 4 (Robust Bayesian calibration and frequentist coverage)
Let r∗T be the radius that calibrates robust Bayesian credibility; i.e., the radius corresponding
to the calibrated nominal level 1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT ). In a slight abuse of notation we replace
CST (1−α∗(Y1, . . . ,YT );λh) by CST (r∗T ;λh). The proof of this result is based on Lemma 1,2,
and 3 in Appendix 6.A.3.
Proof. We show that for every ε > 0 there is T(ε) such that T > T(ε) implies that:
1−α− ε≤ Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (r∗T ;λh), ∀h= 1, . . .H
≤ 1−α+ ε.
Let M1(ε) and M2(ε) be two real-valued (nonnegative) functions. Define the events:
A1(ε) = {(Y1, . . . ,YT )| ||pT(bµT − µ0)|| ≤ M1(ε)},
A2(ε) = {(Y1, . . .YT )| the largest eigenvalue of ÒΩT is smaller than M2(ε)},
A3(η) = {(Y1, . . .YT )| |bσh(µ0) − σh(µ0)| < η/(2χ2d,1−α)
and |bσh(µ0) − σh(µ0)| < η/(2χ2d,1−α)},
A4(ε) = {(Y1, . . .YT )| sup
B∈B(Rd)
|P∗(pT(µ∗ − bµT ) ∈ B | Y1, . . . ,YT )
−P (Z ∈ B) | ≤ ε/8, where Z ∼ Nd(0,Ω),}.
A5(ε) = {(Y1, . . .YT )| r∗T < χ2d,1−α + ε}.
where the standard errors bσh(µ0), σh(µ0), bσh(µ0),σh(µ0) are defined in Lemma 1 of Ap-
pendix 6.A.3.1. We first show that the probability of these events can be made arbitrarily
close to 1 for a large enough sample size.
To see this, note that Assumption 1 of Result 4 (convergence in distribution of
p
T(bµT −
µ0)) implies there exists a function M1(ε) and a large enough sample size T1(ε) such that
for T ≥ T1(ε), Pµ0(A1(ε))> 1− ε/25. Assumption 2 of Result 4 (convergence in probability
of ÒΩT ) implies there exists a function M2(ε) and a large enough sample size T2(ε,η) such
that for T ≥ T2(ε,η), Pµ0(A2(ε))> 1− ε/25 and Pµ0(A3(η))> 1− ε/25. Assumption 3 of
Result 4 (Bernstein von-Mises Theorem in total variation) implies that there is T4(ε) such
that T ≥ T4(ε,η), Pµ0(A4(ε))> 1− ε/25. Finally, since Assumption 3 of Result 4 implies the
assumption of Result 2 (the baseline projection has robust credibility of at least 1−α with
high probability) implies there is T5(ε) such that T ≥ T5(ε), Pµ0(A5(ε))> 1− ε/25
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This means that for T ≥max{T1(ε), T2(ε,η), T4(ε), T5(ε)},
Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (r∗T ;λh), ∀h= 1, . . .H

≤
Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (r∗T ;λh), ∀h = 1, . . .H ∩ A(ε,η)

+ ε/5, (6.13)
where
A(ε,η)≡ A1(ε)∪ A2(ε)∪ A3(η)∪ A4(ε)∪ A5(ε).
Define now, given Z ∼N (0,Ω), the quantile r1−α+ε by the equation:
P(−σh(µ0)r1−α+ε ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z ,
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r1−α+ε, ∀h = 1, . . .H) = 1 − α + ε.
Lemma 3 in Appendix 6.A.3.3 has shown that there exists T6(ε) such that :
(Y1, . . . ,YT ) ∈ A(ε,η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)) =⇒ r∗T ≤ r1−α+ε/5 ≡ r,
where the function η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)) is defined as in Lemma 2 in Appendix 6.A.3.2. This im-
plies that whenever T ≥max{T1(ε), T2(ε,η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)), T4(ε), T5(ε), T6(ε)}, Equation
(6.13) is bounded above by:
Pµ0([vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (r;λh),
∀h = 1, . . .H ∩ A(ε,η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α))) + ε/5. (6.14)
Lemma 1 in Appendix 6.A.3.1 has shown that (Y1, . . . ,YT ) ∈ A(ε,η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)) implies
that the projection region of radius r1−α+ε/5 is contained in the delta-method interval
DMhT (r,η) (with radius r = r1−α+ε/5 and expansion η= η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)):

vh(bµT )− (r +η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α))σh(µ0)pT , vh(bµT )+ (r +η(ε/10,χ
2
d,1−α))σh(µ0)p
T

,
for every h= 1, . . .H. This means that Equation (6.14) is bounded above by:
Pµ0

[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ DMhT (r,η(η/10,χ2d,1−α)), ∀h = 1, . . .H

+ ε/5. (6.15)
200 | 6 Projection Inference for Set-Identified SVARs
An application of the delta-method implies there is T7(ε) larger than
T ≥max{T1(ε), T2(ε,η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α)), T4(ε), T5(ε), T6(ε)}
such that Equation 6.15 is bounded above by 2ε/5 plus:
P( − σh(µ0)(r + η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α))
≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z
≤ σh(µ0)(r + η(ε/10,χ2d,1−α), ∀h = 1, . . .H), (6.16)
which, by definition of η(ε,χ2d,1−α), imploes that the latter equation is bounded above by
P
 −σh(µ0)r ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r, ∀h= 1, . . .H+ 4ε/5.
Using the definition of r, we conclude that there is T(ε) such that for T ≥ T(ε):
Pµ0
 
[vh(µ0), vh(µ0)] ⊆ CST (r∗T ;λh), ∀h= 1, . . .H
≤ 1−α+ ε.
The lower bound is derived analogously.
6.A.1.4 Asymptotic calibration for a Robust Bayesian
(µ|Y1, . . .YT ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T))
We now show that whenever α∗T ≡ α(Y1, . . . ,YT ) is calibrated to guarantee that
PT
 ×Hh=1 [vk1,i1, j1(µ), vk1,i1, j1(µ)] × . . . × [vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)]
⊆ CST (1 − α∗T ,λH) | Y1, . . .YT

equals 1−α whenever µ|Y1, . . .YT ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T), then one can guarantee asymptotic ro-
bust credibility of 1−α for a large class of priors on µ. This is formalized below.
Let f (Y1, . . .YT |µ0) denote the Gaussian density for the VAR data and let Ω ∈ Rd×d
denote the probability limit of ÒΩT . Let GΩ denote a Gaussian measure centered at 0d with
covariance matrix Ω. LetB(d) denote Borel sets in Rd .
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Result 5. Let Y1, . . .YT ∼ f (Y1, . . .YT |µ0) and suppose that the prior P∗µ is such that:
sup
A∈B(d)
P∗µ(pT(µ− bµT ) ∈ A | Y1, . . .YT )− GΩ(A)= op(Y1, . . .YT ;µ0).
Then,
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗T ,λH) | Y1, . . .YT

= 1−α+ op(Y1, . . .YT ;µ0).
Proof. Result 3 has shown that for any α(Y1, . . . ,YY )
inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗T ,λH) | Y1, . . .YT

= P∗µ
 
µ ∈ A∗T | Y1, . . .YT

,
where A∗T ⊆ Rd is defined as:
{µ ∈ Rd | ×Hh=1 [vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)] ⊆ CST (1−α∗T ,λH)}.
Note that
P∗µ
 
µ ∈ A∗T | Y1, . . .YT

= P∗µ
 p
T(µ − bµT ) ∈ pT(A∗T − bµT ) : | Y1, . . .YT 
− GΩ(pT(A∗T − bµT )) + GΩ(pT(A∗T − bµT ))
− GÒΩT (pT(A∗T − bµT )) + GÒΩT (pT(A∗T − bµT ))
We make three observations:
1. Note first that:
P∗µ
 p
T(µ− bµT ) ∈ pT(A∗T − bµT ) : | Y1, . . .YT − GΩ(pT(A∗T − bµT ))
is smaller than or equal
sup
A∈B(d)
P∗µ(pT(µ− bµT ) ∈ A | Y1, . . .YT )− GΩ(A) ,
which is, by assumption, op(Y1, . . .YT ;µ0).
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2. Note then that
|GÒΩT (pT(A∗T − bµT ))− GΩ(pT(A∗T − bµT ))|= op(Y1, . . . ,YT ;µ0)
since ÒΩT p→ Ω and G is the Gaussian measure centered at zero.
3. Finally, note that GÒΩT (pT(A∗T − bµT )) is the same as is the same as
P(N(bµT ,ÒΩT / T) ∈ A∗T |Y1, . . . ,YT ),
which, by definition of A∗T , is the same as:
PT
 ×Hh=1 [vk1,i1, j1(µ), vk1,i1, j1(µ)] × . . . × [vkh,ih, jh(µ), vkh,ih, jh(µ)]
⊆ CST (1 − α∗T ,λH) | Y1, . . .YT

where µ|Y1, . . .YT ∼Nd(bµT ,ÒΩT / T).
We conclude that:
| inf
P∗∈P (P∗µ)
P∗

λH(A,B) ∈ CST (1−α∗T ,λH) | Y1, . . .YT
− (1−α)| ≤ op(Y1, . . .YT ;µ0),
which implies the desired result.
6.A.2 Frequentist calibration of projection
We have shown that projection can be calibrated to achieve exact robust Bayesian credibi-
lity for a given prior on the reduced-form parameters. We now discuss the extent to which
projection can be calibrated to achieve large-sample frequentist coverage of 1−α.
Frequentist calibration requires either an exact or an approximate statistical model for
the data. We assume that: bµT ∼ Pµ ≡Nd(µ,ÒΩT / T), where µ belongs to some setM ⊆ Rd
and ÒΩT is treated as a non-stochastic matrix.
Let λ be some structural coefficient of interest. The frequentist calibration exercise con-
sists in finding a radius, rT (α), for the Wald ellipsoid such that:
inf
µ∈M infλ∈IR (µ)Pµ

λ ∈ CST (rT (α);λ)

= 1−α.
An algorithm to Calibrate Projection over a grid G: Let d denote the dimension
of µ and let 1−α be the desired confidence level.
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1. Generate a grid of S scalars {r1, r2, . . . , rS} on the interval [0,
Ç
χ2d,1−α]. Each of these
values will serve as the potential ‘radius’ of the Wald ellipsoid for µ. Fix one element
rs.
2. Generate a grid of I values G ≡ {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µI} ∈M ⊆ Rd . Fix an element µi ∈ G.
3. Generate M i.i.d. draws from the model
bµiT,m ∼Nd(µi ,ÒΩT / T).
Let CSmT (rs,λ) denote the confidence interval for λ associated to bµiT,m with radius rs.
Note that in order to compute the confidence interval for λ, ÒΩT is fixed across all
draws.
4. Generate a grid of size K {λi1,λ
i
2, . . . ,λ
i
K} from the identified-set for λ given µi , deno-
ted IR(µi).
5. For each µi compute:
CPT (µi; rs,ÒΩT )≡min
k∈K
1
M
M∑
m=1
1
¦
λk ∈ CSmT (rs;λ)
©
.
6. Report the approximate confidence level of the projection confidence interval with
radius rs as:
ApproxCLT (rs)≡mini∈I CPT (µi; rs,ÒΩT )
7. Find the value in the grid
{ApproxCLT (r1), . . .ApproxCLT (rS)}.
that is the closest to the desired confidence level 1−α. Denote this value by r∗T (α,G).
8. The radius r∗T (α,G) obtained in Step 6 approximates the value rT (α) that calibrates
frequentist projection.
In our application µ ∈ R27, which means that constructing an exhaustive grid for µ is
computationally infeasible. To illustrate the computational demands of frequentist calibration
in the SVAR exercise, consider a grid G that contains only bµT . We follow Step 1 to 5 to adjust
204 | 6 Projection Inference for Set-Identified SVARs
the confidence set for the responses of wages and employment to a structural demand shock
(the first column of Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.4 below reports our calibrated radii, horizon by horizon, for the responses of
wages and employment to an expansionary demand shock. Note that the default radius used
by our projection method is χ227,68% = 29.87.
Figure 6.4. Calibrated radii for the 68% projection region; G = {bµT}
(responses to an expansionary demand shock)
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(a) Radii for Wages (b) Radii for Employment
(Blue Pluses) For each horizon k and each variable i the blue markers in Panel a) and b) correspond
to the calibrated radius rT (α,G) for λk,i, j (as computed in Step 1 to 5). Each radius is computed using
a grid of 16 points ranging from .5 to 5 (S = 16 in Step 1); a grid G containing only bµT (I = 1 in Step
2); 1,000 draws for the reduced-form parameters (J = 1, 000 in Step 3); and a grid of 1,000 points
for λk,i, j (K = 1,000 in Step 4). Generating this figure took approximately 76 hours using 50 parallel
Matlab ‘workers’ on a computer cluster at Bonn University.
Calibrating coverage for a coefficient or a vector of coefficients: One could
modify Step 4 in the algorithm to cover a vector of impulse-response functions, as opposed
to one particular coefficient. In our application, this alternative calibrated radius (over the
grid that contains only bµT ) is 4.21. This radius is designed to cover the vector of responses
for wages and employment to a structural demand shock over the 20 quarters under consi-
deration. Calculating this radius took approximately 57 hours using 50 Matlab workers on a
private computer cluster at Bonn University.²³
The following figure compares the calibrated projection using the horizon by horizon ca-
librated radii against the calibrated projection using a radius of 4.21. The calibration over G
²³ The cluster consists of 16 worker-nodes, where each node comprises 8 virtual CPUs and 32 GB vir-
tual RAM, that is a maximum of 8 workers. Each virtual CPU is the core of a Xeon E7-8837@2.67GHz-
processor.
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implies that the true calibrated radius rT (α) designed to cover the impulse-response functi-
onshould be larger than 4.21.
Figure 6.5. 68% calibrated projection for a frequentist; G = {bµT}
(responses to an expansionary demand shock)
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(a) Cumulative Response of Wages (b) Cumulative Response of Employment
(Solid, Blue Line) 68% Projection region using the default radius χ227,68% = 29.87; (Dash-Dotted,
Blue Line) 68% Calibrated Projection Region using the radius 4.21; (Dashed, Blue Line) 68% Ca-
librated Projection Confidence Region based on the radii in Figure 6.4; (Shaded, Gray Area) 68%
Bayesian Credible Set based on the priors in Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a).
6.A.3 Projection region under differentiability
Let h denote some triplet (k, i, j). This section studies the solution to the mathematical pro-
gram defining the projection region whenever the bounds vh, vh are differentiable at a point
µ in the parameter space (and the derivative at this point is bounded away from zero). We
show that a projection region for the (k, i, j) coefficient of the impulse-response function—
indexed by h—is approximately equal to the delta-method confidence interval suggested in
Gafarov et al. (2015): 
vh(bµT )− r bσhpT , vh(bµT )+ r bσhpT .
This result has two important consequences:
1. Under differentiability, the frequentist calibration of projection is straightforward: it is
sufficient to use the square of the (1−α) quantile of a standard normal as the radius
of the Wald ellipsoid for the reduced-form parameters. For example, if the desired
confidence level is 95%, the radius of the Wald ellipsoid can be set to (1.64)2.
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2. Under differentiability, the radius that removes excess robust Bayesian credibility also
eliminates excess frequentist coverage. Thus, the robust Bayes calibration is also a fre-
quentist calibration.
6.A.3.1 Lemma 1: Projection region and delta-method confidence interval
Notation for this Lemma: For µ ∈ Rp define the ‘delta-method’ type standard errors as:
bσh(µ)≡ v˙h(µ)′ÒΩT v˙h(µ)1/2, bσh(µ)≡ v˙h(µ)′ÒΩT v˙h(µ)1/2.
Define also their population counterparts as:
σh(µ)≡

v˙h(µ)
′Ω v˙h(µ)
1/2
, σh(µ)≡

v˙h(µ)
′Ω v˙h(µ)
1/2
,
where v˙h(µ) denotes the derivative of vh at µ. The function v˙h is defined analogously.
For a positive (or negative) δ ∈ R , consider the expansion (or contraction) of the delta-
method type confidence interval:
DMhT (r,δ) ≡

vh(bµT ) − (r + δ)σh(µ0)pT , vh(bµT ) + (r + δ)σh(µ0)pT , (6.17)
where the standard errors evaluated at µ0 ∈ Rd (the ‘true’ reduced-form parameter). Note
that—up to the term δ—the interval in (6.17) can be interpreted as a ‘delta-method’ plug-
in version of the Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval for a set-identified scalar
parameter. The following result—which is taken from the recent working paper of Montiel-
Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2016) (henceforth, MOPM16)—establishes the relation between
the projection region and the confidence interval in (6.17):
Lemma 1. (Projection and delta-method confidence interval) Suppose that vh and vh are
differentiable at µ0 with nonzero derivative. Fix constants δ > 0,M1 > 0, M2 > 0 and M3 > 0.
Suppose that the data (Y1, . . .YT ) is such that:
1. ||bµT −µ0|| ≤ M1 /pT ,
2. The largest eigenvalue of ÒΩT , denoted λmax(ÒΩT ), is smaller than M2.
3. |bσh(µ0)−σh(µ0)|< δ /(2M3) and |bσh(µ0)−σh(µ0)|< δ /(2M3).
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Then, there exists T(δ,M1,M2,M3) such that for any T ≥ T1(δ,M1,M2,M3) and 0< r ≤
M3:
DMhT (r,−δ) ⊆ CST (r;λh) ⊆ DMhT (r,δ),
where CST (r,λh) is the projection region for the parameter λh based on the Wald ellipsoid of
radius r2. This means that our projection region with radius r2 is approximately equal—in large
samples and under differentiability at µ0—to the delta-method confidence interval in equation
(6.17).
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof of this Lemma is based on the theoretical comparison of
Bonferroni and (rectangular) Wald projection confidence regions established in MOPM16.
We reproduce their argument for the sake of exposition. Note first that one can write vh(µ)
as:
vh(µ) = vh(µ) − vh(bµT ) + vh(bµT )
= vh(µ) − vh(µ0) − (vh(bµT ) − vh(µ0)) + vh(bµT ).
For any µ ∈ Rd define the function∆(µ;µ0)≡ vh(µ)− vh(µ0)− v˙h(µ0)′(µ−µ0). Therefore:
vh(µ) = ∆(µ;µ0) − ∆(bµT ;µ0) + v˙h(µ0)(µ − bµT ) + vh(bµT )
=
∆(µ;µ0)
||µ − µ0|| ||µ − µ0|| −
∆(bµT ;µ0)
||bµT − µ0|| ||bµT − µ0||
+v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) + vh(bµT ).
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Note now that for any µ in the Wald ellipsoid of radius r ≤ M3 (i.e., (bµT −µ)′ÒΩ−1T (bµT −µ)≤
r2 / T) we have that:
||µ − µ0|| ≤ ||µ − bµT || + ||bµT − µ0||
≤ ||µ − bµT || + M1 /pT
(by Assumption a) of the Lemma)
≤ max
{µ | ||ÒΩ−1/2(µ−bµT )||≤r /pT} ||µ − bµT || + M1 /pT
= λmax(ÒΩT )r /pT + M1 /pT
≤ (M2r + M1) /pT
(by Assumption b) of the Lemma)
≤ (M2M3 + M1) /pT
(since r ≤ M3).
By the differentiability of vh at µ0, there exists T1(δ,M1,M2,M3) such that T ≥
T1(δ,M1,M2,M3) implies that:∆(µ;µ0)||µ−µ0||
≤ δσh(µ0)
4(M2M3 +M1)
and
∆(bµT ;µ0)||bµT −µ0||
≤ δσh(µ0)
4M1
.
This implies that for such large T we have that for any µ in the Wald ellipsoid of radius
r ≤ M3, denoted CST (r;µ):
vh(bµT ) + v˙h(µ0)′(µ − bµT ) − δσh(µ0) /2pT
≤ vh(µ)
≤ vh(bµT ) + v˙h(µ0)′(µ − bµT ) + δσh(µ0) /2pT .
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Consequently:
vh(bµT ) + bσh(µ0)r /pT − δσh(µ0) /2pT
= vh(bµT ) + max
µ∈CST (r;µ)

v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) − δσh(µ0) /2pT
(since max
µ∈CST (r;µ)

v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) = bσh(µ0)r /pT)
≤ max
µ∈CST (r;µ)
vh(µ)
(since we have bounded vh(µ) from below)
≤ vh(bµT ) + max
µ∈CST (r;µ)

v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) + δσh(µ0) /2pT
(since we have bounded vh(µ) from above)
= vh(bµT ) + bσh(µ0)r /pT + δσh(µ0) /2pT ,
and, likewise,
vh(bµT ) − bσh(µ0)r /pT − δσh(µ0) /2pT
= vh(bµT ) + min
µ∈CST (r;µ)

v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) − δσh(µ0) /2pT
≤ min
µ∈CST (r;µ)
vh(µ)
≤ vh(bµT ) + min
µ∈CST (r;µ)

v˙h(µ0)
′(µ − bµT ) + δσh(µ0) /2pT
= vh(bµT ) − bσh(µ0)r /pT + δσh(µ0) /2pT .
Finally, note that Assumption c) of the Lemma implies that:
vh(bµT )+σh(µ0)(r −δ) /pT ≤ max
µ∈CST (r;µ)
vh(µ)≤ vh(bµT )+σh(µ0)(r +δ) /pT ,
and
vh(bµT )−σh(µ0)(r +δ) /pT ≤ min
µ∈CST (r;µ)
vh(µ)≤ vh(bµT )−σh(µ0)(r −δ) /pT .
An analogous argument applied to vh(µ) gives the desired result.
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6.A.3.2 Lemma 2: Delta-method interval and a Bernstein-von Mises result
Lemma 1 in the previous subsection will be used to show that calibrating robust Bayesian
credibility also calibrates frequentist coverage. We need an additional Lemma before esta-
blishing the main result.
We want to show that the posterior probability:
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ)− σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ)+ σh(µ0)rpT

, ∀h= 1, . . .H
Y1, . . . ,YT ,
can be approximated by the probability that 2H correlated normals with unit variance fall
below the threshold r. We now show that this approximation result can be applied as a
consequence of the Berstein-von Mises Theorem for the reduced-form parameter µ.
Notation for this Lemma: Let P∗ denote the prior distribution over µ. Let µ∗ denote a
random variable with such distribution. For each index h= 1, . . .H define:
Z
∗
h =
p
T(vh(µ
∗)− vh(bµT )), Z∗h =pT(vh(µ∗)− vh(bµT )).
Let the remainder of the first-order Taylor approximation of vh and vh be defined as:
∆h(µ,µ0)≡ vh(µ)− vh(µ0)− v˙0(µ0)′(µ−µ0),
and
∆h(µ,µ0)≡ vh(µ)− vh(µ0)− v˙0(µ0)′(µ−µ0).
Let Z ∼Nd(0,Ω). Given a radius r > 0 and a constant η > 0 define the function:
ΓH(r,η)
≡ P  −v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η, and v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η, ∀h
− P  −v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η, and v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η, ∀h .
For a given ε > 0 and M > 0 define η(ε,M) as the real-valued function such that:
max
0≤r≤M
ΓH(r,η(ε,M))< ε.
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Lemma 2. LetB(Rd) denote the collection of all Borel sets in Rd . Fix ε > 0,M > 0. Let M1 ≡
M1(ε) be such that:
P(||Z || ≤ M1(ε))= ε/4, Z ∼Nd(0,Ω).
Suppose that for every h= 1, . . .H, the bounds vh and vh are differentiable at µ0 with nonzero
derivative. Suppose that the data (Y1,Y2, . . . ,YT ) is such that:
1.
sup
B∈B(Rd)
P∗  pT(µ∗ − bµT ) ∈ B | Y1, . . . ,YT − P (Z ∈ B)≤ ε/8,
where Z ∼Nd(0,Ω). Then for any 0≤ r ≤ M , there is T2(ε,M) such that for any T ≥ T2(ε,M)
the absolute value of the difference between:
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)

⊆

vh(bµ) − σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ) + σh(µ0)rpT

, ∀h = 1, . . .H
Y1, . . . ,YT
and for Z ∼Nd(0,Ω)
P
 −σh(µ0)r ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r, ∀h = 1, . . .H , (6.18)
is smaller than ε. This means that the credibility of the delta-method region can be approximated
by Equation (6.18).
Proof. We prove the lemma in two parts. The first part establishes an upper bound and the
second one establishes a lower bound.
Part 1:We are interested in the posterior probability:
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ) − σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ) + σh(µ0)rpT

,
∀h ≤ H and ||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1 /pT  Y1, . . . ,YT,
which is the same as:
P∗

−rσh(µ0)≤ Z∗h, Z∗h ≤ rσh(µ0), ∀h≤ H, ||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1 /pT  Y1, . . . ,YT ,
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Write:
vh(µ
∗) − vh(µ0)
= ∆(µ∗,µ0) − ∆(bµT ,µ0) + v˙h(µ0)′(µ∗ − bµT )
=
∆(µ∗,µ0)
||µ∗ − µ0|| ||µ
∗ − µ0|| − ∆(bµT ,µ0)||bµT − µ0|| ||bµT − µ0|| + v˙h(µ0)′(µ∗ − bµT )
Note that if ||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1 /pT , then ||µ∗ −µ0|| ≤ 2M1 /pT . The differentiability assump-
tion implies that there is T2(ε,M) large enough such that for T ≥ T2(ε,M):
||µ−µ0|| ≤ 2M1 /pT =⇒
∆h(µ,µ0) / ||µ−µ0||< η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0) /(4M1)
for all h= 1, . . .H, and
||µ−µ0|| ≤ 2M1 /pT =⇒
∆h(µ,µ0) / ||µ−µ0||< η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0) /(4M1)
for all h= 1, . . .H. Therefore:
−η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0)+ v˙h(µ0)′pT(µ∗ − bµT )≤ Z∗n.
An analogous argument for vh(µ
∗) implies that
Z∗n ≤ η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0)+ v˙h(µ0)′
p
T(µ∗ − bµT ).
Consequently the posterior probability we are interested in, which can be written as:
P∗

−rσh(µ0)≤ Z∗h and Z∗h ≤ rσh(µ0), ∀h≤ H, ||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1 /pT  Y1, . . . ,YT ,
is smaller than or equal:
P∗

(−r − η(ε/2,M))σh(µ0) ≤ v˙h(µ0)′(µ∗ − bµT )
and v˙h(µ0)
′(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r + η(ε/2,M))σh(µ0), ∀h ≤ H  Y1, . . . ,YT.
By Assumption 1 of the Lemma 2, the latter probability is at most:
P

−v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0)≤ r +η
ε
2
,M

and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0)≤ r +η
ε
2
,M

+
ε
8
.
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Assumption 4 of the Lemma (and a further application of Assumption 3 to P∗(||pTµ∗ −bµT || ≤ M1 | Y1, . . . ,YT )) implies that:
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ)− σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ)+ σh(µ0)rpT

,∀h≤ H
 Y1, . . . ,YT ,
≤
P
 − v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η(ε/2,M),
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η(ε/2,M)

+ ε/2. (6.19)
This gives an upper bound to the ‘credibility’of the delta-method region.
Part 2:We now derive a lower bound. Start with the probability
P
 − v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M),
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M),∀h ≤ H
 − ε/2.
Note that the latter probability is smaller than or equal −3ε/8 plus:
P∗
 − v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),
and
v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),∀h ≤ H  Y1, . . . ,YT,
by an application of Assumption 3 of the Lemma. Moreover, the latter probability is bounded
above by:
P∗

− v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),
and
v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),∀h ≤ H, and
||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1p
T
 Y1, . . . ,YT ,
by an application of Assumptions 3 and 4 of the Lemma and the monotonicity of probability
measures. Finally, Assumption 1 and the differentiability of vh at µ0 implies that
Z
∗
n ≤ v˙h(µ0)′
p
T(µ∗ − bµT )+η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0).
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Assumption 2 and analogous argument for vh(µ
∗) implies that
−η(ε/2,M)σh(µ0)+ v˙h(µ0)′
p
T(µ∗ − bµT )≤ Z∗n.
Consequently,
P∗

− v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),
and
v˙h(µ0)
σh(µ0)
′p
T(µ∗ − bµT ) ≤ (r − η(ε/2,M)),
∀h ≤ H, ||µ∗ − bµT || ≤ M1p
T
 Y1, . . . ,YT ,
is bounded above by:
P∗

−rσh(µ0)≤ Z∗h and Z∗h ≤ rσh(µ0), ∀h≤ H
 Y1, . . . ,YT .
We conclude that:
P
 −v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M),
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M)
 − ε/2 (6.20)
≤
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ)− σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ)+ σh(µ0)rpT

,∀h≤ H
 Y1, . . . ,YT .
Conclusion: Equations (6.19) and (6.20) imply that
P
 −v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M),
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r − η(ε/2,M)
 − ε/2
≤
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ)− σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ)+ σh(µ0)rpT

,∀h≤ H
 Y1, . . . ,YT
≤
P
 −v˙h(µ0)′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η(ε/2,M),
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z /σh(µ0) ≤ r + η(ε/2,M)

+ ε/2.
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These bounds, the monotonicity of the probability measure, and the definition of η(ε/2,M)
imply the desired result.
6.A.3.3 Lemma 3: Asymptotic behavior of the radius that calibrates r∗T Bayesian
credibility
The previous lemma showed that for any 0≤ r ≤ M the probability
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ vh(bµ) − σh(µ0)rpT , vh(bµ) + σh(µ0)rpT

,
∀h = 1, . . . ,H
Y1, . . . ,YT
is approximately the same as
P
 −σh(µ0)r ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r, ∀h= 1, . . .H , Z ∼Nd(0,Ω).
Let r1−α−ε denote the ‘critical value’ such that:
P
 −σh(µ0)r1−α−ε ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r1−α−ε, ∀h = 1, . . .H
= 1 − α − ε,
and let r1−α+ε be defined analogously. We now show that if the sample size is large enough
and data satisfies the Assumptions of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 then:
r1−α−ε ≤ r∗T ≤ r1−α+ε.
Lemma 3. Fix ε > 0, M1,M2,M3 > 0. Suppose that the data (Y1, . . . ,YT ) is such that the As-
sumptions of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are satisfied:
1. ||bµT −µ0|| ≤ M1 /pT ,
2. The largest eigenvalue of ÒΩT , denoted λmax(ÒΩT ), is smaller than M2.
3. |bσh(µ0)−σh(µ0)|< η(ε/2,M3) /(2M3) and |bσh(µ0)−σh(µ0)|<
η(ε/2,M3) /(2M3), for all h= 1, . . .H; where η is defined as in Lemma 2.
4. For Z ∼Nd(0,Ω),
sup
B∈B(Rd)
P∗  pT(µ∗ − bµT ) ∈ B | Y1, . . . ,YT − P (Z ∈ B)≤ ε/8, ,
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Then, there is T3(ε,M1,M2,M3) such that for T ≥ T3(ε,M1,M2,M3):
r1−α−ε ≤ r∗T ≤ r1−α+ε,
provided r1−α+ε < M3.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that r1−α+ε +η(ε/2,M3)< M3. Note that
Lemma 1 implies that for T ≥ T1(η(ε/2,M3),M1,M2,M3):
P∗

×Hh=1

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ CST (r1−α−ε,λH)  Y1, . . . ,YT
minus
P
 −σh(µ0)r1−α−ε ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)r1−α−ε, ∀h= 1, . . .H
is bounded above by the sum of two terms. The first term is the difference between
P∗

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ DMhT (r1−α−ε , η(ε/2 , M3)), ∀h≤ HY1, . . . ,YT
and
P
 −σh(µ0)(r1−α−ε + η(ε/2,M3)) ≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z ,
and v˙h(µ0)
′Z ≤ σh(µ0)(r1−α−ε + η(ε/2,M3)), ∀h = 1, . . .H

The second term is the difference between the latter probability and
P
 −σh(µ0)(r1−α−ε)≤ v˙h(µ0)′Z , and v˙h(µ0)′Z ≤ σh(µ0)(r1−α−ε), ∀h= 1, . . .H .
Lemma 2 implies that the magnitude of the first term is bounded above by ε/2 if T ≥
T2(ε/2,M3). The definition of η(·) implies that the second term is bounded above by ε/2.
Therefore, we conclude that:
P∗

×Hh=1

vh(µ
∗), vh(µ∗)
 ⊆ CST (r1−α−ε,λH)  Y1, . . . ,YT− (1−α− ε)≤ ε,
which implies that for T ≥max{T1(η(ε/2,M3),M1,M2,M3), T2(ε/2,M3)}:
r1−α−ε ≤ r∗T ,
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as the credibility of the projection region is monotone in its radius. An analogous argument
implies that for T ≥ T1(η(ε/2,M3),M1,M2,M3):
r1−α−ε ≤ r∗T ≤ r1−α+ε.
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6.A.4 Addenda for implementation
6.A.4.1 SQP/IP vs. global methods
Figure 6.6. Accuracy of SQP/IP for a demand shock
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(a) Wage Response (b) Employment Response
(Square, Blue) Optimal Value reported by SQP/IP minus Optimal Value reported by SQP/IP + Mul-
tistart; (Cross, Blue) Optimal Value reported by SQP/IP minus Optimal Value reported by SQP/IP
+ Global Search; (Circle, Blue) Optimal Value reported by SQP/IP minus Optimal Value repor-
ted by ga.
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6.A.4.2 SQP/IP vs. grid search on CST(1−α,µ)
Figure 6.7. Simulation error in projection region.
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters after shock
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 w
ag
e
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters after shock
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 w
ag
e
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters after shock
-2
0
2
4
6
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters after shock
-2
0
2
4
6
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(a) Expansionary Demand Shock (b) Expansionary Supply Shock
(Solid Line) 68% Projection region using the SQP/IP algorithm described in Section 4; (Connected,
Solid Line) 68% Projection region using a two-step algorithm: 1) Sample M=100,000 reduced form
parameters that satisfy the 68% Wald ellipsoid constraint. 2) For each draw, solve for the identified
set. The smallest and largest value of the identified set is the simulation-based approximation of the
Projection region.
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6.A.4.3 Comparison with the credible set in Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015)
Figure 6.8. 68% Differentiable projection and 68% GK robust credible Set.
(Uhlig (2005) priors)
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(a) Expansionary Demand Shock (b) Expansionary Supply Shock
(Solid, Blue Line) 68% Frequentist Projection Confidence Interval; (Shaded, Gray Area) 68% Bay-
esian Credible Set based on the priors in Uhlig (2005); (Dotted, Blue Line) 68% Calibrated Pro-
jection Confidence Interval. The calibration is implemented assuming differentiability of the bounds
of the identified set and strict set-identification of the structural parameter; (Crosses, Gray) 68%
Robust Credible Set based on Giacomini and Kitagawa (2015) using the priors for the reduced-form
parameters described in Uhlig (2005).
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